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Abstract 
 
This is the reference document of the Workshop on "The discard ban and 
its impact on the Maximum Sustainable Yield objective on fisheries" of 16 
th June 2016, organised by the Committee on Fisheries (COMPECH) and 
the Policy Department B (PECH Research) of the European Parliament. 
It is structured in three parts: 
 
1 The discard ban and its impact on the MSY objective-The North Sea 
 
2. The discard ban and its impact on the MSY objective-The Atlantic 
Ocean: The Bay of Biscay case 
 
3. The discard ban and its impact on the MSY objective-The Baltic Sea 
An Overarching report on the commonalities and differences of the three 
reports is attached. 
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Overarching report 
 
Authors: Raul Prellezo, Sarah Kraak and Clara Ulrich 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The three reports, on the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean (Bay of Biscay), 
have commonalities as well as differences, both in terms of the topics covered and in terms of 
the findings and conclusions. In this document we will highlight these differences and 
commonalities. 
 
First of all, the North Sea report provides helpful background information on the concept of 
MSY, its history, novel extensions of the MSY concept (e.g. MMSY) and their problems. 
Likewise, the Baltic Sea report provides a general section on implementation error and on 
how the behavioural sciences may be of help to reduce this. This general information is 
applicable to all three reports. 
 
The reports on the North Sea and the Bay of Biscay, but not the report on the Baltic Sea, 
include extensive discussion of modelling studies and results. The authors of the Baltic Sea 
report had agreed with the client on forehand that they would not include such modelling 
studies; their arguments for this decision are at the bottom of page 12 of their report. 
 
The reports on the North Sea and the Bay of Biscay, but not the report on the Baltic Sea, 
provide extensive discussion of mixed-fisheries and choke-species aspects (and related 
concepts of pretty good yield (PGY) and F-MSY ranges). The authors of the Baltic Sea 
report did not include these aspects because a report devoted to these matters, commissioned 
by the European Parliament, was already prepared in the summer of 2015. 
 
The report on the Baltic Sea, but not the reports on the North Sea and the Bay of Biscay, 
includes sections on recreational fisheries and other anthropogenic factors. In the case of 
the Bay of Biscay, although, as mentioned in the report, the impact of recreational fishery is 
increasing for some particular stocks, it still cannot be considered as a major factor on the 
ecosystem future evolution. In the North Sea, recreational fisheries and other anthropogenic 
factors are likely important mainly for the English Channel and coastal areas rather than the 
main North Sea.  
 
It can also be noted that there is considerable scientific activity related to the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive and Good Environmental Status, so information on the topic of 
anthropogenic factors is available elsewhere. Furthermore this was not an explicit request in 
the given TORs.  
 
Most of the statements in the North Sea report on biological interactions are also valid for 
the Baltic Sea. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the food web is much simpler in the Baltic 
Sea compared to the North Sea.  
 
On the topic of the impact of reduced discards, the statement that the main threat is from 
increased predation by scavenger seabirds on other seabird species (in the North Sea report) 
is probably not transferable to the Baltic Sea, because the main scavenging seabirds in the 
Baltic are herring gulls, which also feed on dumping sites and are not as big as greater black-
backed gulls or skuas in the North sea. It should also be noted that the amount of discards 
falling under LO is much lower in the Baltic compared with the situation in North Sea. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
All three groups of authors, of the North Sea, Baltic Sea, and Bay of Biscay reports, agree that 
the landings obligation (LO) and catch quotas should provide incentives for change in the 
fisheries, including adaptation through taking up selective gears and spatiotemporal effort 
reallocation, but also quota redistribution within and between member states (swapping). 
However, these incentives will only manifests if the LO and catch quotas are fully enforced. If 
they are not fully enforced, there will be an incentive to continue discarding. Because it is not 
known to what extent the LO and catch quotas will be enforced it is not known whether the 
incentives for change will manifest, and therefore the future behaviour of the fisheries cannot 
be predicted. However, bio-economic models need an assumption on future fishery behaviour. 
Without any evidence of change, the most obvious choice for such an assumption so far is the 
assumption of no change in fishing patterns. Therefore, many models were based on the 
assumption that catchability in the future would be the same as in the recent past. This 
assumption has led to the situation that if one species chokes the fishery the fishing 
opportunities for other species are underutilised. Whether this will in actual fact happen is 
not known. Two other possible outcomes could be the continuation of over quota 
discarding, or adaptive change in fishing patterns leading to a better balance between 
quotas and catches. However, predictions of these outcomes cannot be quantified because no 
justifiable assumption on fisher behaviour can be made. 
 
The Baltic Sea report contains a chapter on important aspects regarding governance and 
drivers of (non-) compliance. This part is largely generic and the considerations given can 
apply to most fisheries. 
 
The table below summarizes some commonalities and differences between the reports 
 
 
Baltic Sea North Sea 
Atlantic Ocean 
(Bay of Biscay) 
 Characteristics of the area analyzed 
Structure of the 
ecosystem 
Relatively simple. Relatively 
Complex. 
Relatively Complex. 
Fishing fleet Relatively Simple Relatively 
Complex 
Relatively Complex 
 Objectives covered 
Objectives in 
fisheries  
Multispecies approach Mixed fisheries 
approach and LO 
Mixed fisheries 
approach and LO 
Objectives in 
management 
Stability of yield. 
Minimization of the 
implementation error. 
 
F ranges  
LO 
 
Stability of yield. 
F ranges  
LO 
 
Drivers in ecosystem 
impacts 
Eutrophication, pollution, 
coastal degradation, 
species introduction and 
climate change. 
Not considered.                                                                    Not considered. 
 
 
 
LO LO LO 
Other  Objectives 
covered 
Impact of recreational 
fisheries 
Not considered     
                                                                 
 
Not considered                                                                    
Mentioned the
growing impact of 
recreational fisheries 
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Results 
Results at stocks  There is no biological 
optimal solution. 
Including recreational 
fisheries is important. 
  
Results at stocks 
level of LO 
Slightly higher biomass Fishing 
mortalities 
below FMSY. 
LO not fully 
evaluated 
Fishing mortalities 
below FMSY. 
LO not fully 
evaluated 
Results at fleet level 
of LO 
Not considered Economic 
consequences 
very variable 
across fleet 
segments. 
Not easy to 
anticipate fleet 
reaction 
Economic 
consequences very 
variable across fleet 
segments. 
Not easy to 
anticipate fleet 
reaction 
Results at 
ecosystem level of 
LO 
Effects of discards are 
little known, but amount 
of discards is relatively 
small. 
Might not threaten 
scavengers. 
Effects on benthos 
unknown 
Effects of 
discards are 
little known. 
Might not 
threaten 
scavengers. 
Effects of discards 
are little known. 
Might threaten 
scavengers. 
Results from the 
implementation side 
Fully documented 
fisheries (FDF) and not 
FDF should be treated 
differently. Complex top-
down control and lack of 
trust undermine intrinsic 
motivation of fishermen 
to comply with 
regulations. 
Recommendations to 
increase this intrinsic 
motivation. 
Briefly 
considered 
Not considered 
Recommendations 
Recommendation 
from the objectives 
side 
Include other objectives 
than MSY, e.g. stability 
of yield. 
Prioritize: MSY is 
the most 
important goal. 
Acknowledge the 
variable nature 
of it.  
Consider the 
ecosystem as whole 
system 
Make room to the 
economic and social 
objectives 
Increase the number 
of assessed stocks 
Focus management 
more on the mixed 
and multispecies 
characteristic of the 
fishery. 
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Recommendation 
from the governance 
side 
Use findings from 
behavioral sciences.  
Increase self-decision. 
Increase trust by e.g. 
simpler legislation. 
Transition to it may take 
many years. 
 No 
Recommendation 
from the institutional 
side 
Incentivize the 
organization of fishers 
into groups.  Allow for 
several levels of 
organization to choose 
from and allow for self-
selecting of group 
membership. 
Smart and 
transparent use 
of MSY ranges. 
Keep the 
institutional 
sustainability 
and reactivity. 
Support the 
legitimacy of 
landing 
obligation 
Be precautionary 
Define MSY in a 
flexible way. 
Adaptability can 
boost unexpected 
opportunities. 
Focus not only in 
simulation but in 
data quality. 
EBM is not more 
risky than current 
Fisheries 
management 
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North Sea fisheries are characterised by numerous biological and 
technical interactions, which create difficulties in identifying MSY targets 
and achieving those for all stocks simultaneously. The landing obligation 
may reinforce these issues, as ‘choke’ effects might be triggered by the 
least productive stocks. A flexible management approach can help 
achieve the multiple objectives, but this requires trade-offs to be made. 
The ecological benefits of reducing fishing mortality are likely larger than 
those from the landing obligation itself. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
The provisions of the reformed Europe´s Fisheries Policy (CFP) reflected in the Regulation (EU) 
No 1380/2013 sets the stage for fishery managers and stakeholders to take the initiative and 
responsibility to complement and implement plans for managing fisheries within their region. 
For the purpose of implementing the provisions of the CFP, the discard ban and the MSY 
objective, and to facilitate management by these parties, relevant knowledge needs to be 
developed, accessed and deployed in each regional context.  
 
The European Parliament's Committee on PECH wishes to commission a research study on the 
topic, and at regional level one of them is: "The North Sea- The discard ban and its impact on 
the MSY objective". 
 
Aim 
The study-in depth will conduct in EU waters in the Atlantic Ocean/North Sea/Baltic Sea, a 
specific case- study, to get the relevant knowledge to implement the discard plans and 
multiannual plans, managing the harvested stocks to levels that can produce the MSY, taking 
into account the ecosystem. 
 
The study will be based on the best suitable existing data for the bio-economic model, 
obtained from the fishing fleets operating in the marine area defined for the case-study 
 
The approach will be through the scientific models available to simulate biological marine 
scenarios in order to obtain different practical options. 
 
The study will conduct a summary report of the state for the art scientific knowledge on the 
above objectives and describe and analyse the following topics: 
 
1.  A summary of the current state of MSY modelling in the region, including  specific outcomes 
and main conclusions The summary will identify and analyse objectives, stocks and fleets, 
interactions, uncertainties, according to the indicators used. It will also produce an 
assessment of those elements not included and their likely influence in reaching the 
objectives of the CFP in the short and medium term. 
 
2.  A quantitative bio-economic analysis based on a case-study in the region on the likely 
consequences of the landing obligation regarding the objectives of the CFP, specially the 
MSY. For this purpose, different scenarios and/or practical options should be identified and 
assessed, considering risks, uncertainties and the main interactions. 
 
3.  A qualitative and if possible quantitative assessment of the main impacts that landing 
obligation in the context of the MSY may have in the whole ecosystem of the region, 
identifying and analysing the related uncertainties.  
 
4.  Based on these analyses, recommendations will be made to the European Parliament 
providing the knowledge on the best way to implement the discards plans and multiannual 
plans according to the different scenarios at regional level. 
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Main findings 
This report summarises a vast amount of scientific knowledge developed by several North 
Sea research institutes over time, bringing the most up-to-date findings across the various 
Terms of Reference. 
 
The North Sea is a particularly interesting area for fisheries science, with regards to two 
features: (i) its complexity, which raises important issues and triggers questions, and (ii) 
the quantity and quality of knowledge and data available, which allow in depth analyses 
and the emergence of new thinking. The state of the main stocks is fairly well known. The 
fishing mortality on the main stocks has decreased significantly since the beginning of the XXIst 
century and the biomass has increased, but the recruitment remains poor compared to 
historical observations.  
 
The area is characterised by its multiple biological (predator-prey) and technical (mixed-
fisheries) interactions, and both types have been extensively studied over time. There are 
many models of medium complexity available, which focus on different aspects and processes 
of the North Sea ecosystem and of the fisheries that exploit it. The reductions in fishing effort 
mean that natural mortality is becoming a major source of mortality in the North Sea, 
and the stock dynamics are increasingly influenced by natural processes and not by fisheries 
only. 
 
Regarding the current state of MSY modelling in the region, it is noted that the North 
Sea has traditionally been the most studied and modelled area in European fisheries, but 
efforts to define and estimate MSY have been intensified over the last five years. The 
productivity and growth of North Sea stocks is variable, not least with significant decreases in 
the last two decades potentially linked to climate change. As a consequence MSY and FMSY for a 
single stock can vary considerably across various combinations of biological parameters. A 
generic framework has been developed to estimate an average long-term FMSY for the main 
stocks. This framework has shown that similar high and sustainable long-term yields can 
potentially be achieved with different values of fishing mortality.  
 
The concept of MSY in a wider North Sea ecosystem and/or mixed-fisheries regional approach 
is much more complex. Issues in identifying MSY beyond the single-stock concept are both 
a matter of definition (how to define Yield, Maximum and Sustainable when there are many 
variable and interacting stocks?) and a matter of quantification (which processes and 
assumptions are included in the various models available?). A lot of these questions have been 
investigated during the EU FP7 research project MYFISH1. Three different definitions of MSY 
have been quantified and compared (MSY in tonnage MSYw, MSY in monetary value 
MSYv, and MEY, maximum net present value) when accounting for three different 
processes (biological predator-prey relationships; technical interactions in mixed-fisheries; and 
interactions with sensitive bycatch species). A main outcome was that MSYw may lead to 
undesirable outcomes such as loss in profit and conflicts with environmental constraints. MEY 
seems to be a more appropriate concept to cover wider objectives, but would come at the cost 
of lower fishing effort and thus employment.  
 
                                           
1 www.myfishproject.eu 
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These trade-offs led to the idea that a “Pretty Good Yield” (PGY) (Or Optimum Yield OY) 
concept may be more suitable instead of trying to define and reach the absolute maximum. 
The PGY means that a part of the maximum yield could be traded off against the achievement 
of the other objectives, in particular with regards to mixed-fisheries conflicts in the frame of 
regional management plans and the landing obligation. Single-stock PGY has been 
operationalised through FMSY ranges providing at least 95% of the maximum yield, but ICES 
emphasizes that fishing above FMSY bears some ecological and economic costs. 
 
Regarding a quantitative bio economic analysis on the likely consequences of the 
landing obligation, the linkages between MSY and the landing obligation are first 
investigated. It is argued that the landing obligation is not a direct mean to achieve MSY, 
but rather an objective in itself. Several North Sea stocks are already fished at FMSY in 
spite of sometimes important discards. Many bio-economic impact assessments have been 
performed on several North Sea mixed-fisheries fleets. They mainly highlight the impact of 
“choke species”, where the early TAC exhaustion of the least productive stock (which can be 
either a target e.g. cod, sole or whiting or a bycatch e.g. turbot) or of a stock with limited 
historical fishing rights in the region (e.g. hake) would lead to fishery closure and under-
exploitation of the more productive stocks. The increased fishing costs are also estimated. The 
various policy adjustments possible in the frame of the landing obligation can though 
mitigate or even nullify the short-term negative economic impact for some fleets. Additionally, 
it is noted that with the recovery of the North Sea cod, some “choke effects” might be less 
severe than predicted by the available economic models. 
 
There are many ways by which fishers could improve their fishing patterns to better adjust to 
fishing opportunities. Many options already exist, and new industry-led solutions could be 
developed. But proper mechanisms incentivising them to do so are needed; otherwise the 
risks of non-compliance are real. At this stage, it is thus not possible to predict how the 
fishing industry will actually react, as the voluntary uptake of selective gears has historically 
been limited. New empirical experience will be gained over the next five years.  
 
Regarding an assessment of the main ecosystem impacts of the landing obligation, it 
is noted that the scientific knowledge is still uncertain. Seabirds and benthic scavengers 
are the main populations feeding on discards, but the cascading effects further up in the 
foodweb are limited. It is considered that the populations of scavengers are potentially rather 
large. So it is assumed that they might be able to buffer the food shortage linked to the 
landing obligation; although some studies have pointed out that a gradual reduction of 
discards might be better for the ecosystem stability than an abrupt elimination. The main 
threat identified is whether the opportunistic scavengers will increase predation and 
domination on more sensitive species, mainly among seabirds. It is suspected that Nephrops 
stocks could have been enhanced by fish discards, but the scientific evidence for this is weak 
and observations are scarce.  
 
More generally, the landing obligation has fuelled an important scientific debate regarding 
whether selective fishing on adults is ecologically preferable to the catching of juveniles in a 
“balanced harvesting” approach. This question is still unresolved, and balanced harvesting is 
probably not fully operational technically and economically in mixed fisheries like those in the 
North Sea. Nevertheless, this challenges the established paradigm of concentrating fishing 
mortality on few adult age classes of few commercial species. Ultimately, it is argued that the 
most important ecological benefits are obtained by limiting fishing mortality (and thus fishing 
effort) in the first place. A low fishing mortality reduces the importance of other factors 
such as size- and species-selectivity. 
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Regarding recommendations, we argue that MSY is and remains the most important CFP 
objective for sustainable European fisheries, in spite of the many criticisms raised against it. 
But we acknowledge its fuzzy and variable nature, especially when considered at the scale of 
the entire eco-region. This require some policy trade-offs to be made when it is not 
possible to achieve all ecological, economic and social objectives at the same time.  
 
We acknowledge that the MSY ranges can be a pragmatic formal frame buffering the worst 
negative impacts when choke effects occur in mixed-fisheries. It could potentially improve the 
governance around the annual TAC setting compared to the situation observed with e.g. North 
Sea cod over the last few years. Nevertheless, it is understood that TACs should not be 
blindly and systematically set at the Fupper level, which would not solve the basic mixed-
fisheries issues. We recommend following a smart and transparent use, and suggestions for 
these are explored briefly. One option might be for example to choose FMSY as the default 
option for setting the annual fishing opportunities, and to allow for deviation from it within the 
range only on the basis of obvious and documented short-term conflicts (ecological, 
economic, social or political). 
 
Ultimately, we consider that in the light of the many uncertainties facing European fisheries 
during the transition years from now to 2020, it is likely appropriate to ensure that in any 
case, fishing effort should not increase back to the high levels observed up to a decade ago, 
which would surely prevent reaching any of the CFP objectives. 
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1. GENERAL INFORMATION 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The North Sea is a data-rich area with a large amount of data and models available 
 ICES provides information on 55 stocks in the North Sea ecoregion, of which 22 are 
assessed using a full analytical assessment and 14 are assessed with biomass trends 
from scientific surveys only. 12 of the stocks with full assessment were assessed to be 
above MSY Btrigger in 2015.  
 In 2015, discard information was available for most of the stocks.  
 The North Sea fisheries can be characterised by many complex interactions, both 
biologically (predator-prey relationships) and technically (species being caught 
together in mixed fisheries).  
 Because of this, the North Sea fisheries have long been considered at regional level in 
addition to single-stock assessment. 
1.1. A complex area with high level of scientific knowledge 
The North Sea is a particularly interesting area for fisheries science, with regards to two 
features: (i) its complexity, which raises important issues and triggers questions, and (ii) 
the quantity and quality of knowledge and data available, which allow in depth analyses 
and the emergence of new thinking. The area is characterised by its multiple biological 
(predator-prey) and technical (mixed-fisheries) interactions, and both types have been 
extensively studied over time. The North Sea has therefore long been apprehended at its large 
regional scale and not only as a suite of independent stocks to be managed individually. This 
global understanding has triggered the development of many scientific models, which all 
build on the same broad principles of population dynamics, but which also have conceptualised 
and explored the interactions in multiple and diverse ways; none of these models being able to 
capture the full diversity and complexity of the processes driving the North Sea ecosystem, but 
only a subset.  
 
One of the challenges in this current study has thus been to synthetize a very vast 
amount of scientific knowledge developed by scientists from numerous institutions from 
the eight countries surrounding the North Sea, across widely different fields of fisheries and 
marine science. No new specific modelling work has been developed for this study; rather, 
salient results have been selected from the existing published literature and many ICES 
reports. The tables and figures presented below are therefore picked up from a variety of 
independent studies and models, and are not always directly comparable with each other. 
Incidentally, this diversity of scientific investigations is another important source of complexity 
in itself. One the one hand, having a fair amount of different models is a great advantage 
as this allows critical evaluation of models’ assumptions and a more complete understanding of 
the uncertainties associated with outcomes. On the other hand, it makes it sometimes difficult 
for the scientific community to convey a simple and unique message. In this sense, the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) plays a fundamental role in 
bringing this vast knowledge together and operationalising it for useful advice. 
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Most of the work on MSY presented here draws knowledge from the FP7 EU Project MYFISH2 
(Maximising yield of fisheries while balancing ecosystem, economic and social concerns, Grant 
Agreement 289257), that started in 2012 and finished in February 2016. This study represents 
therefore a synthesis of the most recent state-of-the art knowledge on MSY in the North Sea 
region. Additionally, insights on the landing obligation are being gathered as part of the 
ongoing H2020 EU Project DiscardLess3 (Strategies for the gradual elimination of discards in 
the European fisheries, Grant Agreement 633680, 2015-2019). As a consequence some of the 
work presented here refers to most recent studies that are not published yet or are still 
ongoing. Other studies not related to these two projects are presented, but this review might 
not be a fully exhaustive list of the scientific knowledge available. 
1.2. MSY, FMSY and BMSY 
In the following document, we will systematically refer to the following definitions as used by 
ICES4: 
 
BMSY:  Spawning stock biomass (SSB) that results from fishing at FMSY for a long time 
FMSY:  Fishing mortality consistent with achieving Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) 
MSY:  Maximum Sustainable Yield: the largest average catch or yield that can continuously 
be taken from a stock under existing environmental conditions.  
 
ICES does not estimate BMSY though, because of long controversies on this reference point. 
Until fishing has been stabilised long enough at FMSY to get a better knowledge of the actual 
productivity of stocks at lower exploitation rates, which would allow a more reliable estimate of 
BMSY, ICES rather refers to BFMSY.  
If not specified, the generic term “MSY modelling” refers to the global approach of 
identifying MSY, FMSY and/or BfMSY using scientific models. Otherwise, the expressions 
“achieving MSY” or “being at MSY” refer to the objective of the Common Fishery Policy to 
achieve the maximum sustainable yield exploitation rate for all stocks (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, 2013), and they are thus expressed in term of fishing 
mortality F compared to FMSY.  
1.3. Overview of North Sea stocks 
In 2015, ICES provided information on 55 stocks in the North Sea ecoregion (Table 1). The 
stocks are categorised according to the type of assessment model used to produce their catch 
advice, which itself depends upon the quality and the quantity of biological and fishery data 
available. This categorisation has commonly been referred to the DLS (Data-Limited Stocks) 
categories (NB this labelling is expected to be renamed differently in 2016), ranging from 1 to 
6 (ICES, 2015a). In the North Sea ecoregion, 22 stocks are assessed analytically (i.e. with a 
full quantitative assessment model and a forecast, DLS Category 1) and 14 are assessed with 
biomass trends from scientific surveys only (DLS Category 3.2). The rest is assessed on the 
basis of catch data only. At present, ICES provides MSY-based advice only for the stocks of 
categories 1 and 2. Advice for the other categories is still based on the Precautionary Approach 
(see chapter 2.2.2). 12 stocks of category 1 were assessed to be above MSY Btrigger in 
2015, and 6 were estimated below. 4 stocks have an undefined MSY Btrigger. 
 
 
 
                                           
2 www.myfishproject.eu 
3 www.discardless.eu, 
4 http://www.ices.dk/community/Documents/Advice/Acronyms_and_terminology.pdf 
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Table 1.  List of stocks assessed by ICES in 2015 in the North Sea Sea EcoRegion, 
together with the DLS assessment category.  
For the stocks of category 1 (full assessment), the DLS colour highlights the biomass level relative to MSYBtrigger 
according to the ICES Advice in 2015. Green: Above MSY Btrigger. Red: Below MSY Btrigger. Darker Grey: MSY Btrigger 
undefined.  
 
STOCK 
CODE 
SPECIES SCIENTIFIC 
NAME 
ICES STOCK NAME DLS 
bll-nsea   Brill Scophthalmus 
rhombus 
Brill in Subarea IV and Divisions IIIa and 
VIId,e 
3.20 
cod-347d   Cod Gadus morhua Cod in Subarea IV (North Sea) and 
Divisions VIId (Eastern Channel) and IIIa 
West (Skagerrak) 
1.00 
cod-kat   Cod Gadus morhua Cod in Division IIIa East (Kattegat) 3.20 
dab-nsea   Dab Limanda limanda Dab in Subarea IV and Division IIIa  3.20 
fle-nsea   Flounder Platichthys flesus Flounder in Division IIIa and Subarea IV 3.20 
gug-347d   Grey gurnard Eutrigla gurnardus Grey gurnard in Subarea IV (North Sea) 
and Divisions VIId (Eastern Channel) and 
IIIa (Skagerrak–Kattegat) 
3.2q 
had-346a Haddock Melanogrammus 
aeglefinus 
Haddock in Subarea IV and Divisions VIa 
and IIIa West  (North Sea, West of 
Scotland, Skagerrak)  
1.00 
her-3a22 Herring Clupea harengus Herring in Division IIIa and Subdivisions 
22–24 (western Baltic spring spawners) 
1.00 
her-47d3 Herring Clupea harengus Herring in Subarea IV and Divisions IIIa 
and VIId (North Sea autumn spawners) 
1.00 
hom-nsea Horse 
mackerel 
Trachurus 
trachurus 
Horse mackerel in Divisions IIIa, IVb,c, 
and VIId (North Sea stock) 
5.20 
lem-nsea Lemon sole Microstomus kitt Lemon sole in Subarea IV and Divisions 
IIIa and VIId  
3.20 
mur-347d Striped red 
mullet 
Mullus surmuletus Striped red mullet in Subarea IV (North 
Sea) and Divisions VIId (Eastern English 
Channel) and IIIa (Skagerrak–Kattegat) 
3.20 
nep-10 Norway 
lobster 
Nephrops 
norvegicus 
Nephrops in Noup (FU 10) 4.14 
nep-32 Norway 
lobster 
Nephrops 
norvegicus 
Nephrops in the Norwegian Deep (FU 32) 4.14 
nep-33 Norway 
lobster 
Nephrops 
norvegicus 
Nephrops off Horn’s Reef (FU 33) 4.14 
nep-34 Norway 
lobster 
Nephrops 
norvegicus 
Nephrops in Devil’s Hole (FU 34) 4.14 
nep-3-4 Norway 
lobster 
Nephrops 
norvegicus 
Nephrops in Division IIIa 1.00 
nep-5 Norway 
lobster 
Nephrops 
norvegicus 
Nephrops in Botney Gut–Silver Pit (FU 5) 4.14 
nep-6 Norway 
lobster 
Nephrops 
norvegicus 
Nephrops in Farn Deeps (FU 6) 1.00 
nep-7 Norway 
lobster 
Nephrops 
norvegicus 
Nephrops in Fladen Ground (FU 7) 1.00 
nep-8 Norway 
lobster 
Nephrops 
norvegicus 
Nephrops in Firth of Forth (FU 8) 1.00 
nep-9 Norway 
lobster 
Nephrops 
norvegicus 
Nephrops in Moray Firth (FU 9) 1.00 
nep-oth-4 Norway 
lobster 
Nephrops 
norvegicus 
Norway lobster (Nephrops spp.) in Division 
IV, outside the Functional Units (North 
Sea) 
5.00 
nop-34 Norway pout Trisopterus 
esmarkii  
Norway pout in Subarea IV (North Sea) 
and Division IIIa (Skagerrak–Kattegat) 
1.00 
pan-flad Northern 
shrimp/ prawn 
Pandalus borealis Northern shrimp in Division IVa (Fladen 
Ground) 
6.30 
pan-sknd Northern 
shrimp/ prawn 
Pandalus borealis Northern shrimp in Divisions IIIa and IVa 
East (Skagerrak and Norwegian Deep) 
1.00 
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ple-eche Plaice Pleuronectes 
platessa 
Plaice in Division VIId (Eastern Channel) 1.00 
ple-nsea Plaice Pleuronectes 
platessa 
Plaice in Subarea IV (North Sea) and 
division IIIaN (Skagerrak) 
1.00 
pol-nsea Pollack Pollachius 
pollachius 
Pollack in Subarea IV and Division IIIa 5.20/ 
3.14 
raj-347d Other skates 
and rays 
Rajadai Other skates and rays in the North sea 
ecoregion (Subarea IV, and Divisions IIIa 
and VIId) 
6.20 
rjb-34 Common 
skates 
Dipturus spp. Common skate in Subarea IV and Division 
IIIa (North Sea and Skagerrak) 
6.30 
rjc-347d Thornback ray  Raja clavata Thornback ray in Subarea IV, and Divisions 
IIIa and VIId (North Sea, Skagerrak, 
Kattegat and eastern English Channel) 
3.20 
rjh-4c7d Blonde ray Raja brachyura Blonde ray in Divisions IVc and VIId 
(Southern North Sea and eastern English 
Channel) 
5.20 
rjm-347d Spotted ray Raja montagui Spotted ray in Subarea IV, and Divisions 
IIIa and VIId (North Sea, Skagerrak, 
Kattegat, and Eastern English Channel) 
5.20q 
rjn-34 Cuckoo ray Leucoraja naevus Cuckoo ray in Subarea IV and Division IIIa 
(North Sea and Skagerrak and Kattegat) 
3.20 
rjr-234 Starry ray Amblyraja radiata Starry ray in Subareas II, IIIa and IV 
(Norwegian Sea, Skagerrak, Kattegat and 
North Sea) 
3.1.5 
sai-3a46 Saithe Pollachius virens Saithe in Subarea IV (North Sea), Division 
IIIa (Skagerrak), and Subarea VI (West of 
Scotland and Rockall) 
1.00 
san-ns1 Sandeel Ammodytes spp. Sandeel in the Dogger Bank area (SA 1) 1.00 
san-ns2 Sandeel Ammodytes spp. Sandeel in the South Eastern North Sea 
(SA 2) 
1.00 
san-ns3 Sandeel Ammodytes spp. Sandeel in the Central Eastern North Sea 
(SA 3) 
1.00 
san-ns4 Sandeel Ammodytes spp. Sandeel in the Central Western North Sea 
(SA 4) 
3.20 
san-ns5 Sandeel Ammodytes spp. Sandeel in the Viking and Bergen Bank 
areas (SA 5) 
5.30 
san-ns6 Sandeel Ammodytes spp. Sandeel in Division IIIa East (Kattegat, SA 
6) 
5.20 
san-ns7 Sandeel Ammodytes spp. Sandeel in the Shetland area (SA 7) 5.30 
sol-eche Sole Solea solea Sole in Division VIId (Eastern Channel)  1.00 
sol-kask Sole Solea solea Sole in Division IIIa and Subdivisions 22–
24 (Skagerrak, Kattegat, and the Belts 
1.00 
sol-nsea Sole Solea solea Sole in Subarea IV (North Sea) 1.00 
spr-kask Sprat Sprattus sprattus Sprat in Division IIIa (Skagerrak – 
Kattegat) 
3.20 
spr-nsea Sprat Sprattus sprattus Sprat in Subarea IV (North Sea) 1.00 
syc-347d Lesser-spotted 
dogfish 
Scyliorhinus 
canicula 
Lesser-spotted dogfish in Subarea IV, and 
Divisions IIIa and VIId (North Sea, 
Skagerrak, Kattegat, and Eastern English 
Channel) 
3.20 
tur-kask Turbot Scophthalmus 
maximus  
Turbot in Division IIIa 3.20 
tur-nsea Turbot Scophthalmus 
maximus  
Turbot in Subarea IV  3.20 
whg-47d Whiting Merlangius 
merlangus 
Whiting in Subarea IV (North Sea) and 
Division VIId (Eastern Channel) 
1.00 
whg-kask Whiting Merlangius 
merlangus 
Whiting in Division IIIa (Skagerrak – 
Kattegat) 
5.20 
wit-nsea Witch Glyptocephalus 
cynoglossus 
Witch in Subarea IV and Divisions IIIa and 
VIId 
3.20 
Source: ICES. See (ICES, 2015a) for further info on the categories. 
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The information on discards has improved over the years. In 2015, the ICES advice included 
discards considerations for most stocks. In the North Sea, eleven stocks of category 1 have 
now discards included in the analytical assessments, and seven of them have had that for 
more than ten years. For these seven stocks, the summed discard ratio has been around 20-
25% since 2010, against 30-35% in the period 2004-2010 (Source: ICES database5).  
 
An important feature in the North Sea is that fishing mortality has strongly reduced since the 
beginning of the XXIst century for all demersal stocks (Error! Reference source not found.), 
and the summed stock biomass has increased in response. Nevertheless, the productivity 
(recruitment and recruitment-per-unit of SSB) has regularly decreased, and is still now at a 
very low level compared to historical observations (Gascuel et al., 2014; ICES, 2015b).  
 
Figure 1.  Trends in stock‐based indicators for all assessed North Sea stocks: mean 
fishing mortality F (a), total spawning stock biomass SSB (b, in thousand 
tonnes) and the mean recruitment index R (column c, relative value to 
the 1990–2000 average). 
 
 
The red line refers to all stocks assessed in 2012, while the blue line is the longest available 
time series including at least 60% of assessed stocks. 
Source: (Gascuel et al., 2014) 
1.4. An overview of the interactions influencing MSY in the North 
Sea  
1.4.1. Biological interactions 
 
The knowledge on foodweb is developed by the ICES Working Group on Multispecies 
Assessment Methods WGSAM. The North Sea is characterized by many and strong biological 
interactions (Figure 6), which are quantified using the SMS model parameterized on historical 
stomachs samples for the main commercial species (Lewy and Vinther, 2004). This knowledge 
has been summarized in the ICES multi species considerations for North Sea stocks (ICES, 
2013) as follows:  
  
Top predators form an important part of the food web, including numerous charismatic 
species such as seabirds and marine mammals that eat fish. Within the fish community a 
number of fish eat other fish, and some of those spend only part of their time in the North 
Sea. The fish species can be divided into four categories: forage (prey) fish, fish that eat 
small fish, benthic-feeding fish, and fish that eat large fish (top predators). Forage fish feed 
on plankton in the water column. The majority of forage fish are also targeted directly by the 
fishery (herring, sandeel, sprat, Norway pout). Together with typical forage fish, juvenile 
gadoids are also an important food source in the North Sea food web. Fish that eat small fish 
belong to a wide range of species, including some that are targeted by fisheries (e.g. whiting, 
haddock), some that are only occasionally landed (e.g. grey gurnard, starry ray), and some 
that enter the North Sea only in specific seasons (e.g. western horse mackerel and mackerel). 
                                           
5 http://www.ices.dk/marine-data/tools/Pages/stock-assessment-graphs.aspx. 
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Benthic-feeding fish include all kinds of flatfish that feed on prey in or near the bottom. The 
majority of flatfish species only eat a small amount of commercially important fish species and 
are not considered as important fish predators. Fish that eat large fish are mainly large cod 
and saithe, which also have almost all other fish in their diet. Elasmobranchs (e.g. spurdog) 
are also important top predators in the North Sea foodweb, but the abundance of most species 
is currently at a low level and data on their diet is scarce, so they have not been included in 
the model.  
 
A very important feature is that due to a successful reduction in fishing mortality for many 
stocks, natural mortality is becoming a dominant source of mortality in the North Sea. 
This means that the stock dynamics are increasingly influenced by natural processes and not 
by fisheries only. Understanding the role of other non-fish top predators, such as seals and 
cetaceans, is also important, particularly since these predator populations are expected to 
increase further. 
 
Figure 2.  Overview of the important predators and prey in the North Sea SMS 
model foodweb. 
 
 
 
Other fish include grey gurnard, North Sea and western horse mackerel, and starry ray. Seabirds include 
fulmar, gannet, great black-backed gull, guillemot, herring gull, kittiwake, puffin, and razorbill. Seals and 
porpoises include grey seal and harbour porpoise. An “Other food” pool with constant biomass is included 
in the model to represent all prey types that are found in the stomachs but that are not modeled 
explicitly (e.g., crustaceans, mollusks, other prey fish).The colour of the line indicates which predator the 
species is eaten by, the thickness of the line Indicates the biomass removed in this interaction (average 
from 1963 to 2010).  
Source: (ICES, 2013), Figure 6.3.1.1 
1.4.2. Technical interactions 
 
The technical interactions among fishing units are mainly described and monitored in the ICES 
Working Group on Mixed Fisheries, WGMIXFISH. Data on catch and effort for the various types 
of fishing activities are collected annually. Distinction is made between the fleet segment, 
which describes a group of vessels, and the métier, which describes a type of activity (e.g. a 
given gear and mesh size targeting a given group of species). Typically, a vessel would belong 
to only one fleet, but may engage in several métiers over one year. These two concepts 
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provide a convenient medium layer between considering all fishing together without  
accounting for their diversity, and monitoring each vessel individually  (Ulrich et al., 2012). 
North Sea fisheries are very diverse, and often very mixed (i.e. métiers catch several 
different species). As the lowest level of vessels aggregation, ICES uses a segmentation by 
country (nine categories), gear type (four categories), vessel length class (four categories), 
and with additional provision for Fully Documented Fleets. This leads to a total number of 39 
fleet segments. These fleets engage in one to five different métiers (different mesh size) 
and/or areas (including North Sea, Skagerrak or Eastern Channel) each, resulting in 105 
combinations of fleet*métier*area targeting cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, plaice, sole and 
Nephrops (ICES, 2015c), and catching also a great diversity of other  bycatch. These 
numerous combinations can naturally be aggregated into fewer categories for easing the 
display and the interpretation of results. The Figure 3 illustrates this diversity, emphasizing the 
number of target species caught by each fleet.  
 
Figure 3.  Technical interactions in the North Sea demersal fisheries, based on 2014 
catches by fleet aggregated over vessel length classes. The colour of 
arrows is proportional to the share of total catches by species taken by 
each fleet.  
 
 
WHG: Whiting; TUR: Turbot; SOL:  Sole; POK: Saithe; PLE: Plaice; NEP: Nephrops; HAD: Haddock; COD: 
Cod. 
Source : DTU Aqua, (ICES, 2015c) data 
 
The major impact of technical interactions is that they may prevent reaching MSY for all 
stocks at the same time, since the FMSY for the different stocks correspond to different levels 
of fishing effort. Conceptually, this implies that the fleets may either be constrained by the 
stock with the smallest relative quota, the “choke stock”. The choke stock can be the least 
productive stock (which can be either a target e.g cod, sole or whiting or a bycatch e.g. turbot) 
or the stock with quota imbalance compared to historical right allocations (e.g. hake). The 
fleets would either not be allowed to fully exploit the more productive ones, or would 
exploit (and possibly discard) the choke stock above its FMSY level in order to maximise the 
economic returns from the other stocks. This dilemma is the cornerstone of all mixed-
fisheries models (see also section 3 Tor 2 below), and has been formalised by ICES since 
2009 in the form of an annual advice on mixed-fisheries (Figure 4), which quantify the risk of 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
 28 
not achieving the single-stock management objectives because of the risks of over quota 
catches (ICES, 2015d; Ulrich et al., 2011):  
 
 
Figure 4.  Standard plot of ICES mixed fisheries advice. Estimates of potential 
catches (in tonnes) for 2016 by stock and by scenario. overshoot 
(hatched) and undershoot (below zero). 
 
 
Horizontal lines correspond to the single-stock catch advice for 2016. Bars below the value of zero show 
undershoot (compared to single-stock advice) where catches are predicted to be lower when applying the 
scenario. Hatched columns represent catches in overshoot of the single-stock advice 
Source: (ICES, 2015d), Figure 6.2.2.2.1 
Single-stock advice 
2016 
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Since the beginning of such advice in 2009, cod has repeatedly been estimated to be the most 
limiting target stock in the North Sea demersal fisheries (hake is not included in these 
considerations), until last year. In 2015, ICES estimated for the first time that it had recovered 
enough to be managed in more balance with the other stocks, while the most limiting target 
stocks turned out to be whiting and sole (ICES, 2015d). 
1.4.3. Other ecosystem considerations 
 
Beyond the predator-prey and the technical interactions, other aspects that may affect the 
achievement of FMSY will be the constraints imposed by the Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive (MSFD), with the need to achieve Good Environmental Status (GES) in EU Waters. 
There are important activities going on regarding this topic, closely involving ICES and EU 
Member States. Of particular importance for fisheries management is the consideration of 
bycatch species. There are a lot of developments ongoing into this topic (see also (ICES, 
2015e)). The impact of demersal fisheries on the seafloor and on fish habitats is another 
important issue. As these discussions are still very much in progress by the time of writing this 
report, they are not further detailed here, but this should be kept in mind in the policy 
considerations. ICES has recently published the first integrated ecosystem overviews for 
several ecoregions, including the North Sea, and these provide a useful source of knowledge 
for ecosystem-based marine management (ICES, 2016).  
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2. Current state of MSY modelling in the region 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The productivity and growth potential of the different stocks is variable over time 
and partly influenced by large scale climatic processes. 
 It is difficult to define a unique and constant FMSY for each stock, and to manage 
fisheries after this. Not all stocks may be at single-species FMSY at the same time 
and for the same level of fishing effort. 
 Ecoregion-wide MSY beyond the single-stock context is difficult to define as there is 
no unique definition and quantification of the concepts of Yield, of Sustainability 
and of Maximum  
 There is no unique target that can satisfy all objectives and constraints at the same 
time, and trade-offs are necessary  
 Defining North Sea-wide MSY in weight or in value leads to opposite directions 
due to the biological interactions: Maximising MSY in weight would imply high fishing 
mortality and low biomass of demersal predator fish (such as cod and saithe), to 
secure large populations of small pelagic prey fish (such as herring and sprat) 
that can be fished intensely. At contrary, maximising MSY in value would imply 
reducing the pelagic fisheries, to secure food for larger stocks of high-valued 
demersal predator species.  
 Using Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) as a target would achieve a lot of objectives, 
such as low ecosystem impact and high profitability of the fisheries. But MEY is 
typically achieved at fishing mortality lower than FMSY, implying fewer vessels 
and lower employment in fisheries than at present.  
 For many stocks a range of fishing mortalities around FMSY could achieve high, 
sustainable and precautionary yield in the vicinity of the maximum estimated.  
 Defining FMSY as an area with a range rather than a point estimate provides a frame 
that can account for the variability in the ecosystem and integrate some other 
ecological, economic, social and/or institutional objectives, but this implies making 
trade-offs. 
2.1. The history of MSY in the North Sea 
The North Sea has traditionally been the most studied and modelled area in European 
fisheries. Earliest records on the idea of a Maximum Sustainable Yield are found in the late XIX 
century, when hypotheses started developing to explain the observed variability of North Sea 
fish stocks (Degnbol, 2015). This question triggered the creation of the first global organisation 
for marine science, The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) in 1902. 
Later, the variability of year-class strengths was hypothesised for the first time in the Northern 
North Sea and Norwegian waters (Hjort, 1914), leading to the concept of “optimum catch” 
in 1933. It is also with North Sea stocks that Graham et al (1935) first established the famous 
equilibrium yield curve with a MSY top (later popularised by Gordon and Scheafer, Figure 5), 
and that (Beverton and Holt, 1957) quantified and operationalised the concept in an age-
structured approach accounting for the annual variability of growth and productivity. 
In the same time, similar developments took place on the East Coast of the USA, so most of 
the early development of modern quantitative fisheries science has been fostered in these two 
areas. 
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Figure 5: The Gordon-Scheafer MSY yield curve from equilibrium biomass model 
 
 
Source: FAO (Cochrane, 2002) 
 
Since the time of these early pioneers in fisheries science, continued development in fisheries 
modelling has occurred on the North Sea fish stocks, which are now among the most studied 
in the world. The quantity and quality of fisheries data and models available is high, both at 
the single-stock level and at the ecosystem and regional scale. We review separately 
the state of the art regarding MSY modelling at these two scales. 
2.2. Single-stock FMSY 
2.2.1. Stocks with an analytical assessment 
2.2.1.1. FMSY: point estimate, variability and uncertainty 
Considering the most recent history only, the work to identify FMSY started in 2010 for most 
ICES stocks (ICES, 2010a, 2010b). At that time, the variability of FMSY over time, due to the 
annual fluctuations of the basic productivity, growth and selectivity parameters was already 
highlighted. This is illustrated for haddock on Figure 6, but similar fluctuations were observed 
for most stocks. This revived the historical long-lasting debate regarding the inadequacy of 
the equilibrium MSY concept in a dynamic ecosystem where stocks fluctuate and interact 
(Larkin, 1977).  
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Figure 6.  Haddock in Subarea IV and Division IIIa. Retrospective estimates of 
fishing mortality reference points. 
 
Source: (ICES, 2010a) 
 
Some progresses have been achieved in investigating the causes of the variability of 
growth and productivity over time, especially when trends are observed beyond the annual 
fluctuations. In particular, the role of the increasing temperature has been often advocated, 
as this can affect many processes. (Baudron et al., 2014) showed that six out of eight 
commercial fish species in the North Sea underwent concomitant growth reductions, and 
this coincided with a 1–2 °C increase in water temperature. Smaller body sizes decreased the 
yield-per-recruit of these stocks by an average of 23%. The recruitment success of North Sea 
cod may also have decreased because of reduced plankton availability for the early life 
stages in warming waters (Beaugrand et al., 2003; Nicolas et al., 2014). Similarly, (Clausen et 
al., 2016) investigated the productivity of all small pelagic species in the North Sea, 
showing a drop in both growth and recruitment since the early nineties (Figure 7). This 
correlates to some extent with the shift in the composition of plankton community although 
the direct causal effect yet needs to be concluded. The effect is clear, though; the MSY and 
precautionary reference points are different between the high and low productivity 
period in the North Sea. Changes in productivity can also be linked to e.g. changes in 
predation (Kempf et al., 2009) or fisheries-induced evolution (Marty et al., 2014). 
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Figure 7.  Solid lines: Time trends in anomalies in fish stock length at age (for age 2 
and over), i.e. the relative deviation in length from mean for the time 
series by age for any given year. Broken lines: Mean before and after 
1993. 
Source
:(Clausen et al., 2016) 
 
But in most cases, the variability of the system cannot be fully explained and more 
importantly, cannot be predicted for the future. Instead, the scientific efforts have rather 
focused on the best way to integrate this variability as a key input to MSY modelling. Since 
2010 the statistical analyses have thus been refined, in order to achieve better consistency 
across the different methods available to estimate FMSY and to build a generic framework 
across stocks. In particular, much focus has been given to the handling of the uncertainty 
linked to the relationship (SRR) between spawning stock biomass (SSB, the parental 
biomass) and the recruitment (number of offsprings). FMSY is primarily sensitive to 
whereas it is assumed that the SRR is rather flat (above a given level of biomass, recruitment 
fluctuates around average without trends, “Hockey-Stick” shape), rather increasing (higher 
biomass gives higher average recruitment, asymptotic “Beverton and Holt” shape, leading to a 
lower FMSY) or rather dome-shaped (above a given level of biomass, the average 
recruitment might decrease due to density-dependent effects, i.e. negative effects that 
occurs when the density (numbers per unit of area) of animals increase: typically increased 
predation including cannibalism and/or food or habitat shortage; “Ricker” shape, leading to a 
higher FMSY) (Figure 8). In most cases though, the time series of observed recruitment does 
not clearly follow any of those three choices, but is a more scattered cloud of points.  
 
To account for this uncertainty, a probabilistic and stochastic framework was developed 
including all three options. In addition, attention was paid to include precautionarity in this 
framework, so that the risk of falling below Blim should be low (<5%, with the 
corresponding fishing mortality noted FP.05) when fishing at FMSY over a long period of time 
(Figure 9, red line in the right panel) This work culminated in an ICES Workshop in late 2014, 
which applied this framework to most stocks in the Baltic Sea and North Sea and provided 
consistent FMSY and precautionary FP.05 estimates (ICES, 2015f, 2015g). 
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Figure 8.  Different stock-recruitment relationships fitted to North Sea saithe.  
 
   
 
Source : (ICES, 2010a), figure 11.9.1 
 
The outcomes of this work have shown clearly and consistently that given the annual 
fluctuations in growth, productivity and selectivity, it is often difficult to provide a 
single value of FMSY. The estimated long-term Maximum Yield can be obtained with a range 
of fishing mortalities, depending of the combination of these parameters. Taking Eastern 
Channel sole as an example below (Figure 9), we can see that different long-term yields can 
be obtained for any given level of fishing mortality (between dotted lines on left panel). 
Turning this around, this implies that the average highest yields can also be obtained with 
several F values, here between 0.2 and 0.4 (red line left panel, plotted correspondingly as a 
probability distribution in the brown line, right panel). 
 
Figure 9.  Summary plot for Sole VIId. Left: historic values (dots), mean (solid 
red), median (solid black) and 90% intervals (dotted black) landings for 
exploitation at fixed values of F. Right: probability of SSB<Blim (red, 
with FP.05 shown with the dotted line) and the cumulative distribution of 
FMSY (brown).  
 
Source : (ICES, 2015g), Figure 6.16.4 
 
This means that the FMSY point-estimate that is finally produced as the key result of this work 
(ICES, 2015f) is an average (median) across many plausible future developments in the 
stock, based on historical observations of both high and low productivity periods. This value 
could be kept constant for some years, provided that the current productivity does not vary 
outside the assumptions made on the basis of these historical observations. 
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Another important finding of this study was the observation that for most short-lived and 
small fish, the FMSY is very close to the precautionary FP.05, while a number of large 
fish (able to grow larger than 60 cm) stocks can potentially sustain high and precautionary 
yields across a range of fishing mortality (ICES, 2015g). For these stocks, long-term fishing 
at F values which are slightly higher or lower than the average FMSY can deliver average yield 
quite close to the estimated maximum. For such F values higher than FMSY, this implies average 
biomass levels slightly lower than at FMSY, but with a probability of at least 95% of staying 
above Blim.  
 
This framework was also used to derive MSY ranges, see chapter 2.3.3 below. 
2.2.2. Stocks without an analytical assessment 
 
For stocks without an analytical assessment (ICES DLS Category 3 to 6), ICES has so far not 
estimated a MSY based target, nor an FMSY range. The advice for these stocks is currently 
based on the precautionary approach. ICES has tested methods to derive reference points 
and they have already been tested on western waters stocks (ICES, 2015h). The other stocks, 
including the North Sea ones will follow from 2017. In addition, a DGMARE tender (number 
MARE/2014/44) has started in early 2016 to develop management strategies for stocks 
without analytical assessment. The North Sea is one of the case studies covered, and major 
progresses are expected to be achieved between 2016 and 2018.  
2.3. Multiple stocks / Ecoregion-wide MSY 
2.3.1. Generic issues in defining MSY beyond the single-stock concept 
 
The concept of MSY in a wider North Sea ecosystem and/or mixed-fisheries regional 
approach is much more complex. There are many models and many studies that have 
investigated this concept from different angles, but none of them has yet emerged as a 
consensual approach directly used to establish official management targets. Issues in 
identifying MSY beyond the single-stock concept are both a matter of definition and a 
matter of quantification.  
 
First, the basic concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield becomes fuzzier and more difficult 
to agree on in an ecoregion context. Each of the three words must be defined: What means 
Yield (e.g. yield of all stocks, or of main commercial stocks? Yield in tonnes or in value? Or 
Profit, as in Australia, which uses MEY as the primary policy objective)? What means 
Maximum when stocks and fleets fluctuate every year, and how to define “on average”? 
What means Sustainable, and sustainable for what and for who, when sustainability can be 
defined out of several pillars and scales (Charles, 1994; Hilborn et al., 2015)? Defining 
these terms is not a question for scientists alone, as there is no single and straight answer to 
these questions. Clearly, they require legitimate choices from managers and stakeholders as 
well.  
 
Second, once defined, these terms must be quantified. That is largely a task for scientists to 
do. But as the marine ecosystems and the fisheries that exploit them are so complex and 
dynamic, no model is able to encompass in a single frame all ecological and human processes 
and how they impact each other. The models that try to incorporate as many of these 
processes as possible (e.g. Atlantis modelling framework, (Fulton et al., 2011a) are based on 
many modelling assumptions and require a large number of parameters to be quantified. 
They are useful for identifying broad patterns but are not so well suited for the daily 
management of fisheries.  
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Rather, models of medium complexity have developed over time to investigate specific subsets 
of these processes, resulting in a situation where several intermediate models may be 
available for addressing a given question. These different models will likely provide different 
MSY outcomes, depending on which processes are integrated and how. Scientists are 
therefore able to provide a given answer for a given question (e.g. “using this given model 
which includes these given processes and assumptions, the maximum sustainable yield defined 
in this given unit for this given set of stocks and for this given time frame is XXX”), but they 
cannot provide a single answer on an overall ecosystem-based MSY that would be unique, 
would encompass all processes and would be constant over time. 
 
Nevertheless, a common feature of these models is that they all focus on highlighting some 
trade-offs between various objectives and various constraints. For example, if 
predator-prey relationships are considered, any increase in the biomass of predators will cost 
yield from prey stocks; if mixed-fisheries are considered, a fishery having to stop when the 
first quota is exhausted will mean losing yield from other species; if social aspects are 
considered, more profitable fishery may come at the cost lower employment. Scientists will 
therefore use these models (individually or in combination) to inform managers and 
stakeholders on which processes and which sources of uncertainty influence the most the 
identification of objectives and their achievement; which trade-offs are the most 
crucial to consider; and which options are the most robust and the most sustainable 
according to different criteria. 
 
Another important aspect to consider is the variability over time. The scientific models 
represent the best available knowledge at a time, and are based on the current situation.  
Managers and stakeholders must realise that most likely, MSY estimates will have to be 
regularly updated, following the prevalent conditions of ecosystem productivity and fisheries 
selectivity, and following also the development of new knowledge and new policy 
objectives.  
 
Finally, the role of science is to provide knowledge on trade-offs and risks according to 
given criteria, but not to decide which criteria are decisive to policy-makers and society. It is 
the role of the political arena to make final decisions on where to go within different 
sustainable options.  
 
An overview of the quantification of MSY in the North Sea is given below. This is largely based 
on the outcomes of the research project EU FP7 MYFISH referred to in section 1.1. This project 
has investigated how to integrate these interactions into ecosystem-wide MSY approaches in 
much detail. But a few other models are also available.  
2.3.2. Quantitative ecoregion-wide North Sea MSY  
 
This paragraph is the key outcome of the FP7 project MYFISH, summarised in (Kempf et al., in 
press)6. Most of the paragraph is extracted from this scientific paper, which reviews both the 
various modelling approaches undertaken and how their outcomes have been perceived by a 
number of key stakeholders and policy makers through a suite of consultations and 
workshops between 2012 and 2014. Some of the results have been updated in this present 
review with the latest results available in December 2015. 
 
A first exercise aimed to define a number of potential variants of MSY objectives, and three 
definitions were retained: Maximum Sustainable Yield in landed weight (MSYw); Maximum 
Sustainable Yield in landed value (MSYv); Maximum Economic Yield in net present value 
                                           
6  See also the corresponding presentation at 
http://myfishproject.eu/images/MYFISH/symposium/Talks/Day2/AlexanderKempf.pdf 
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(MEY). A second exercise aimed to quantify and compare these three variants, across three 
models incorporating various types of biological and/or technical interactions; A third 
exercise aimed to identify some constraints that would prevent the achievement of these 
objectives. Constraints would be undesirable states of either the ecosystem (e.g. too high 
bycatch levels of some sensitive or protected species, or incompatibility with MSFD GES 
indicators) or of the fishery (e.g. poor profitability or employment levels, low equity etc).  
 
The outcomes of these exercises have been summarised under the form of three graphical 
Decision Support Tables (DSTs), one for each model. The DSTs represent the main trade-
offs across the various MSY objectives, and between objectives and constraints.  
 
As explained above, these DSTs are the outcomes of different models, focusing on different 
issues and types of fisheries in different areas of the North Sea. They are thus not entirely 
comparable with each other. They shall rather be used individually for comparing trade-offs 
across scenarios within a given modelling approach. The DST tables are not reproduced here 
but are displayed in the MYFISH newsletter 3 in a synthetic version7. 
2.3.2.1. MSY accounting for species predator-prey interactions (DST1) 
This work is a direct follow up of initial considerations presented in (ICES, 2013) advice and 
described in chapter 1.4.1. 
 
This first DST investigated the MSY trade-offs linked to biological interactions, where the 
biomass of a stock is dependent of the biomass of other stocks eating it. Cod and saithe are 
top predators feeding on all species, while herring, sprat, Norway pout and sandeel are 
only preys and do not eat other fish. Whiting and haddock are intermediate. Small pelagic 
fish produce high tonnages with low monetary unit value while demersal fish produce 
smaller volumes of higher-valued fish. 
 
The main result of this analysis was that MSYw and MSYv pull the system into opposed 
directions. The absolute long-term Maximum Yield (MSYw) translated into a higher fishing 
mortality of predators compared to single species FMSY estimates, in order to provide the 
highest tonnage from intense fishing of the pelagic and industrial species. Conversely, 
Maximising Yield in value (MSYv) suggested reducing the fishing of these smaller 
species to maintain food for the more valuable species. Similar results had also been obtained 
by other models including EwE (Mackinson et al., 2009) and size-spectrum models (Blanchard 
et al., 2014; Jacobsen et al., 2013).  
 
A trade-off between these two extremes is difficult to estimate mathematically, as there is no 
obvious objective to maximize. Adding sustainability constraints aiming to maintain each 
stock above a minimal biomass level (Blim or Bpa) reduced the span of the potential fishing 
mortalities, and reduced also the multispecies level of maximum yield in tonnes and in value. 
There remains nevertheless a probability that not all stocks can be maintained above 
precautionary single-species biomass reference points simultaneously. In particular, 
whiting may suffer from high juvenile predation pressure by grey gurnard and by a recovery 
of the cod stock. 
                                           
7 http://myfishproject.eu/images/MYFISH/Media/Newsletter/MYFISH_Newsletter_Issue3.pdf 
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Ultimately, the total yield in tonnes and in value of the entire North Sea fishery does not 
vary much across a wide range of combinations of single-stock fishing mortality levels 
(potentially less than 15% difference in total yield and less than 10% in total value across the 
various scenarios of objectives and constraints, Vinther et al., MYFISH deliverable 3.2). It is 
therefore possible to achieve a total yield very close to the maximum (a “Pretty Good Yield”) 
without jeopardizing either the biomass or the fishery of any of the stocks (to the exception of 
whiting for which the outcomes remain uncertain).  
2.3.2.2. MSY accounting for mixed-fisheries technical interactions (DST2) 
This second DST focused on the economic impact of MSY on the fishing fleets from the 
different North Sea countries, and is performed using the model FishRent (Salz et al., 2011). 
It was analyzed whether better profitability could be achieved for identical levels of fishing 
mortality by stock (point estimate FMSY) by changing the distribution of national quota (fixed 
share of the TAC by stock) across fleets within a country.  
 
The model was parameterized on data up to 2013, where the cod stock was still very low 
compared to the other roundfish stocks and the cod TAC was very limiting. There it was 
shown that countries’ quotas could be better utilized, and the fleets would be more profitable if 
quotas would be freely swapped. It was also shown important trade-offs in terms of 
employment and fishing effort if fishing costs are accounted for, illustrating that pursuing a 
MEY objective maximizing profit would imply a very different configuration of the fleets, 
moving from a situation with many vessels with low profitability to a situation with few but 
highly profitable vessels (Hoff and Frost, MYFISH deliverable 3.2) 
2.3.2.3. MSY accounting for technical interactions and Good environmental 
status (GES) (DST3) 
This third DST focused on the linkages between MSY and selected MSFD GES indicators for 
the flatfish and brown shrimp beam trawl fisheries in the Southern North Sea. In particular, 
also the impact on sensitive bycatch species such as turbot and elasmobranchs was 
investigated. The DST was obtained through a combination of the ecosystem model Ecopath 
with Ecosim (EwE,(Christensen and Walters, 2004)) and the spatial economic model Simfish 
(Bartelings et al., submitted). 
 
An important outcome from this analysis was that MSYw is not optimal from an economic 
and conservation point of view. It led to a substantial loss in profit and risks the 
sustainable exploitation of bycatch species. On the other hand, MEY leads to lower fishing 
effort, which has a positive impact on GES indicators, but at high social cost in the form of 
much lower employment. 
2.3.2.4. Summary of MSY outcomes and some managers’ reflections 
These three DSTs studies have highlighted important trade-offs across multiple objectives 
because of biological and technical interactions as well as social constraints. The results 
were presented and discussed with several managers and stakeholders across the North Sea 
(Kempf et al., submitted). Especially trade-offs related to biological interactions were identified 
by managers as being an issue of high potential conflict, because of the implications for 
demersal vs. pelagic fleets. It was also noted that the current definition of MSY “to 
maximise the yield in weight from a stock or community” may lead to undesirable outcomes 
such as loss in profit and conflicts with environmental constraints. MEY seems to be a more 
appropriate concept to cover wider objectives, but would come at the cost of lower 
employment.  
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Learning on trade-offs led to the idea that a “Pretty good yield concept” may be more suitable 
instead of trying to define and reach the absolute maximum. 
2.3.3. FMSY ranges 
 
In parallel to the work developed in MYFISH, the EU has also been forced to discuss these 
issues from a policy point of view, in order to implement the CFP objectives of MSY and 
mixed-fisheries management plans (European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union, 2013). A task force (EU, 2014) comprising the three main EU Institutions (EU 
Commission, EU Parliament and EU Council of Fisheries Ministers) suggested to use FMSY 
ranges as flexible targets for the regional management plans rather than 
prescriptive Harvest Control Rules  (STECF 2015a), de-facto considering MSY as a 
desirable multi-dimensional area rather than a point estimate. The idea started thus to emerge 
that the MSY concept could be extended into a multidimensional area, the “Pretty Good Yield” 
(PGY) area (as named by (Hilborn, 2010)). This idea means that a part of the maximum yield 
could be traded off against the achievement of the other objectives, in particular with regards 
to mixed-fisheries conflicts in the frame of regional management plans and the landing 
obligation.  
 
ICES was thus tasked by the EU Commission to identify a range of precautionary F values that 
would deliver a PGY, and a threshold of at least 95% of the maximum estimated average 
long-term yield in a single-stock approach was chosen. The boundaries of this area are 
the so-called FMSY ranges (ICES, 2015f) (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10.  Median landings yield curve with estimated reference points for North 
Sea saithe, with fixed F exploitation from F= 0 to 1.2.  Blue lines: median 
FMSY estimate (solid) and range at 95% of maximum yield (dotted).  
Green lines: precautionary FP.05 estimate (solid) and range at 95% of 
yield at FP.05 (dotted)  
 
 
Source: (ICES, 2015g), Figure 6.12.2 
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In 2015, many of the North Sea stocks were exploited at levels within the estimated range 
(Table 2) 
 
Table 2.  FMSY point estimate and range for the main North Sea demersal stocks, 
and fishing mortality in 2014.  
 
STOCK ICES STOCK NAME FMSY Fupper Flower F2014 
cod-347d   Cod in Subarea IV (North Sea) and Divisions 
VIId (Eastern Channel) and IIIa West 
(Skagerrak) 
0.33 0.49 0.22 0.39 
had-346a Haddock in Subarea IV and Divisions VIa 
and IIIa West  (North Sea, West of Scotland, 
Skagerrak)  
0.37 0.52 0.25 0.24 
nep-3-4 Nephrops in Division IIIa 0.079 0.079 0.056 0.030 
nep-6 Nephrops in Farn Deeps (FU 6) 0.081 0.081 0.07 0.13 
nep-7 Nephrops in Fladen Ground (FU 7) 0.075 0.075 0.066 0.035 
nep-8 Nephrops in Firth of Forth (FU 8) 0.163 0.163 0.106 0.291 
nep-9 Nephrops in Moray Firth (FU 9) 0.118 0.118 0.091 0.147 
ple-eche Plaice in Division VIId (Eastern Channel) 0.25 0.34 0.18 0.11 
ple-nsea Plaice in Subarea IV (North Sea) 0.19 0.27 0.13 0.18 
sai-3a46 Saithe in Subarea IV (North Sea), Division 
IIIa (Skagerrak), and Subarea VI (West of 
Scotland and Rockall) 
0.32 0.43 0.2 0.3 
sol-eche Sole in Division VIId (Eastern Channel)  0.3 0.41 0.16 0.55 
sol-nsea Sole in Subarea IV (North Sea) 0.2 0.37 0.11 0.25 
 
Values highlighted in green are below FMSY, in orange are values between FMSY and MSY Fupper, 
and in red are above MSY Fupper. 
 
There are however many discussions whether Fupper is truly an acceptable MSY reference point. 
ICES underlines that using ranges and deciding upon the PGY threshold (here 95%) is a 
policy decision that can help balance trade-offs, not a scientific one. (ICES, 2015f) noted the 
following: “In a single-species context fishing above FMSY implies reduced stock biomass and 
this may be substantial where Fupper is much higher than FMSY. So in utilizing FMSY ranges there 
are more advantages to fishing between FMSY and Flower than between FMSY and Fupper. 
 
With higher fishing mortalities the following occurs: 
• A need for increased fishing effort; 
• Higher dependence of stock and yield on recruiting year classes and increased 
variability on catch opportunities; 
• The size of the fish in the stock and the catch will be smaller on average; 
• Greater probability of SSB being less than MSY Btrigger, implying that advised 
catches would have to be reduced more often according to the sliding rule used in ICES 
advice; 
• A lower probability of density-dependent effects such as reduced growth or increased 
cannibalism. 
 
For some mixed fisheries it may be difficult to reconcile the Fs on different stocks. An 
approach for maximizing long-term yield could be to attempt to reconcile F on a mixed 
fishery using Fs between Flower and FMSY. If this cannot be accomplished, F between FMSY 
and Fupper could also be used in the short term. However, using F >FMSY for the same stock in 
the long term implies that there are structural changes required in the fishery to avoid the 
consequences listed above.” 
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2.4. Summary on MSY modelling in the North Sea 
In summary, the state of the art of the modelling of MSY in the North Sea is made both of an 
old history with long-lasting prospective and knowledge, and of a very recent and prolific 
scientific activity which has opened, and is still opening, new insights on this old concept. 
These look for pragmatic and robust management approaches to the intrinsic issues of 
variability and definition. The story is not fully matured yet, and new questions are still 
likely to emerge from these current findings over the next few years. But this can be 
summarised as follows: 
2.4.1. An appealing old concept but with well-known issues 
 
The problems with the definition and performance of MSY targets in fisheries are well 
documented, even for a single-species if there are natural fluctuations in the resource (Mace, 
2001). Where there are multiple interacting species and/or multiple objectives it becomes 
even more difficult to evaluate the many trade-offs that inevitably occur and to establish any 
overall optimised outcome. These issues are not new, and Larkin (1977) already stated that 
single species MSY cannot be achieved simultaneously for all species within an ecosystem 
when biological interactions (such as predator-prey relationships) are considered. It is also 
well understood that because of mixed-fisheries interactions, not all stocks can reach MSY at 
the same pace, and managing fisheries according to the least productive stock(s) can lead to 
the under exploitation of other stocks (Hilborn et al., 2015; ICES, 2015d). 
 
The modelling capacities have improved greatly since the seventies, and numerous advanced 
scientific studies have been performed in the last ten years. Nevertheless, more complex and 
holistic approaches haven’t solved these basic questions, and the accumulated evidence 
demonstrates clearly the inherent difficulties for managers and scientists to (i) agree on 
a single and simple definition of MSY in an extended and dynamic ecosystem context, (ii) 
translate this into robust and constant single-stock point estimate FMSY and (iii) manage 
variable and complex fisheries towards these objectives.  
 
These difficulties will not disappear, as they relate to the intrinsic characteristics of the 
marine ecosystems and fisheries. They will neither be solved by additional scientific 
modelling. The natural fluctuations of productivity and the multiplicity of ecological, economic, 
social and institutional objectives call for the acceptance of the needs to making trade-offs. 
One pragmatic approach forward would be to give more importance to avoiding risks of 
adverse outcomes than to optimising exactly the exploitation patterns across a given set of 
criteria to be defined (Degnbol, 2015; Hilborn et al., 2015). In this sense, the MSY objective 
is still appealing in spite of the concerns summarised above (Mace, 2001; Patrick and Link, 
2015). It induces higher yields, better ecosystem status and higher profitability than the 
previous European fisheries management frameworks; Being formulated more explicitly in the 
2013 CFP than in any previous CFP, MSY should ensure that the fishing mortality for European 
stocks is maintained in the future at levels significantly below those observed in the 
past. We argue thus that the MSY concept needs adaptation, not wholesale replacement 
(Kempf et al., submitted). 
2.4.2. Recent insights on the meaning of MSY in an ecosystem context: trade-
offs and constraints 
 
During the EU FP7 MYFISH project, different definitions and quantifications of MSY have 
been explored for the North Sea, considering or not the predator-prey relationships between 
species, the technical interactions between fleets, and some ecological side-effects on 
non-target species. These are three important aspects to take into account when considering 
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MSY beyond its narrow single-stock definition. Although performed with different models 
and with different focus, the outcomes of these three independent analyses tell similar stories:  
 
The first main outcome is that total long-term Yield of the entire North Sea fishery varies 
fairly little across many different combinations of fishing mortalities for the different stocks. 
This outcome has two major implications. (i) because of the interactions, the North Sea-
wide MSY is not necessarily the same as the sum of the MSY of the individual stocks, 
and is not necessarily achieved with the same level of fishing mortality as if fishing at the FMSY 
point estimate for each stock individually. (ii) not all combinations of fishing mortalities 
delivering Maximum Yield are likely to be equally acceptable from a policy point of view. 
Total Maximum Yield can theoretically be achieved with some stocks being maintained at a 
low biomass level (“sustainably overfished”, (Hilborn et al., 2015)) or some fisheries having 
to close in order for some others to catch more or be more profitable. Therefore, Maximum 
Yield alone might not be sufficient as the long-term target for fisheries management. 
 
The second main outcome is that employment often points towards the opposite direction 
as the other objectives. In most analyses, it is estimated that decreasing fishing mortality 
towards North Sea-wide MEY also contributes to fulfilling other objectives, such as better 
ecosystem status, lower impact on bycatch, lower fuel consumption and lower carbon 
footprint (Figure 11). But fishing mortality is linked to a great extent to fishing effort (i.e. 
number of boats x number of days fishing during the year), and therefore this reduction 
implies a decrease in fishing activity and employment. According to EU CFP facts8 the 
economic dependency on fishing is very low to moderate for most North Sea regions, with the 
exception of Scotland where it can be very high. Effort reductions have nevertheless been 
difficult to achieve in the North Sea (Kraak et al., 2013; Scientific Technical and Economic 
Committee for Fisheries (STECF), 2014), and implementing further reductions towards effort 
levels compatible with MEY will not be straightforward. MSY appears therefore as an 
intermediate trade-off between the current situation (“traditional management” in Figure 10) 
and the more ideal “zone of new consensus” closer to MEY.  
 
Figure 11.  The relationship between fishing effort and benefits derived from 
different objectives 
 
Source: (Hilborn, 2007) 
 
                                           
8 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/pcp_en.pdf 
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These important considerations may mean that additional criteria other than maximum yield 
alone might be considered appropriate by managers, for example that no stock should be 
left below a given biomass level or, at contrary, considered more important than another. 
Such an approach would allow satisfying other ecological, economic, social and/or 
institutional while staying in the vicinity of Maximum Yield.  
2.4.3. FMSY ranges as a pragmatic policy solution: opportunities and challenges  
 
The idea of Pretty Good Yield (Hilborn, 2010) and single-stock FMSY ranges (ICES, 2015f) 
have been suggested in these multi-objective considerations. They estimate the range of 
fishing mortality which would provide for each stock some long-term yields close to the 
maximum possible while maintaining low risk to the biomass to fall below the acceptable 
threshold. ICES used an arbitrary PGY threshold of 95% of maximum yield, but other 
values might be decided.  
 
Within these ranges, it would be potentially possible to eliminate the combinations of single-
stock fishing mortality that are mutually exclusive, i.e. which together would lead to 
undesirable or incompatible outcomes at the regional ecosystem scale (Rindorf et al. 2016), 
(see also paragraph 5.3). From there, the remaining FMSY ranges could provide a flexible 
policy framework, offering a buffer around a target for integrating the annual variations in 
productivity of the different stocks while defining clear limits for the undesirable states that 
should be avoided.  
 
(ICES, 2015f) though underlined that this flexibility would have a cost, and in particular, 
fishing at levels between FMSY and Fupper would increase the dependence of stock and yield on 
recruiting year classes and increased variability on catch opportunities, with reduced advice 
when SSB would fall below MSY Btrigger. We argue that the concept of the ranges is 
potentially useful and can theoretically address some key operational issues in achieving MSY 
in a regional mixed-fisheries approach, but care must be taken in how it is used.  
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3. A quantitative bio-economic analysis on the likely 
consequences of the landing obligation regarding the 
objectives of the CFP, specially the MSY 
KEY FINDINGS 
 MSY and the landing obligation are two independent objectives of the CFP. The 
landings obligation cannot be considered as a direct mean to achieve MSY. 
 When assuming full implementation and no fleet adaptation, the landing obligation 
would lead to total landings lower than when discards occur, because early fishery 
closures would be triggered by the most limiting stock (“choke species”). This would 
lead to the under exploitation of the most productive stocks. 
 The estimated economic consequences for the North Sea fleets are very variable 
across countries and fleets, with some of them expected to be only lightly affected 
while some others being more strongly affected. The various policy adjustments can 
largely offset the short-term negative impact.  
 There are many ways by which fishers can improve their fishing patterns to better 
adjust to fishing opportunities, but effective mechanisms incentivising them to do so 
are required 
 It is not possible to predict how the fishing industry will react to the landings 
obligation. Therefore, the current bio economic analyses can only compare options on 
the basis of current fishing patterns. Practical experience on how fishers adapt to 
the new management will be gained over the next five years, and models will be 
updated accordingly.  
 The recovery of North Sea cod makes that most available economic scenarios, 
parameterised with data up to 2013, are potentially slightly pessimistic. The 
improved situation of the stock according to the 2015 assessment indicates that its 
“choke” effect has considerably reduced compared to the situation prevalent 
during the last decades. 
 
In this chapter, we first deal with a number of generic considerations on the relationships 
between MSY and the landings obligation, before moving to the actual bioeconomic 
considerations. It is underlined that this chapter has only focused on those aspects of the 
landings obligation that are most directly linked to the MSY objectives, and other important 
aspects linked e.g. to (i) the reasons to discard, (ii) possible mitigation options and (iii) the 
use of discards in the value chain and have only been briefly addressed here. 
3.1. Generic considerations on the relationship between MSY and 
the landing obligation as management objectives 
3.1.1. Single-stock approach 
 
The Landing obligation (LO) and the MSY are two different aspects of the CFP, and the 
relationships between the two are complex. The Landing Obligation is presented in the EU 
infographics9 as a mean (“HOW”) to achieve the CFP objectives (“WHAT”): MSY, 
regionalisation, better science and multi-annual plans. But the LO may in reality be 
considered as an objective on its own, rather than a mean, since the linkages between the LO 
and the MSY as management objectives are complex and largely indirect. 
                                           
9 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/2015-cfp-management_en.pdf 
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“Achieving MSY” means achieving a level of fishing mortality at FMSY. The fishing mortality 
accounts for all catches, regardless whether these catches are landed or discarded. If total 
catches are correctly monitored and controlled, i.e. that they do not exceed the total advised 
level, the FMSY objective can be achieved. That means that there is no direct relationship 
between discarding and achieving FMSY. In the world, there are examples of fisheries with 
limited discards that are overfished, typically small pelagic purse seine fisheries such as 
the Japanese sardine fishery, or many Asian fisheries where all catches are used, e.g. (FAO, 
2005). Conversely, there are examples of fisheries with high discards that are not 
overfished. In the North Sea, many target stocks are already fished at FMSY, prior to the 
landings Obligation (Table 2). The most emblematic example of this is the case of North Sea 
plaice, where fishing mortality has been fluctuating around FMSY since 2008, in spite of the 
high discard ratio around 40% in weight (ICES, 2015i). Most of the discards for this stock are 
constituted by undersized fish with low market value, and the quantities discarded are 
fairly well correlated with the year-classes strength (Figure 12 Left). Scientists have thus been 
able to estimate and predict the quantity discarded accurately enough to account for it in the 
stock assessment and management advice. Moreover, plaice is not a high-valued species and 
its productivity hasn’t reduced in the recent period. Plaice hasn’t become a choke species, 
and discards have fluctuated together with the catches (Figure 12, Right). This implies that to 
a large extent, limiting landings through TACs did not induce additional over quota 
discards, and total catches have been controllable.  
 
Figure 12.  North Sea plaice. Left: Relationship between juveniles number in the 
stock (at start of one year) and in the discards (within that year), in 
millions R2=0,73. Right: relationship between discards and catches, in 
weight. R2=0.69. straight line : linear relationship 
Sou
rce: (ICES, 2015i) data 
 
The situation becomes more complex when discards are mainly induced by the quota 
management itself. That is typically the situation of a “choke-species”, where the 
management target such as FMSY cannot be easily achieved, because reductions in TACs do 
not necessarily translate into the expected reductions in fishing mortality. Rather, they 
may translate into increased discards if the fishery is mixed and continues fishing for other 
species beyond the exhaustion of the TAC of the species in question. A major emblematic 
example of this has been the situation of North Sea cod over the last two decades, where the 
prolonged lack of recovery can largely be explained by the sustained high levels of fishing 
mortality and increased discards and highgrading of cod above the MLS (e.g. (Batsleer et 
al., 2015; ICES, 2015i; Kraak et al., 2013; Ulrich et al., 2011). For this stock, the relationships 
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between discards and stock size or catch volume are much more uncertain (less linearly 
correlated on Figure 13), as other factors play a role. In such a case, discards have also been 
monitored and estimated, and they are also included in the assessment and in the 
management advice; but the main differences with the case of North Sea plaice is that (1) 
discards are much less predictable and (2) total catches are less controllable by 
management and fishing mortality has remained higher than expected. 
 
Figure 13.  North Sea cod. Left: Relationship between juveniles number in the stock 
(at start of one year) and in the discards (within that year), in millions 
R2=0,58. Right: relationship between discards and catches, in weight. 
R2=0.54. straight line : linear relationship 
 
Source: (ICES, 2015i) data 
 
A third example to cite could be the case of Northern hake, for which discards have 
increased when fishing mortality has decreased to FMSY, as the large recovery of the 
stock has led to its expansion in the North Sea where fishing fleets do not owe enough 
historical quotas to cover their increased catches (Baudron and Fernandes, 2015).  
 
These three examples underline that discarding and MSY are not directly linked, and that 
different situations apply to different stocks. Generalising this, (Hall, 1996) distinguished 
between Critical Discards of populations or species that are in danger of extinction; 
Unsustainable Discards where, although not currently at risk, continued mortality could put 
a species or population at risk; Sustainable Discards which do not pose a threat to the 
resource; Biologically insignificant discards where the numbers are negligible from the 
point of view of the population involved; Unquantifiable Discards for which a lack of data 
creates an unknown level of impact. Worldwide, this is likely the category with the greatest 
number of cases; Ecosystems impacts which occur where a complex of species is removed. 
In many cases the biological consequences of these impacts are unknown; and Charismatic 
discards which involve species of particular significance to groups of people such as marine 
turtles, dolphins and whales. The capture of these animals may or may not have significant 
biological consequences. 
 
3.1.2. Mixed-fisheries approach 
 
At a mixed-fisheries regional level, the issue becomes even more difficult to apprehend, 
because the achievement of the FMSY objective for one less productive stock (or one with little 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
 48 
historical quota) might trigger an early closure of the fishery for other stocks (the “choke 
species” effect). This would lead to catches below the maximum yield for a number of stocks. 
At this has been explained in ToR 1, the landings obligation might maintain the entire fishery 
in an exploitation level below its maximum yield potential, until the choke stock has 
recovered and/or the fishery has developed strategies to avoid it. This “choke species” 
mechanism is the cornerstone of most mixed-fisheries models, and using such an approach it 
has been estimated that up to 50% of the potential seafood production in the North Sea, 
Iberian Sea, US west coast and southeastern Australia trawl fisheries would be lost if all 
species within a mixed species fishery were constrained to levels below FMSY (cf. e.g. (Gourguet 
et al., 2015; Hilborn et al., 2012; Patrick and Benaka, 2013), though this loss in volume is not 
necessarily accompanied by a loss in economic yield (Dichmont et al., 2010).  
 
The analyses for the North Sea are provided in more details below in section 3.2.  
3.1.3. On the impact of the landings obligation on the estimation of FMSY and FMSY 
ranges 
 
Incidentally, it must be kept in mind that the landing obligation might also affect the value of 
the FMSY reference point itself. As an illustration, we explored the values of FMSY and MSY 
ranges for the main North Sea stocks, using the same data and model as (ICES, 2015g) but 
varying the selectivity parameters across three scenarios : 1) full avoidance of discards, 
landings selectivity only, 2) full catch selectivity but all discard are landed and contribute to 
yield (LO full implementation) and 3) a shift in selectivity curve as a proxy for the effect of 
an increased mesh size.  
 
The first two scenarios resulted generally in higher FMSY and a larger FMSY range ( 
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Figure 14, Table 3). Assuming full compliance to the landing obligation and no other change in 
fisheries pattern shows an increase in FMSY between 33 % (Cod) and 110 % (Plaice) and 
equally higher FMSY ranges. Scenario 3 resulted in similar FMSY values, with no obvious pattern 
in the direction of change in the FMSY range (Figure 15). 
 
Table 3.  Effects of changes in selectivity on FMSY estimates for selected North Sea 
stocks 
 
SPECIES COD HADDOCK SOLE PLAICE 
 ICES 2015 MSY Flower 0.22 0.25 0.11 0.13 
 
FMSY 0.33 0.37 0.2 0.19 
  MSY Fupper 0.49 0.52 0.37 0.27 
Full avoidance MSY Flower 0.321 0.449 0.151 0.263 
 FMSY 0.602 0.657 0.329 0.398 
  MSY Fupper 0.902 0.928 0.572 0.542 
Landing MSY Flower 0.266 0.439 0.201 0.274 
Obligation FMSY 0.441 0.639 0.393 0.401 
 MSY Fupper 0.773 0.914 0.591 0.537 
  MSY Flower 0.152 0.209 0.105 0.135 
Shift selectivity FMSY 0.235 0.368 0.222 0.2 
 
MSY Fupper 0.375 0.658 0.496 0.297 
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Figure 14.  Effect of the landing obligation on the FMSY value and range on Plaice in 
the North Sea. Median Yield curve as in Figure 10 and in (ICES, 2015g). 
Top shows the baseline run similar to ICES 2015 and bottom shows the 
LO scenario. 
 
 
 
Source: DTU Aqua 
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Figure 15.  Effect of shift selectivity (proxy for higher mesh size) on the FMSY value 
and range on Sole in the North Sea. Median Yield curve as in Figure 10 
and in (ICES, 2015g). Top shows the baseline run similar to ICES 2015 
and bottom shows the increased selectivity scenario. 
 
 
Source: DTU Aqua 
 
In summary, this small simulation shows that when the fishing patterns change following 
the LO, the proportion of the various age- and size classes of the fish population change as 
well and this affects the perception of the reference points and of the actual maximum yield.  
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3.2. Modelling the bioeconomic consequences of LO in the North 
Sea 
Many bio economic models and studies are available for the North Sea fisheries. They 
operate at different scales and with different purposes. But they usually build on a similar 
mixed-fisheries conception, where several fleets catch several stocks. When evaluating the 
impact of the landings obligation, most studies involve the same approach as in (ICES, 2015d) 
(Figure 4), where the fishery are limited by the TAC of the least productive stock and are 
forced to early closure (“choke species”), leading to lower effort and underutilisation of 
the more productive resources. The outcomes are thus fairly similar in trends and 
magnitude across studies, with some differences linked to the various specifications of the 
models and of the simulations. We present here some key results available, but other studies 
not referred to in this report might also exist. 
 
Beyond this choke species effect, there are many other factors that can affect the profitability 
of fishing fleets in the event of a landing obligation (Frost et al., DiscardLess deliverable D2.1; 
Frangoudes and Guillen, DiscardLess Deliverable D2.2)10. These factors are of four types: 
 Changes in fish price 
 Changes in costs 
 Changes in catch composition 
 Changes in control and monitoring 
 
The models build on an empirical landing price for the fraction previously discarded which is 
usually low, reflecting the currently limited market opportunities for undersized fish. But it 
cannot be excluded that this price can increase when new opportunities develop. 
3.2.1. Short-term impact of the landings obligation 
 
The short-term analyses build on static scenarios of what could have happened in a given year, 
under the landing obligation rules, if current fishing patterns did not change, or if selectivity 
would have been different but with the same stock biomass. They are thus mainly 
retrospective analyses rather than predictions, and since changes in fishing behaviour are not 
included, they can only be considered as potential short-term economic effects.  
 
(Buisman et al., 2013) first made an economic analysis taking the year 2011 as the baseline, 
and estimated the cost of the landings obligation to be between 6 and 28 millions euros for 
the Dutch fleet, depending on (1) the amount of the quota uplifts and (2) the expected mean 
price for selling undersize fish. Additional costs for monitoring and control should be 
considered as well.  
 
(Condie et al., 2014a) performed various catch quotas scenarios for the English North Sea 
Otter trawls, taking the year 2010 as the basis. They argued on the difficulty to derive generic 
results, as the short-term economic impact would be dependent on the species regulated, the 
level and composition of catches and discards, the scale of additional quota, and on any 
change in fishing behaviour. Without any behavioural changes, the average profit loss was 
estimated around 14%.  
 
Similarly, The UK organisation Seafish11 has undertaken a comprehensive economic impact 
assessment that examined a number of different scenarios for the UK fleet, simulating what 
could have happened if the landings obligation had been implemented in 2013. First, an 
analysis of the choke species was performed (Russell et al., 2015a). Without changes in fishing 
                                           
10 http://www.discardless.eu/results 
11 www.seafish.org 
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patterns, the effects were substantial, with species like hake and saithe most likely to trigger 
early closures due to rapid quota exhaustion. Second, these results were translated into the 
economic analysis of different scenarios of implementation of the Landings Obligation, with or 
without policy arrangements such as quota uplift, catch allowance for zero-TAC stocks, de 
minimis, interspecies flexibility and survivability (Russell et al., 2015b). The results obtained 
showed great differences of impact across fleets and scenarios, and for many fleets the 
different policy arrangements would almost compensate for the expected loss of revenue, but 
not for all.  
 
Figure 16.  Estimated revenue of various UK fleets under the full implementation of 
the landings obligation (as of 2019) as a percentage of the 2013 value 
under two policy scenarios.  
 
 
Scenario B3: scenario including quota uplift but no policy adjustements. Scenario 4B: as scenario B3 but 
including a combination of policy adjustements: 5% de minimis, interspecies flexibility and survivability 
exemptions.  
Source: (Russell et al., 2015b), Figure 10-1 p 118. 
 
A similar analysis was performed for the Danish fleets, equally using 2013 as the reference 
year and testing the impact of various combination of quota uplift, increased costs for sorting 
and processing the catch onboard, and changes in minimum conservation reference size MCRS 
(Ravensbeck et al., 2015). For the entire Danish fleets, it was estimated that without quota 
uplift, revenue would fall by around 7% and gross margin by around 10%. But if full 
quota uplift would take place, the effects on the fishery would be fairly reduced (less than 
5%), and profitability could even increase if the MCRS would be reduced for some stocks. 
These results differed across fleets and regions, and the effects would be most severe for the 
small/medium trawlers in the Kattegat/Skagerrak, but would be quite limited for the North Sea 
Danish fleet.  
 
These four national studies of the main fleets in the North Sea are fairly consistent in their 
approaches and their findings. All results clearly show that without any policy adjustments, 
the landing obligation would have a short-term negative impact on the profitability of the 
fleets, by incurring more operating costs not compensated by the low market price for landings 
not sold as human consumption. They also show that one of the most important parameter 
is the “choke effect”, i.e. how quickly would a fleet reach its catch quota of the least productive 
stock and what would happen afterwards. In many cases though, it has also be shown that the 
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various policy adjustments that can be applied would largely mitigate these adverse 
effects.  
 
Importantly, all these studies have been performed with data prior to 2014, and are thus all 
driven by the major “choke” effect of the North Sea cod, which has suffered from low 
abundance and low TACs over the last decades. But the latest assessment in 2015 (including 
2014 data) has shown significant improvements in the stock in spite of continued 
reduced recruitment (ICES, 2015i), and for the first time in the decade of mixed-fisheries 
advice, cod has been estimated not to be the most limiting stock for the North Sea 
fisheries (ICES, 2015d). In this context, this means that the results presented here are 
potentially more pessimistic than the reality. This has been already demonstrated with the 
first step of enforcement of the landing obligation in 2016, where the Danish fisheries are 
expected to get major increase in revenue owing to the major TAC increases, not least for 
Nephrops. 12 
3.2.2. Medium-term effects in relation to MSY 
 
The medium-terms effects of the landings obligation are much more difficult to assess, 
because the processes that will be going on in the fisheries are still unknown, and largely 
unpredictable (see chapter 3.3 below). It cannot be ascertained if the fleets will react by some 
sorts of changes in their behaviour or not, with better or worse compliance, with selectivity 
improvements or not. There are many factors that can drive the system in one direction or in 
another, but their effects can lead to dramatic differences in the outcomes, both for the fleets 
and for the stocks.  
 
This topic is at the heart of the H2020 DiscardLess project13. At present, results are 
primarily available comparing some basic scenarios without adaptations, typically contrasting 
“Business as Usual” with current discards, and “Full implementation” where all discards are 
landed and sold, with full compliance and where the fleets stop fishing when the first quota is 
reached. This is largely similar to the short-term analyses presented in the previous 
paragraph. Alternative models are still scarce (paragraph 3.2.2.2 below). When experience is 
gathered on the actual developments in the fishery, the existing models will be updated 
accordingly and the bio-economic analyses will be refined. DiscardLess will publish annual 
policy briefs on this topic between 2016 and 2019. 
3.2.2.1. Results with full compliance and no adaptation 
Such results have been developed by Hoff and Frost as part of FP7 MYFISH, linked to the DST2 
results presented in chapter 2.3.2.2. Again, these runs have been performed with the data up 
to 2013, where North Sea cod was still very much the main choke species in the North Sea.  
 
Four sets of target fishing mortalities corresponding to alternative MSY objectives (MSY in 
weight, MSYw; MSY in value, MSYv; MEY maximising net present value), as well as the 
traditional (current) management plans have been evaluated, allowing or not for over-quota 
discard of the species included in the model. In the LO case the fishers in reality stops fishing 
when the most binding quota is exhausted (corresponding to the ‘min’ scenario in (ICES, 
2015d)) while they first stop fishing when the least binding quota is reached in the case with 
no LO (corresponding to the ‘max’ scenario in (ICES, 2015d)). In the traditional management 
case historical catch fractions for all fleets are maintained while they are allowed to 
exchange quotas in between country fleets in the MSY/MEY cases, thus being more 
able to optimize their outcome and suffer less, especially under the LO. Table 4 displays the 
                                           
12  http://naturerhverv.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/NaturErhverv/Nyheder/2015/Forventede_fangstvaerdier_ 
NAER_2016.pdf;  
13  www.discardless.eu 
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base indicators resulting from the two scenarios with and without discard allowed, averaged 
over a 20 years period. The total catches decrease in all scenarios when the landings 
obligation is implemented. The catch is landings plus discards, and thus when all fleets are 
allowed to discard over quota catches, the total catches is higher. Table 4 further shows that 
the landing obligation leads to a lower profitability in the MEY case, and to a lower 
revenue in the MSYv case.  
 
Table 4.  Net Present Value (NPV) (mill EUR) catch weight (1000 tonnes) and 
catch value (mill EUR) for the four scenarios, without and with landing 
obligation. Total for 24 years (2014-2037)  
 
  Without landing 
obligation 
With landing 
obligation 
Trad 
Man 
NPV 567 546 
Weight 22271 7510 
Value 12252 5557 
MSYw: 
Max 
Weight 
NPV -2166 458 
Weight 26335 9731 
Value 9857 7518 
MSYv: 
Max 
Value 
NPV -868 868 
Weight 17609 9675 
Value 10988 8517 
MEY: 
Max 
NPV 
NPV 2086 1550 
Weight 14526 9411 
Value 10058 7721 
 
Source: (Hoff and Frost, MYFISH deliverable D3.2). 
 
In the medium-term (until 2020), a stringent landings obligation as simulated here would 
lead to lower catch and higher biomass for all stocks, similarly to the short-term simulations 
presented above (Figure 17). 
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Figure 17.  Average yearly (2014-2020) total catch (1000 tonnes), and yearly 
variation (+/- st.dev) for North Sea cod, haddock, saithe and whiting in 
the two scenarios with and without discards allowed, for the four options 
of target fishing mortality. 
 
  
  
  
  
Source: (Hoff and Frost, MYFISH deliverable D3.2). 
 
Similarly, Hamon et al. (unpublished, EU Project SOCIOEC) used the results of the static 
analysis by (Buisman et al., 2013) into a medium term projection, and concluded that profit 
would decrease by 20% over the next five years in the flatfish fishery.  
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3.2.2.2. Modelling fleet adaptation and compliance to the landings obligation 
The results presented above are based on current fishing patterns, and would therefore 
represent the worst case impact assessment. It might be expected that fishers would change 
their behaviour to mitigate this negative impact, for example by avoiding fishing grounds 
where the choke species are most abundant. But this behaviour is not easily captured by 
scientific models (Fulton et al., 2011b). One way to address this is to model the fishers 
individually rather than as average fleets.  
 
The previous bio economic models presented above dealt with groups, classifying all fishers 
into “fleet segments” with average fishing patterns. Such models are convenient because they 
are computationally easy enough to operate, and can therefore cover many fleets and many 
species. But their main limitation is that they cannot easily integrate features of human 
behaviour and fleet adaptation, since changes in fleet behaviour result in reality from 
multiple individual decisions made by multiple individual fishers (Andersen et al., 2010; Ulrich 
et al., 2012). Therefore, such adaptation and choice processes are better dealt with Individual-
Based Models (IBM), which allow simulating behaviour at a very small spatial and temporal 
scale with simplified rules of decision-making, and estimate the average large-scale changes 
resulting from the sum of these small individual changes. These models are more 
computationally complex, and are thus less commonly used. One such application of an IBM 
model for assessing the impact of the landing obligation on the behaviour of fishing fleets is 
found in (Batsleer et al., 2013), for the mixed-fisheries in the Eastern Channel. Assuming that 
fishers operate under ITQ schemes and can thus plan and adjust their fishery according to 
their personal fishing opportunities (Poos et al., 2010), the model showed that a discard ban 
may force fishers to reallocate effort to areas and periods in which catch of the 
choke species (here cod) is low (Figure 18), but that would be at the expense of lower 
revenue.  
 
Figure 18.  Modelled spatial allocation of effort in average number of trips per year 
for French trawlers with a low cod ITQ. Left (a): with discarding. Right 
(c): no discarding. Colour gradient from 0 (white) to 12 (black) trip per 
year. 
 
 
Source: (Batsleer et al., 2013), Figure 5 (Subset) 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
 58 
This model, although it remains itself only a simplification of reality, underlines that the 
incentives to change behaviour as the simple consequence of the landing obligation are 
complex. (Batsleer et al., 2013) estimated that in order to influence this change through 
financial penalties to non-compliance, a fine should be in the order of 20 times the market 
price of the fish before it can make a significant difference to the fisher.  
3.3. Adaptation, changes in selectivity and risks of non-compliance 
As it has already been underlined in this report and in numerous other studies, the most 
uncertain factor regarding the bio economic impact of the landing obligation on the fisheries, 
and on the achievement of the MSY objectives, is thus the human factor, with the decision 
to adapt or not and comply or not to the obligation to land catches and, as (or more) 
importantly, to report all catches.  
 
Discarding is motivated by many technical, economic, regulatory and socio-cultural 
factors which are often interlinked (Catchpole et al., 2005; Rochet et al., 2014), and these 
drivers will not disappear only because discarding becomes forbidden. As an illustration, 
the figure below quantifies the main drivers of discards for English fleet (Figure 19), 
emphasising that discards are highly variable and that the relative importance of the various 
drivers may also vary. Different causes of discarding will also create different incentives to 
change behaviour or not. 
 
Figure 19.  The estimated weight of discarded fish, commercial cephalopods, and 
crustaceans generated by the English fishing fleet (2002–2010).  
 
 
Source: (Catchpole et al., 2014) 
 
3.3.1. Selectivity improvements and discard mitigation 
 
There is a vast amount of literature on discards mitigation, which is only briefly discussed 
here. There are many ways in which avoidance could be achieved.  
 
One obvious solution is the increased use of selective gears. There is a long history of 
development in this domain, and many technological solutions are already available, but the 
uptake has remained generally low. Some work is being done to collate and synthetize the 
outcomes of numerous selectivity trials in an accessible format (Frandsen et al., 2015; 
SEAFISH, 2015), see also http://www.seafish.org/geardb/. Pilots are also conducted in several 
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fisheries to trigger industry-led development of selective fishing gears adapted to fishers’ 
individual needs (Mortensen et al., 2015). Also, it may be possible to enhance avoidance of 
unwanted catches through effort displacement, either voluntarily or through e.g. Real Time 
Closures (Kraak et al., 2015; Little et al., 2015). Another option would include more efficient 
quota trading (Hoefnagel et al., 2015), although there are indications that member states 
will rather be less encline to swap quotas to limit risk of quota limitations for their own fishers.  
 
(Sigurðardóttir et al., 2015) performed a comparative SWOT analysis of twelve options, 
including technical, management and market mitigation measures. They concluded that 
such measures would be more successful in achieving their goal when used in combination, 
rather than in isolation. Nevertheless, it was also demonstrated that most measures may have 
(unwanted) spin offs and ask for adaptive management approaches. Co-management was 
repetitively scored as a strength, making it a core ingredient for a successful approach to 
develop and implement reduction strategies. 
 
Without going into further details, it is then clear that many options to mitigate discards 
already exist, and new options are developing as discarding become illegal. But this 
development is largely unpredictable, and must be closely followed, as negative incentives and 
non-compliance may also occur instead. The key barrier is how to trigger the proper incentives 
that would increase the uptake of selectivity measures by the industry.  
3.3.2. Risks of non-compliance 
 
Experience from countries where a discard ban has been implemented (Alaska, British 
Columbia, New Zealand, the Faroe Islands, Norway and Iceland) highlights that this can result 
in a reduction of discards, but relying upon a high level of surveillance and/or economic 
incentives to encourage fishers to land more of their catch (Condie et al., 2014b). All the 
bioeconomic analyses presented above show that at worst, the LO can have significant 
negative economic impact to the fisheries, potentially triggering a reaction through fishers 
adaptation. But it cannot be ascertained whether this reaction will actually take place, for three 
reasons. 
 
First, the various policy adjustments and exemptions that will be implemented make it 
difficult to evaluate whether this impact will be simply mitigated, nullified or even possibly 
turned positive. This would help the industry in the short-term, but may also reduce the 
economic incentives to change fishing patterns in the medium-term. Second, the landing 
obligation suffers from a legitimacy crisis, with the fishing industry feeling that the decision 
on LO was made by people that lack understanding of their daily practices (Borges, 2015; de 
Vos et al., 2016), and only a diligent dialogue and sustained collaboration at national level can 
revert this crisis. Third, the proper mechanisms of adaptation need to be incentivised.  
 
There are though many known factors that can insure the success or the failure of discard 
reduction programmes. (Catchpole and Gray, 2010) argued that the following conditions 
must be met for enhancing the chances of success:  
 perceived crises from the stakeholders side 
 economic incentives 
 stakeholder participation 
 adequate funding 
 expert knowledge 
 strong leadership 
 strict enforcement 
Ultimately, if the industry does not comply with the landing obligation and does not fully report 
catches, reduction of discard-based fishing mortality will not occur. Rather, there is a 
certain risk that fishing mortality increase instead, if the TACs are increased as catch quota, 
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but unreported discarding continues. This can be potentially worsened by the mechanisms of 
inter-species flexibility (STECF 2013; Woods et al. 2015). Therefore, great care must be 
given over the next few years, in order to closely follow whether and how fishers will react 
during the transition period from now to 2019.  
3.4. Summary: A quantitative bio-economic analysis on the likely 
consequences of the landing obligation regarding the 
objectives of the CFP, specially the MSY 
At this stage, it appears quite difficult to assess the true effect of the landing obligation 
on the objectives of the MSY, and to predict the evolution of the situation from now to 
2020, because the potential paths of development are numerous. And which path will be 
followed in each fishery is to a large extent conditional on social and cultural factors.  
 
This chapter has highlighted that the MSY and the landing obligation are two different 
objectives, with unclear relationships between the two. Many processes are engaged, which 
potentially conflict with each other: 
 
 In a single-stock context, a fully enforced landing obligation would imply a better 
monitoring and controllability of the total catches of the stock. Better data would mean 
a higher quality of the scientific knowledge, and better controllability would mean that 
the advised catch levels, decided in accordance with the MSY objective, would be 
respected and fishing mortality would be maintained at FMSY. This positive process has 
arguably been the main thinking motivating the landing obligation. 
 
 In a mixed-fishery context, a fully enforced landing obligation might trigger early 
closures of the fisheries, when a TAC is reached first (“choke effect”). This would 
potentially force the fishery at levels below those giving MSY for other stocks, until the 
choke effect has been mitigated.  
 
 This choke mechanism is then expected to trigger bottom-up mechanisms of 
adaptation of the fishing industry, which may develop paths towards more selective and 
adaptive fishing in order to make best use of the fishing opportunities. In theory, this 
would lead to the optimum combination of exploiting the most productive stocks and 
avoiding the least productive ones, which would achieve the MSY objective in the 
mixed-fishery context. Many options to achieve this already exist, and others are to be 
developed on the way in a collaborative process led by the fishing industry. 
 
 However, this mechanism may also lead to significant negative economic impact in 
the short term. Therefore, a more pessimistic scenario is also likely, as this situation 
might trigger mechanisms of non-compliance and resistance, rather than 
adaptation. Past experience with the North Sea cod management plan have already 
shown how politically difficult it is to enforce the reductions in effort that would be 
necessary to achieve recovery of the weakest stock in a mixed-fisheries. In case of 
non-compliance, the MSY objective will not be achieved for the weakest stocks as 
uncontrollable over quota discard would continue. 
 
 Policy adjustments are being implemented to mitigate these short-term negative 
impacts, such as TAC uplifts, exemptions and inter-species flexibility. These have 
been estimated to reduce, or even nullify the negative impact, but they might then 
also nullify the incentives to develop selective fishing. Furthermore, these 
adjustments might help for a better reporting of catches to some extent (what was 
previously discarded can be reported as landings as long as the TAC adjustment is 
higher than the potential discard); but they might not constrain fishing mortality, as 
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unreported overquota discarding might still take place when the adjusted TAC becomes 
constraining. In that case, fishing mortality could even increase unnoticeably. 
 
 Additionally, it cannot be excluded that new market opportunities will develop for 
the fraction of catch previously discarded, ensuring a higher landing price than the 
current levels. This would reduce the negative economic impact of the LO, but the 
fisheries would then develop towards a system of better discard use rather than better 
discard avoidance. These aspects are not developed further here, but should be 
considered closely.   
 
This summary highlights the difficulty to align the intention of the landing obligation, with its 
implementation in practice in highly mixed-fisheries. There are conflicting mechanisms in 
the system that can potentially drive the fishery away from its path towards MSY, and 
achieving both the MSY and the LO objectives at the same time, and within a short time 
frame is an ambitious task. The incentives to comply are rather weak, and the LO suffers from 
a lack of legitimacy in the views of many stakeholders.  
 
It is nevertheless possible to achieve all objectives by 2020 as stated in the 2013 CFP, but 
that requires that all necessary elements are in place to prevent the vicious circles to 
dominate, including: 
 
 Appropriate levels of quota uplifts to account for the expected additional landings that 
were discarded before; 
 A high level of surveillance and monitoring to ensure that the fraction previously 
discarded is reported and accounted in the TAC; 
 A sustained dialogue at national level to insure better acceptance and legitimacy; 
 Develop bottom-up mechanisms that can stimulate the development and the uptake of 
selective fishing practices; 
 Alternatively, if selectivity cannot be achieved, facilitate the inclusion of discards in 
the value chain, which could add some value to this fraction of the catch. Some value-
chain models like in Iceland or in Norway might be envisaged.  
 Additionally, a flexible management approach based on MSY ranges may limit the 
most adverse choke species effects and allow adapting to the changing productivity of 
the various stocks (see section 5.3). 
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4. An assessment of the main ecosystem impacts of the 
landing obligation in the North Sea 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The actual role of discards in the ecosystem is still little known but foodweb effects 
beyond scavengers may be limited  
 Seabirds and benthic scavengers are the main populations feeding on discards. 
 Some local impact might occur but the landing obligation might not threaten 
scavengers at population level 
 The main threat identified is from increased competition by scavenging seabirds on 
other seabird species. 
 A gradual reduction may potentially impact the ecosystem less than an abrupt 
elimination of discards  
 It is debated whether improved selectivity is ecologically beneficial or not in the 
long-term 
 The most important ecological benefits are obtained by avoiding catching discard in 
the first place, primarily by limiting fishing mortality 
 It is expected that improved knowledge will continue to develop in the coming years 
 
Assessing the actual ecosystem effects of discarding is a difficult issue, with many unknowns 
remaining. It hasn’t been much studied before the recent policy focus on the landing 
obligation. Direct observations are technologically difficult to gather and are scarce. Some 
literature review was conducted by (ICES, 2015j) and as part of the DiscardLess project 
(Feekings et al., 2015, Deliverable D1.1), that is used here. This scientific field of science is 
though receiving increased focus now. New knowledge is being gathered, that may lead to a 
better understanding of the ecological role of discarding and of selective fishing in the 
near future. 
4.1. Contribution of discarded fish to commercial fish stocks 
If the mortality of discarded individuals is low the issue of discarding becomes less of a 
concern (Mesnil, 1996). However, in many circumstances this is not the case and the mortality 
of discarded individuals can represent a significant portion of total fishing mortality. Many 
factors influence the survival of discarded fish, including technical factors (gear type, catch 
volume and composition, towing speed, haul time and duration, time on deck, handling 
procedures), environmental conditions (water and air temperatures, light conditions, anoxia, 
sea conditions, depth of capture), and biological attributes (fish size and species, 
behaviour, and physiology) (STECF 2013). Discarded fish of most demersal species do not 
survive well – potential exceptions include flatfish such as plaice, and certain elasmobranchs 
(skates and rays) may also be resilient. In theory, discarded Nephrops should survive well, 
although the survival rate is very dependent on handling processes and the season of the year. 
As for other sedentary species, the distance from fishing ground can also have an effect on 
survival, if they are thrown overboard while the vessel steam away and they fall on a 
potentially unsuitable habitat (Evans et al., 1994). An additional source of mortality for 
crustaceans is associated with their shell durability, and subsequently the stage of moult 
(Broadhurst et al., 2006).  
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In the stock assessments performed by ICES, only Nephrops include some parameters of 
discard survival as part of the management advice (25% survival rate on average in the North 
Sea). For the other stocks, it is assumed that all discard die, and therefore in terms of 
stock assessment, it does not make any significant difference if the discards are thrown 
back to the sea or brought to land as long as no unreported/unobserved discards occur under 
the landing obligation. If discards quantities are reduced, this will translate into a lower 
mortality of younger ages. In the medium-term, this should enhance the spawning stock 
biomass, but it cannot be ascertained whether this will also enhance future recruitment and 
productivity. 
 
A specific issue with regards to commercial species relates to the potential benefits of 
Nephrops as scavenging on fish discards. Direct observations of this are though scarce 
across the various in situ analyses. (Bergmann et al., 2002) reported observations of Nephrops 
being an important megafauna scavenger in the Clyde Sea. Some observations were also 
made by Feekings in the Kattegat (unpublished data). Ultimately, the actual dependency of 
Nephrops populations on fish discard remains largely unknown but may potentially play a role. 
4.2. Qualitative considerations on the ecosystem impacts of the 
landings obligation in the North Sea 
4.2.1. Effects on seabirds 
 
Some studies have estimated that seabirds consume up to 60% of discarded animals 
(Catchpole et al., 2006; Furness et al., 2007), but other studies have shown that most discard 
sink fairly rapidly and are only shortly available to seabirds. In any case, seabirds represent 
clearly a major group feeding on discards (Wassenberg and Hill, 1990). The effect of a 
reduction in food for seabirds might lead to decreased populations of the species most 
dependent on discards such as large generalist seabird species (Bicknell et al., 2013). 
These species (such as the great skua) have adapted to the discards food availability, and 
dominate many seabird communities. It is however expected that those will be able to buffer a 
decline in discards by switching to feed on alternative food. While it can thus be argued that 
a reduction of discards would then bring seabird populations to a more natural equilibrium, it is 
nevertheless noted that the impact would potentially rather be on other species than these 
generalist species, as those may increase competition and domination on other species of 
birds, either by direct predation or by stealing from their other sources of food (Votier et al., 
2004).  
4.2.2. Effects on benthic and demersal scavengers  
 
The new policy may also have an impact on benthic and demersal species who consume 
discards on or near the seabed (Depestele, 2015). The effect of this shortage depends on 
the ability of the scavengers to compensate by switching to other food sources, since it has 
been shown that the consumption of discards is dependent on the type of fish discarded 
(Sotillo et al., 2014), and on the changes in conversion efficiency of their food. This may limit 
the direct effects on these species, but may also cause unpredictable cascading effects on 
other species through increased predation and/or competition. A wide range of other species 
has been identified to scavenge on discards, from marine mammals to benthos (Svane et al., 
2008; Wassenberg and Hill, 1990). Scavengers range from those that are close to obligate 
scavengers through to predators that will occasionally scavenge.  
 
(ICES, 2015j) identified key scavengers from field studies which investigated the aggregation 
of organisms after presenting discards to them as bait. In European waters, most studies were 
conducted in the North Sea, the Irish Sea or the Clyde Sea. The main scavenging species (in 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
 64 
terms of biomass observed in trials) are common whelk (Buccinum undatum), Hermit crab 
(Pagurus bernhardus), common sea star (Asterias rubens), Edible crab (Cancer pagurus), 
swimming crabs (Liocarcinus sp.), and common littoral crab (Carcinus maenas). Nephrops has 
also been observed, but less frequently. Among fish species, the most obvious candidate would 
be the hagfish (Myxine glutinosa) (Martinez et al., 2011), but other common species were 
flatfish (mainly dabs Limanda limanda), whiting (Merlangius merlangus) and haddock 
(Melanogrammus aeglefinus) emphasizing the continuum between predator and scavenger.  
 
It is difficult to quantify the importance of discards compared to the abundance of other 
dead biomass in the sea. Seasonal and diurnal feeding patterns may affect food 
partitioning, and there is likely a high variability in the spatio-temporal effects of discards 
scavenging (Depestele, 2015). The spatial overlap between discards and benthic scavengers is 
an important factor. Fishing effort is not uniformly distributed in the North Sea (Figure 
20)(ICES, 2014). The gears leading to most discards are mainly concentrated in some given 
areas, the shallow waters in the Southern North Sea for beam trawls, and around the 
Nephrops fishing grounds for trawlers. 
 
Figure 20.  Fishing intensity (surface + subsurface) for otter trawls, beam trawls 
and dregdes, combined for the years 2009-2012. The colour in each 0.05 
× 0.05 degree grid cell corresponds to the swept area ratio (average 
number of times fished per year).  
 
Source : (ICES, 2014) Figure 1.6.6.5.5 
 
Discards are likely concentrated in these areas of more intense trawling, so the potential 
impact of the landings obligation might be local rather than regional. 
 
There is little information available on the spatial distribution of benthic scavengers in 
comparison. (Callaway et al., 2007) have demonstrated that the current populations of benthic 
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scavengers are those who have resisted to a century of trawling, and the main species are 
largely distributed all over the North Sea. Without certainty, one may thus assume that 
although local effects might occur, a reduction of discards may not threaten the benthic 
scavenging species at the population level. 
 
Another important point to consider is also the rate at which changes occur. (Fondo et al., 
2015) have shown for another ecosystem that a gradual reduction of discards is beneficial 
because it would increase the resilience of scavenger species through adaptation to food 
shortage, but that conversely, an abrupt reduction may be detrimental as it may affects 
ecosystem stability.  
4.3. Quantitative impacts of the landings obligation in the North 
Sea 
Heath et al (2014) have modelled the ecological effects of a discard ban, and in particular the 
indirect effects on other components of the ecosystem through trophic cascades (Figure 21). 
The study suggested that if discards were landed, there would be small negative effects on 
birds, mammals and scavengers (left column). However, if the discards were avoided (i.e. not 
caught at all through improved selectivity) there would be significant benefits to birds, 
mammals and the demersal fish biomass. But some limited negative effects were observed for 
the pelagic fish through trophic cascades on the pelagic fish biomass. This is reinforced if 
fishing mortality decreases at the same time, since the increased biomass of demersal stocks 
would increase predation on the pelagic communities. 
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Figure 21.  Sensitivity of food web components to landing obligation scenarios. 
Horizontal bars indicate the relative abundance of food web components 
under landing obligation scenarios relative to ‘status-quo’ discarding, for 
three levels of fishing intensity. Left column (a,c,e): sensitivity to 
‘discards-landed’ scenario, right column (b,d,f): sensitivity to ‘improved 
selectivity’.  
 
 
 
Source: (Heath et al., 2014) 
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4.4. Improved selectivity vs. balance harvesting 
More generically, the landing obligation has raised a fundamental issue, which is whether 
improved selectivity is actually ecologically beneficial or not. This question is not fully 
resolved scientifically. In the recent years, many voices have been raised to challenge the 
established selectivity paradigm that fishing on juveniles is damaging and wasteful, 
arguing that a ‘balanced harvesting’ (BH) across all species and size classes would provide 
high yield and improved ecosystem resilience and stability (Garcia et al., 2012; Kolding et 
al., 2015; Zhou, 2008), and less fisheries-induced evolution (Marty et al., 2014). Since then, 
analyses have been refined to assess the actual benefits and limits of the BH idea in the real 
world (Garcia et al., 2015), leading to a more nuanced view, with many uncertainties 
remaining due to the complex interactions of species and fisheries in open marine fisheries. In 
particular, BH does not appear to be technologically feasible, economically viable, and 
politically manageable in mixed demersal fisheries as those in the North Sea (Burgess 
et al., 2015; Reid et al., 2016).  
 
Nevertheless, even if a fully balanced fishing will not occur, it must be kept in mind that the 
quest for fully selective fisheries avoiding juveniles may have unintended ecological effects in 
the medium and long-term, and there is maybe an optimum selectivity in between these 
two extremes (Froese et al., 2016). Ultimately, the clearest ecological benefits remain in 
limiting fishing mortality overall.  
4.5. Summary on ecosystem effects of the landing obligation 
The ecosystem effects of discarding, and of its reduction with the landing obligation, are still 
largely unclear. The quantification of the role of discards in the marine foodweb is difficult. 
 
In the short-term, it can be expected that some changes will mainly occur in the seabirds and 
benthic scavenging communities. From the limited knowledge that is gathered here, it may 
though not lead to dramatic collapse of populations, since most scavenging species are able to 
feed on a wide variety of food sources. They also occur in large population numbers, so it can 
be expected that these have the required buffer to adapt.  
The main threat identified is on some seabird species that may be significantly affected by 
increased predation and/or competition by scavenging birds. In this regard, it is argued that 
the ecosystem would better adapt to potential food shortage if the landing obligation was 
implemented gradually rather than abruptly.  
 
An important discussion that is taking place is whether it is ecologically meaningful to bring 
biomass to land rather than discarding it. The study by Heath et al. (2014) shows that this 
effect is quite limited (left column on the Figure 21) beyond the actual scavenger groups. 
There is little evidence that landing the discarded biomass affects other species further in 
the food web. The importance of this question is thus rather an economic question 
(because of the extra costs linked to sorting, handling on board, shorter fishing trips and 
processing onshore) more than an ecological one.  
 
Clearly, the main ecological benefits are found in the reduction of catching discards in 
the first place, primarily through reduction in fishing mortality.  
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5. Recommendations on the best way to implement the 
discards plans and multiannual plans according to the 
different scenarios at regional level 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 MSY is the most important goal 
 Acknowledge the fuzzy and variable nature of MSY 
 Make smart and transparent use of MSY ranges 
 Maintain institutional sustainability and reactivity 
 Support the legitimacy of the landing obligation 
 Be precautionary over the next five years 
 
This ToR is difficult to address, as it is not exactly the role of science to make generic policy 
recommendations. Usually, scientists provide factual considerations on specific requests, 
often channelled through ICES or STECF, but usually not as individual and personal views.  
 
The topics below are therefore merely a reflection from the author on a small number of 
selected issues that have been witnessed to be of importance in the current political debate. 
These are built on own experience as well as on the knowledge gained through writing the 
present report, and can hopefully contribute to achieving the CFP objectives in spite of the 
major sources of complexity, variability and uncertainty surrounding them.     
5.1. MSY is the most important goal 
The 2013 CFP is a major document containing many words, covering different aspects, and 
many objectives. These objectives cannot always easily translate into operational and 
quantitative targets. There is also confusion whereas the landing obligation is an objective in 
itself, or a mean supposed to support the achievement of the other objectives. The multiplicity 
of goals may dilute the political efforts into many directions, and we witness that the landing 
obligation has overshadowed some of the previous developments in ecosystem-based 
marine management. Considering the unclear linkages between MSY and the landing 
obligation, we consider that achieving exploitation rates able to produce maximum 
sustainable yield is likely the most important objective and should be prioritised. Even in a 
single-stock perspective, MSY as a management objective brings a lot of ecological 
benefits compared to the previous management frameworks based on the 
precautionary approach, thus contributing directly and automatically to ecosystem-based 
management (Mace 2001; Patrick & Link 2015; Hilborn 2007; Hilborn 2011; Rindorf et al. in 
press) as well as to high yield and economic returns. Progresses towards this objective were 
already observed before the implementation of the 2013 CFP, and these should not be 
jeopardised. 
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5.2. Acknowledge the fuzzy and variable nature of MSY 
As at been explained at length in this report, a major impediment to this first recommendation 
is the difficulty to define and quantify this MSY objective. For scientists, MSY is a Holy 
Grail. Its quest is a noble cause, but it may never be found, and one may never know how it 
looks like and whether it has been truly reached. By nature, FMSY will always be varying even 
in a single-stock context. And it is less definable in a regional ecosystem context. 
Without any doubt, the multiple biological and technical interactions that are well known and 
well quantified in the North Sea cannot be ignored. Defining what is to be maximised (what is 
MSY) and whether it is a limit or a target is therefore not a scientific question alone. The 
fact that scientists argue against each other on the value and the appropriateness of MSY 
reflects this fuzzy border between science and policy (Mesnil, 2012). Therefore, MSY-based 
management requires first that this uncertain state of nature is understood and 
accepted. Only after can the necessary trade-offs be acknowledged, and the political choices 
be made.  
 
We argue thus that the MSY concept needs adaptation, not wholesale replacement (Kempf et 
al., in press; Rindorf et al., in press). Considering MSY as a multidimensional area rather 
than a point estimate is a new and pragmatic management approach to this central issue of 
definition and quantification of the MSY objective. This approach creates a formal frame which 
prioritises the avoidance of risks (“staying away from where we do not want to be”) to the 
achievement of a given optimum (“being where it is exactly best”), thus circumventing 
some of the most irresolvable definition questions while maintaining a productive ecosystem 
and viable fisheries (Degnbol, 2015).  
5.3. Smart and transparent use of MSY ranges 
Following these arguments, it has been proposed to define ranges of/around FMSY for each 
of the main stocks, as a primary management tool (Hilborn, 2010) Kempf et al., submitted). 
This “Pretty Good Yield” approach is conceptually appealing to address the issues above, but 
it also requires the quantification of these ranges, and in particular of the upper value 
above FMSY point estimate. This one relies on an important subjective choice, which is the 
acceptable threshold of loss of yield compared to the maximum estimated. 
 
(ICES, 2015f) has developed one objective and generic approach in a single-stock concept, 
and used the threshold of 5% loss of yield as the basis for defining MSY ranges. But these 
values could be further refined to account for other criteria of sustainability: e.g. the MSY 
Fupper value could be lowered if other ecosystem considerations are included, or the MSY Flower 
could be increased if social criteria are considered (Rindorf et al., in press, Figure 22). Also 
political constraints may forbid the usage of values above FMSY in the longer run.  
 
Following this approach, converting ecosystem objectives into corresponding single-stock 
FMSY ranges may lead to a narrower range, for example keeping 98% of maximum yield 
instead of 95%.  
 
(ICES, 2015f) has also pointed out clearly that F values above FMSY bear some costs in term of 
higher dependency on incoming year classes and higher variability in the advised catch 
opportunities (the occurrences where F has to be reduced because SSB is below MSY Btrigger 
will be more frequent). Fishing at the higher value of the range over a long period of time has 
negative consequences on fleets profitability and stocks biomass (although they might still 
remain precautionary with regards to Blim). It may therefore not be appropriate to fish 
systematically and blindly at the upper range.  
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One transparent option might be for example to choose FMSY as the default option for 
setting the annual fishing opportunities, and to allow for deviation from it within the range 
only on the basis of obvious and documented short-term conflicts, being of economic, 
ecological, social or political nature.  
 
Figure 22.  Hypothetical idea of a single-stock Pretty Good Yield, ecosystem- PGY 
and economic PGY for two groundfish species caught in a mixed fishery. 
Overlaps are displayed in green and striped green, indicating the most 
desirable areas of fishing mortalities for achieving multiple objectives.  
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Source: (Rindorf et al., 2016) 
 
From there, transparent options might also be explored to choose the management target 
for the annual TACs within the ranges, i.e. to identify the best value of fishing mortality for 
each stock and each year. As one possible option, (Ulrich et al., submitted) have for example 
developed an optimisation algorithm aiming at minimising the risk of over quota 
discarding in mixed-fisheries, resulting in fishing mortality values intermediate between the 
MSY Flower and Fupper ranges (Figure 23): 
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Figure 23.  Fishing mortality by stock in 2016: FMSY, FMSY ranges, F2014 and outcome 
of the optimisation algorithm  
 
Source: (ICES, 2015e) and Ulrich et al., submitted 
 
Ultimately, these are exploratory examples to illustrate that the concept of MSY ranges is 
pragmatic and potentially promising in a mixed-fisheries context, if used in a smart and 
measured way.  
 
But this process is also still very new and needs to be fully understood. Much is still to be 
learnt and explored on how to make the best use of ranges and not blindly manage stocks 
at the higher value. The work needs to be pursued through an iterative and collaborative 
process involving scientists, managers and stakeholders. 
5.4. Maintain institutional sustainability and reactivity 
Over the last few years, a considerable debate has animated the scientific community 
worldwide, discussing the true status of fish stocks in developed and developing countries 
and arguing on the major drivers of when, why and how some fisheries are sustainable, and 
some are not (see for example (Pauly et al., 2013) as well as the numerous other publications 
by these three authors). The main arguments by Professor Ray Hilborn (cf (Hilborn et al., 
2015) are that: 
 sustainability is more than ecological sustainability. It also includes economic 
growth and social development. Different interests groups (large fishing industry, 
small-scale fisheries, environmental organisations, consumers, food processing industry 
etc) may thus use different criteria to assess whether a fishery is sustainable or not, 
and the same fish product may be deemed sustainable by one group and totally 
unsustainable by another one. But the legitimacy of each group’s criteria is often 
questioned by other groups 
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 Ultimately, the most important factor of sustainability is not the actual objectives and 
criteria themselves, but the ability of the management institutions to take action and to 
implement ways to achieve them. 
 
This factor can also be referred as “institutional sustainability” (Charles, 1994; Garcia et 
al., 2003). It emphasizes the importance of having management authorities that are both 
proactive (setting clear goals) and reactive (adapting to changing conditions). An imperfect but 
adaptative path to manage fisheries could be potentially less risky than a blocked system 
where objectives and rules cannot be agreed upon.  
5.5. Support the legitimacy of catch quota management 
It has been described in section 3.4 how the simultaneous implementation of MSY and LO 
objectives may lead to vicious circles that could hamper their achievement, because of 
inappropriate economic incentives and poor industry support. Additionally, it has been shown 
in section 5 that the actual ecological effects of removing discarding are unclear and 
potentially limited, as are also the ecological effects of bringing discarded biomass to 
shore. It appears therefore that the most important aspect of the landing obligation is not so 
much the fate of discard after the catch, but mainly the ecological, economic and ethical 
benefits of avoiding catching them in the first place.  
 
In this regard, Catch Quota Management is a more important mechanism than the actual 
obligation to land. For this, documentation is a primordial element. We argue that the most 
important necessity is to ensure that discards and unwanted catches are routinely estimated 
by fishers and reported in log-books. An accurate reporting and monitoring of all catches 
is a primary step towards sustainable and responsible fisheries. It may also incentivise more 
selective fishing by raising awareness of the extent of unwanted catches, regardless of the 
subsequent fate of discards. This priority should be enforced straight from the start of the 
policy implementation.  
 
Ultimately, bringing discards to land requires changes in handling practices on-board and 
at shore, and while this shift is already emerging in a few places, this topic bears a great 
potential and will develop gradually, when technologies and markets become more 
available. Until then, it is felt that at present the idea of bringing discards to land is probably 
more contested by the fishing industry than the idea of Catch Quota itself, and a prioritisation 
of the implementation tasks during the transition phase 2016-2019 may improve the fishers’ 
perception of the policy’s legitimacy. 
5.6. Be precautionary over the next five years 
This final comment is to reflect on the major uncertainties regarding how the European 
fisheries will actually develop over the next five years. The 2013 CFP has set up very 
ambitious objectives, and the current European policy cannot be compared to any other 
fisheries in the world. As it has been explained in this report, there are many plausible 
scenarios for the future, some being more optimistic than others, but it is still too early to 
know which one(s) will dominate in the various fisheries. The situation of the North Sea 
demersal stocks is rather positive at present, and this is also reflected in significant 
increases in TACs in 2016. But globally, the European fishery system is still not very 
resilient yet. European fisheries have entered a state of fragile recovery, with many stocks 
slowly improving from low biomass levels and many fisheries slowly improving from low 
profitability and overcapacity levels (STECF 2015).   
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Therefore, inappropriate management decisions in the short-term may induce unbearable 
and potentially irreversible damages, and ruin the chances of achieving the CFP objectives. 
During the gradual implementation of the landing obligation between 2016 and 2019, 
many unknowns remain regarding, among others, (i) the compliance of the fleets, (ii) the 
changes in behaviour and in fishing patterns, and (iii) the availability and the reliability 
of catch statistics used in stock assessment. The effects of these unknowns will also likely 
not be perceived immediately, as it will take months or years before enough scientific evidence 
is collected on these. It would be appropriate to acknowledge these uncertainties, and act 
precautionary during the transition period. Adverse events such as major increases of fishing 
effort and fishing mortality should be avoided. Many commercial fish stocks in the North Sea 
are already exploited at levels close to FMSY, which might indicate a better balance 
between the current fishing capacity and the productive potential of the North Sea stocks than 
has been the case in the previous decades. This better balance should thus rather be 
maintained. It may be wise to maintain the overall fisheries activities around the same level as 
they are now until full confidence is gained on the controllability and enforcement level of 
the landing obligation.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
The provisions of the reformed European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reflected in the 
Regulation (EU) No.1380/2013 set the stage for the fishery managers and stakeholders to take 
the initiative and responsibility for the implementation of their regional fishery management 
plans. To implement the provisions of the CFP, the discard ban and the MSY objectives, and to 
facilitate management by these parties, the relevant data needs to be obtained, accessed and 
deployed in a regional context, for the purpose of this research study, in the Atlantic Ocean, 
through the specific case-study of the Bay of Biscay. The Bay of Biscay fits into the southern 
region of the Northeast Atlantic and in effect runs the entire coastline of western France and 
Spain. Both the high productivity of this region coupled with its somewhat complex political 
and geographic structure make comprehension of the current fisheries a difficult task. As in 
many other fisheries in the Atlantic Ocean most of the demersal fisheries in the Bay of Biscay 
are composite, i.e. a given resource, composed of several stocks and exploited by various 
gears. Fishing can operate, according to the gear, the area or season, on different components 
of a population i.e. juveniles, adults. Overall the Bay of Biscay can be considered as a highly 
representative example of the existing complexity in the fisheries management of the Atlantic 
Ocean. 
Aim 
The aim of this study is to provide a summary report on the state-of-the-art scientific 
knowledge in the relevant fields and analyse the following topics: 
- The current state of MSY modelling in the BoB as a case study of the Atlantic Ocean. 
- A quantitative bioeconomic analysis based on a case study in the BoB of the likely 
consequences of the LO on the objectives of the CFP, especially the MSY. 
- A qualitative and, if possible, quantitative assessment of the main effects of the LO, in the 
context of the MSY, on the whole ecosystem of the BoB. 
- Recommendations on the best way to implement the discard plans and multiannual plans, 
following different scenarios at the regional level. 
 
Main Findings 
In the Bay of Biscay, the stocks for which Maximum Sustainable Yield is known are, in 
general, above the biomass reference point for which a further action is necessary (Btrigger). 
FMSY, one of the benchmarks used to control different fishery aspects, is the fishing mortality 
that produces the maximum sustainable yield. However, the overall fishing mortalities in the 
Bay of Biscay are still above the FMSY, the numerical target of the Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(MSY). Two-thirds of the landings come from stocks with an unknown stock status. This does 
not imply that there is not management at all, given that to these stocks with an unknown 
status the precautionary approach is applied. Since the year 2000 there are positive signals of 
the changing status of the stocks. However, individually, the number of stocks with an 
unknown status in the Bay of Biscay is too high. Procedures assessing the MSY principle need 
to be explored urgently, even if such an assessment provides only a limited overview 
(“something better than nothing” approach). These procedures can be based on the “data 
poor” approaches currently being investigated by for example the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES). 
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In the mixed fisheries (those with technical interactions between different gears) simultaneous 
management of some stocks at single-species FMSY levels is likely to fail and create 
inconsistencies between the targets for the different stocks. These inconsistencies come from 
the technical interactions in the sense that the fleets catching different stocks and in some 
cases catching them simultaneously, cannot be selective enough to reach individual MSY of 
each stock, at the same time. 
 
Fishing opportunities can be more easily reconciled and made consistent with the objectives of 
the Common Fisheries Policy by using the flexibility provided by the FMSY ranges. However, 
adopting these ranges will increase the risk of overfishing if fishing is conducted persistently at 
the upper limit of the ranges. In any case, the scientific advisory process will have to be more 
focused on mixed and multispecies fisheries (fisheries in where many species contribute to the 
output) for a better management. This recommendation is reinforced by the introduction of the 
Landing obligation. 
 
Landing obligation, introduced in the current Common Fisheries Policy, implies that catches 
of quota fish may no longer be discarded and that they have to be counted against the quota. 
Within the EU Atlantic waters it can be interpreted as a discard ban only for stocks subjects to 
TACs and quotas. In the Mediterranean it applies to species subject to minimum size limits. 
The Landing obligation (LO) generates the so-called choke effect (the smallest quota species in 
a mixed fishery: when the quota of such choke species is exhausted, the whole fishing activity 
has to stop). When landing obligation is combined with Harvest Control Rules (sets of well-
defined rules that can be used for determining annual fish catch quotas) seeking a single-point 
estimate of MSY (i.e. FMSY), the final fishing mortalities will be below the FMSY. According to the 
MSY criteria, this constitutes a loss of fishing opportunities. However, this does not necessarily 
imply an economic effect, or at least not the same effect on all the fleets. Even though, in the 
short-term there will be economic (lower profits) and social (reduction in the number of 
vessels and hence of employment) losses, in the mid-term, some fleets will be better off. 
However, it is not possible to provide a clear long-term picture, especially because it is not 
easy to infer the likely consequences of the landing obligation in the ecosystem functioning. 
Exemptions (e.g. de minimis) and flexibilities (e.g. quota swap) effectively reduce the short-
term effects of the LO. In the long term, the benefits of the LO implementation will also 
decrease using exemptions and flexibilities. The size of the exemption determines how close 
the system will be to the previous (no-LO) state. The higher the level of the exemption in the 
system, the closer it will be to the no-LO state. 
 
The landing obligation will produce incentives for the fishers to reduce the discard levels. These 
incentives come in the form of fewer constraints for the fleet targeting one or more than one 
species (multispecies fisheries). There are many ways of reducing the discard levels; they 
depend on the spatial and temporal patterns of the fleet activity, including some fishing gear-
related technical factors. 
 
The overall ecosystem analysis does not give us precise results of the effects that the 
landing obligation will have on the Atlantic Ocean and in particular in the Bay of Biscay 
ecosystem. However, a preliminary quantitative analysis shows some differences between the 
results obtained for the no-LO and the LO scenarios. While both adult and juvenile hake 
biomasses are higher in the no-LO scenario, other species of the same guild (i.e., megrim) 
show different trends. Similarly, in the pelagic system, depending on the species, the 
management measures in each scenario have different effects: the landing obligation seems to 
be favourable for anchovy and horse mackerel, whereas sardine biomasses keep decreasing. 
The discard ban has negative effects on the carnivorous invertebrates such as Nephrops. 
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In the Bay of Biscay, few studies have assessed seabird attendance of the fishing vessels 
during fish discarding and few have shown the contribution of discards to the diet of 
populations or species. There is no study providing estimates of the discard consumption and 
contribution to the diet of the marine mammals, and there are no reports on the effect of 
discards on movement patterns, breeding success and adult survival. 
 
The results of the preliminary analysis presented in this report show that there is no ideal 
solution for all the stocks. What might be a good solution for some species could have 
undesirable effects on other stocks. These results highlight the need for a holistic framework to 
find the most appropriate measures for the management of marine resources. 
 
A discard ban must be accompanied by a suite of supplementary regulatory measures. We 
have learned that from the past attempts to analyse these complex systems. These measures 
could include compensations for the extra work of handling and processing the unwanted 
catch that now has to be landed. For example if this unwanted catch could be sold to the 
processing industry, all this extra income could go directly to the crew. It should also include a 
harmonisation between mesh sizes and minimum conservation reference sizes, considering 
also the commercial references, avoiding differences between different areas but equal 
markets that can confuse consumers. It should be also ensured that regulations are formulated 
to minimise possible incentives to discarding, for example allocating quotas to cover expected 
unavoidable bycatches. Finally this suite of supplementary regulatory measures should also 
consider the specific characteristics of some fleets like small coastal vessels fishing with 
passive gears, which have limitations in terms of mobility and ability to change fishing ground 
and hence to avoid some undesired catches. 
 
Development and implementation of improved exclusive fishing technologies and 
operational methods could help to achieve a sustainable use of the marine resources. Some 
trade-offs need to be established to balance the effects of any intervention on the different 
components of the marine ecosystem. 
 
In the context of implementation disturbances, MSY looks like a necessary target; however, 
MSY does not constitute in itself a plan. Any effective plan has to involve the ecosystem-based 
management. The existing uncertainties regarding the data and the system dynamics make 
the application of a multi-level ecosystem-based management a risky exercise. However, a 
plan following some well-considered steps might reduce those risks, or at least, it would be no 
more risky than the traditional fishery management. 
 
Such a plan must be, of necessity, iterative and adaptive. Scientific investigation should be 
linked to a societal debate on management objectives, trade-offs, and analytical tools. No one 
individual can be fully aware of all activities and dependencies, so it is important to build 
teams working towards a shared regional vision, with a strong communication between the 
main players. 
 
The plan must maximise the use of available information rather than emphasize the limiting 
impact of insufficient information and the lack of quantitative models on the application of the 
ecosystem approach. As we all know, it is unlikely that even a full understanding of the 
ecosystem would make the political decision-making easier. Furthermore, the complexities of 
governance should not be an excuse for avoiding new approaches. The society has the right to 
make decisions based on its evolving political processes. 
 
There is room to achieve flexibility without sacrificing the sustainability of the fishing policy. 
The Pretty Good Yield (PGY) concept defined as the sustainable yield of at least 80% of the 
maximum sustainable yield could be mentioned as an example. Pretty Good Yield theory 
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acknowledges the fact that MSY (in the form of BMSY or FMSY) can either be treated as expected 
values (averages over time when fishing at a constant fishing rate) or point estimates given 
deterministic dynamics. Furthermore, by adopting a sustainable and “pretty” optimal solution, 
other uses and/or societal factors can be considered, without compromising the MSY concept. 
This flexibility is important to allow appropriate management. It also avoids the criticism that 
MSY has received from the very beginning, of ignoring the multispecies, multi-fleet of the 
fisheries. Single stock MSY concept requires that all species be exploited below their MSY 
abundance and therefore that the overall level of exploitation be fixed at the lowest level 
required by the species with the lowest resilience. Furthermore from the ecosystem 
perspective the MSY concept does not consider the existing relationships within all the 
ecosystem components. The flexibility provided by PGY can provide room for trade-offs 
between the economic and the social sustainability pillars. 
 
This approach is also in line with the iterative and adaptive characteristics that any effective 
plan would need. The general policy and, in particular, the ecosystem-based fishery 
management have become a “predict and prescribe” strategy, exacerbated by the recent 
economic crisis in Europe and its social consequences. This probably reflects the limited 
research on the basic functions of the ecosystems. However, predictions have to be based on 
what we know and it is important not to base all our expectations on what might be a giant 
with feet of clay. Furthermore, the future is not likely to be a simple extrapolation of the recent 
past. 
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GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
KEY FINDINGS for the Bay of Biscay 
• The Bay of Biscay can be considered as a representative example of the Atlantic 
Ocean; it can also be treated as an individual ecosystem. 
• The Bay of Biscay is an ecosystem fished by the fleets from eight different member 
states; the main two players are France and Spain. 
• It is difficult to define a virgin/pristine ecosystem after centuries of anthropomorphic 
alterations. It is only possible to talk about the ecosystem health if we treat it as a 
unique organism. 
• Ecosystem health is defined as a comprehensive, multiscale, dynamic and hierarchical 
measure of system resilience, organisation and vigour. All these concepts are 
embodied in the term “sustainability”. 
• The ecosystem approach serves multiple objectives, includes strong stakeholder 
participation and focuses on human behaviour as the central management dimension. 
The regionalisation of the advice is based on the ecosystem overviews in which the 
ecosystem state and pressures are summarized for the individual regions. 
 
 
As in many other fisheries in the Atlantic Ocean most of the demersal fisheries in the Bay of 
Biscay are composite, i.e. a given resource, composed of several stocks and exploited by 
various gears. Fishing can operate, according to the gear, the area or season, on different 
components of a population i.e. juveniles, adults. Overall the Bay of Biscay can be considered 
as a highly representative example of the existing complexity in the fisheries management of 
the Atlantic Ocean. 
 
The Bay of Biscay (BoB) has been suggested as an individual ecosystem by some sources, 
such as the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF (2012), while 
others (e.g., The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, ICES) make it a part of 
the BoB and Iberian Seas Eco-Region. Both approaches can be easily supported. In this report, 
the BoB will be considered a manageable ecosystem composed by the ICES divisions VIII a, b, 
c and d (see Map 2 in Section 1 of this report). 
 
The ecosystem approach serves multiple objectives, involves strong stakeholder 
participation and focuses on human behaviour as the central management dimension. However 
it is not easy to manage an ecosystem given that it is necessary to define its attributes. 
Setting up objectives is difficult given that we are trying to define a virgin/pristine ecosystem 
after centuries of anthropomorphic alterations. This is why if we treat it as a unique organism, 
in general, we talk about the ecosystem health. 
 
Ecosystem health has been defined by Costanza (1992) as a comprehensive, multiscale, 
dynamic, hierarchical measure of system resilience, organisation and vigour. In fact, all these 
concepts are embodied in the term “sustainability”. Sustainability implies the system ability to 
maintain its structure (organisation) and functions (vigour) in the face of external stress 
(resilience). The culture and attitudes of humans are the most important factors in our striving 
for sustainability. We can only achieve it by putting humans and their uses of space and 
resources at the heart of the decision-making process.  
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In this report we combine the ecosystem approach with the regionalisation given that the 
regionalisation of the advice is based on the ecosystem overviews, in which the ecosystem 
state and pressures are summarized by regions. The regionalisation is also supported by 
looking only at the fisheries. For example, according to Uhlmann et al. (2014), the region-by-
region approach is preferable given the differences between the regional discard levels in 
Europe. 
 
This report reviews the up-to-date information on the LO, its impact on MSY objective and on 
the ecosystem. It also provides an overview of the ecosystem processes to allow the 
ecosystem drivers to be incorporated into traditional fish stock assessments and formulate the 
operational advice. We discuss the data applicable to the BoB ecoregion. 
 
We present a synthesis of the existing literature for ToR 1, a quantitative analysis based on the 
projections for ToR 2 and a combined analysis of these ToRs for ToR 3. ToR 4 presents the 
general conclusions and recommendations that can be extracted from ToRs 1 to 3. Some of 
the results, conclusions and recommendations could apply to all ecoregions outside the Atlantic 
Ocean. However, the report focuses on the main differences found from the comparison 
between the Atlantic Ocean (taking the Bay of Biscay as a case study) and other areas. 
 
The area: the Bay of Biscay 
 
The BoB is a gulf of the northeast Atlantic Ocean located south of the Celtic Sea. It lies along 
the western coast of France from Brest to the Spanish border and the northern coast of Spain 
to the Cape Ortegal. The average depth is 1744 m and the greatest depth is 4735 m. There is 
a continental shelf in the northern BoB, approximately 140-km wide, which becomes narrower 
to the south, reaching 50 km from the southern France. From the coast to offshore, the depth 
gradually increases to 200 m; the shelf is mainly flat. On the southern border of the BoB, the 
continental shelf of the Cantabrian Sea is as narrow as 12 km. 
 
Map 1. Bay of Biscay 
 
           Source: AZTI 
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Fleets operating in the Bay of Biscay  
The Bay of Biscay is an ecosystem fished by the fleets from different member states. According 
to the ICES database, eight member states report the catches: France, Spain, Germany, 
Denmark, United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal. In the year 2013, the first 
two countries (Figure ) accounted for the 93% of the catches. 
 
Figure 1. Catch composition by member state 
 
Source: AZTI, using ICES data. 
 
Table 5 provides a summary of the fleets of these two main member states. These fleets are 
subject to many different regulations, including effort regulations, technical regulations and a 
system of total allowable catches (TAC) and quotas. 
 
Table 5. Main types of fleets in the Bay of Biscay.  
Member State Gear Type Main Target species 
France 
Bottom trawls  Nephrops; Mixed: Sole, whiting, 
cuttlefish; Anglerfish 
Pelagic trawl small-mesh  Anchovy 
Pelagic trawl Bass, Albacore 
Purse-seine Sardine, anchovy 
Gillnets Hake 
Gillnets large mesh Anglerfish 
Miscellaneous Crabs, bass, conger 
Spain 
Fixed nets Hake, Anglerfish 
Longline Hake, Great forkbeard, Conger 
Otter Trawl Mixed Fishery Horse mackerel, Blue whiting,  
Mackerel, White fish 
Pair Bottom Trawl Fishery Blue Whiting; hake 
Purse-seine Sardine, anchovy 
Miscellaneous Multispecies 
  Source: ICES 
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1. Summary of the current state of MSY modelling in the 
Bay of Biscay 
KEY FINDINGS  
 The stocks with known MSY are in general above the value of spawning stock 
biomass that triggers a specific management action (Btrigger). For these stocks FMSY 
seems to be a safe advice to reach the MSY objective.  
 The number of species with an unknown stock status in the Bay of Biscay is too high 
(66%). 
 The impact of the landing obligation in the Atlantic Ocean in general and in the Bay of 
Biscay in particular has not been fully evaluated. 
 Managing many stocks at a single-species fishing mortality consistent with achieving 
Maximum Sustainable Yield (FMSY) level is likely to create inconsistencies between the 
targets for different stocks. These inconsistencies come from the technical interactions 
in the sense that the fleets catching different stocks and in some cases catching them 
simultaneously, cannot be selective enough to reach individual MSY of each stock, at 
the same time 
 Using flexible targets, such as ranges of MSY or multi-stock reference points, fishing 
opportunities can be more easily reconciled and become consistent with the objectives 
of the CFP.  
 The use of flexible targets will increase the risk of overfishing if the fishing activities are 
maintained at the upper limit of the ranges. 
 Fishing at the lower limits of the FMSY ranges generate larger biomasses but lower 
catches and require less effort in comparison with the single estimate of FMSY. 
 The scientific advisory process should increase its focus on the mixed and 
multispecies fisheries. This recommendation is reinforced by the introduction of the 
landing obligation. 
1.1. Modelling status 
There are many large and diverse communities of the commercial species in the Bay of Biscay 
and the surrounding waters (ICES, 2014b). In the demersal species group, the most important 
commercial species are hake, megrim, anglerfish and sole. Cephalopods and rays are also 
considered target species by some fleets during some parts of the year. 
 
The main pelagic species are sardine, anchovy, mackerel, horse mackerel and blue whiting. 
Seasonally, albacore can be found along the shelf break. Immature northern bluefin tuna 
migrate to the feeding areas in the innermost part of the BoB, from late spring to mid autumn, 
returning to the Gulf of Cadiz and Atlantic Moroccan coasts in winter (Rodríguez-Marín et al., 
2007). 
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Map 2.  ICES areas VI, VII, VIIIabcd and IXa.The Bay of Biscay is shadowed in 
light blue. 
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   Source: AZTI 
The study area is presented in the Map 1. For the purpose of this study, the BoB comprises the 
ICES divisions VIII a, b, c and d. Single stock scientific advice is made by the different regional 
fishery organisations, on the basis of the Biological Reference Points (BRPs). BRPs are the 
benchmarks with which the abundance of the stock or the exploitation rate can be compared. 
The stocks evaluated in the BoB waters and their statuses in the MSY approach are displayed 
in Table 6. 
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Table 6.  Stocks for which there are reference points defined in the Bay of Biscay 
(BoB) and Iberian Waters (IW). 
Stock Distribution F2014/FMSY SSB2015/BTrigger 
Sole (BoB) 
Sole (Solea solea) in Divisions VIIIa,b 
(BoB) Overfished 
High risk of being 
overexploited 
Hake (IW) 
Hake (Merluccius merluccius) in 
Divisions VIIIc and IXa (Southern stock) Overfished Undefined 
Four-spot 
megrim (IW) 
Four-spot megrim (Lepidorhombus 
boscii) in Divisions VIIIc and IXa Overfished 
Small risk of being 
overexploited 
Megrim (IW) 
Megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis) 
in Divisions VIIIc and IXa Overfished 
Small risk of being 
overexploited 
White anglerfish 
(IW) 
White anglerfish (Lophius piscatorius) 
in Divisions VIIIc and IXa (Cantabrian 
Sea. Atlantic IW) Overfished Undefined 
Black-bellied 
anglerfish (IW) 
Black-bellied anglerfish (Lophius 
budegassa) in Divisions VIIIc and IXa 
(Cantabrian Sea. Atlantic IW) Not Overfished 
Small risk of being 
overexploited 
Sardine in 
Divisions (IW) 
Sardine (Sardina pilchardus) in 
Divisions VIIIc and IXa Undefined Undefined 
Hake (BoB, Celtic 
Seas, North Sea, 
, English 
Channel) 
Hake (Merluccius merluccius) in 
Division IIIa. Subareas IV. VI and VII and 
Divisions VIIIa.b.d (Northern stock) Overfished 
Small risk of being 
overexploited 
Blue whiting 
(Combined stock) 
Blue whiting (Micromesistius 
poutassou) in Subareas I-IX. XII and XIV 
(Combined stock) Overfished 
Small risk of being 
overexploited 
Horse mackerel 
(Western stock) 
Horse mackerel (Trachurus trachurus) 
in Divisions IIa. IVa. Vb. VIa. VIIa-c. e-k. 
VIII (Western stock) Below 1 
Small risk of being 
overexploited 
Mackerel 
(Combined stock) 
Mackerel (Scomber scombrus) in the 
Northeast Atlantic (combined 
Southern. Western and North Sea 
spawning components) Overfished 
Small risk of being 
overexploited 
Boarfish (BoB, 
Celtic Seas, 
English Channel) 
Boarfish (Capros aper) in Subareas VI-
VIII (Celtic Seas and the English 
Channel. BoB) Undefined Undefined 
Nephrops (BoB) 
Nephrops in Divisions VIIIa,b (BoB, FUs 
23–24) Undefined Undefined 
Plaice (IW) Plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) in Undefined Undefined 
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Subarea VIII and Division IXa (BoB, 
Atlantic IW) 
Whiting (BoB, 
IW) 
Whiting (Merlangius merlangus) in 
Subarea VIII and Division IXa (BoB, 
Atlantic IW) Undefined Undefined 
Rays and skates  Unknown Unknown 
Saithe  Unknown Unknown 
Spurdog  Unknown Unknown 
Deep-sea sharks  Unknown Unknown 
Black 
scabbardfish 
 
Unknown Unknown 
Alfonsinos  Unknown Unknown 
Roundnose 
grenadier 
 
Unknown Unknown 
Orange roughy  Unknown Unknown 
Red seabream  Unknown Unknown 
Greater 
forkbeard 
 
Unknown Unknown 
 
There are different approaches to the concept of MSY, using alternative reference points. FMSY 
is the fishing mortality rate, which, if maintained, would result in MSY. Used as a biomass 
reference point, FMSY can be seen as the implicit target harvest rate used to accomplish the 
CFP.  
 
Table 6 defines three concepts: 
 
1. The ratio F to FMSY. F is the status quo fishing mortality and FMSY is the fishing mortality 
consistent with achieving the MSY. If the F value is smaller than the FMSY, the stock is not 
overfished. If F is larger than the FMSY, the stock is overfished. 
2. The ratio SSB2015 to Btrigger. SSB2015 is the statu quo spawning-stock biomass and Btrigger is 
the biomass level that triggers a specific management action. If the statu quo biomass 
SSB2015 is below the Btrigger, there is a risk of overexploitation; thus, some additional 
management action has to be taken apart from recommending the FMSY. If SSB2015 is larger 
than the Btrigger, maintaining the FMSY should safely accomplish the MSY objective. 
3. There is a difference between the undefined and unknown situations. The situation is 
undefined if one or several reference points cannot be computed. It is unknown if only the 
landing estimates exist. 
The overview of the stock status in the BoB is provided in Figure ; the stock status was 
multiplied by the landings in the BoB provided to the ICES (the year 2013). 
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Figure 2. Status of the stocks in the Bay of Biscay weighted by landings. 
 
 
Source: AZTI 
 
For the stocks for which reference points are known, the trend for the main groups of species 
(pelagics, demersals and flatfish) is provided by the ratio of F to FMSY and the abundance (SSB) 
to Btrigger (Figure ). 
 
Figure 3.  Temporal evolution of the F to FMSY (up) and SSB to Btrigger ratios (down). 
The dotted line represents the ratio 1 that  defines the overfished and 
risk of everexploitation, respectively 
 
Source: ICES  
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Any impact assessment has to consider the multispecies and mixed fishery characteristics of 
the BoB. In a multispecies fishery, many species contribute to the output. Mixed fisheries are 
those with technical interactions between different gears. The Scientific, Technical and 
Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF, 2015) has supplied the most up-to-date evaluation 
of MSY bioeconomic modelling considering the multispecies and mixed fisheries of the BoB. 
The report discussed the likely environmental, economic and social impact of a multiannual 
plan. It tested the MSY objectives and upper and lower limits of the stock within the 
framework of such a plan. That is, this work tested the likely effects of using fishing mortality 
ranges as an objective instead of single estimates. The exercise was fleet-oriented. The fleets 
were projected according to the best available knowledge of the dynamics of the stocks and 
their uncertainties. A summary of the results obtained in this work can be found in Section 1.2 
of this document. 
 
There are some other similar studies; however, they only cover some fleets or some stocks: 
 
 The study of Guillen et al. (2013) has analysed the impact of exploitation using the 
MSY and the maximum economic yield (MEY) on the optimal effort allocation in fleets 
with different exploitation patterns and economic structures. The authors have shown that 
when the multi-fleet nature of the fisheries is taken into account, MSY landings are a third 
higher than the single-fleet estimates. It shows the importance of allocating fishing effort 
between fleets to obtain better yields taking into account joint production processes, 
various metiers and reallocation of effort (both in production and economic terms). 
 
 The consequences of nonselective fishing operations have been analysed by Da 
Rocha et al. (2012). The authors report that the single-species management 
objectives might not be achievable in mixed fisheries. The practice could be unsafe for 
some species, promote over-quota discarding and lead to misreporting of the catches. The 
study reports the losses due to the use of the FMSY single-species target in the mixed 
fishery accounting for a tenth of the total discounted profit. This discounted profit is 
obtained multiplying anticipated profits to their current market value present value. 
 
 Guillen et al. (2014) have explored the impact of the maximisation of catches or 
landings and the effect of the survival level of discards on the MSY estimates. They 
report that the optimal exploitation levels can vary significantly when optimizing for 
catches or landings and are affected by assuming a certain survival rate of the discards. All 
these factors can lead to different MSY target estimates. 
 
 In the study of Morandeau et al. (2014), the main reasons for discarding have 
been identified using a sampling-based scheme. The results show that the main reasons for 
discarding are market-based first and quality-related, second. The regulation-associated 
factors have been less important in the analysed fisheries. The study has also shown that 
the decision to discard (live discards, in part) in highly selective fisheries might be 
motivated by the economic constraints. 
 
 Da-Rocha et al. (2015) highlight the importance of the discount factor (associated 
with the projected value of the stocks). The discount factor is the multiplier that converts 
anticipated returns to their current market value (present value). That is, a positive 
discount factor implies that the present (catches, income, profits,…) is positively weighted 
in comparison with the future and that the higher this discount rate is the higher will be 
this positive weight of the present. They suggest that in the MSY computation, the discount 
factor should change depending on the scarcity of the resource. 
 
 The studies by Garcia et al. (2016) and Prellezo et al. (under review) explore the 
likely implications of the LOs in the context of the MSY. They show that the multi-
stock reference points, i.e., the computation of reference points per fishery (or at least for 
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the main stocks of a fishery) could reduce the negative impact of the LO. They also report 
that the LO provides an incentive to be more selective and reduce the level of discards. 
 
 Guillen et al. (2015) have conducted an analysis of the share remuneration 
system (the crew paid a proportion of the value of the landings) for different stock and 
fleet objectives. The results confirm the necessity of stock recovery and improvements in 
the fleet efficiency to increase the salaries. 
1.2. Summary of the results 
Almost all the stocks for which the MSY (or a proxy) is known are above the biomass 
reference points for which a further action is necessary (Btrigger). However, the overall fishing 
mortalities are still above the FMSY. It has been shown that two-thirds of the landings originate 
from the stocks with an unknown status. Since the year 2000, the ratio of F to FMSY has been 
decreasing while the ratio of B to Btrigger has been increasing for the main group of species 
(demersal, pelagic and flatfish). In both cases, this is a positive development in the stock 
status. 
 
We came across some important results in the existing literature. The result that the 
simultaneous management of several stocks at a single-species FMSY level is likely to fail and 
create inconsistent targets for different stocks is of particular relevance. These inconsistencies 
are derived from the non-selective nature of the fishing gears. It implies that all the reference 
points cannot be obtained simultaneously at a given fishing effort level. 
 
In the mixed fisheries, fishing opportunities can be reconciled and made consistent with the 
objectives of the CFP by exploiting the flexibility provided by the FMSY ranges. However, 
adopting this approach will increase the risk of overfishing if the fishing activities are 
maintained at the upper limit of the ranges. If we take into account the mixed fishery 
requirements for matching the single-species targets simultaneously, the benefits of flexibility 
and adaptability might be lost. The probability of some stocks falling below Bpa/Blim reference 
points might increase and the economic performance could be impaired. Fishing at the lower 
limits of the FMSY ranges generate larger SSB but lower catches and require less effort in 
comparison with the with the single estimate of FMSY. 
 
Last but not least, the conclusion of the STECF (2015) report is that the biomass safeguards 
for all stocks should still be maintained to provide a basic level of protection. These safeguards 
should guarantee that the SSB never (or with a low probability -<5%) falls below the Blim 
(stock size below which there may be reduced recruitment). ICES stock estimates leads to a 
precautionary reference point Bpa, which is a biomass reference point designed have a low 
probability of being below Blim. In most cases the safety margin is taken as a standard value, 
such that in most cases Bpa = Blim ×1.4. When the spawning stock size is estimated to be 
above Bpa, the probability of impaired recruitment is expected to be low.  
 
Some other important results should be also highlighted: 
 
-Inter-annual catch constraints should be kept to stabilize inter-annual fishing opportunities. In 
particular, it is necessary to consider the future discount factors, given that they affect the 
path to the targets. 
 
-MSY estimates depend not only on the stock dynamics but also on the discard ratio and the 
discard survival rate. 
-The reasons for discarding are diverse and the regulations are only one of the factors. In 
some fisheries of the Bay of Biscay, the economic constraints are more important than the 
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regulatory constraints. In that sense we can find market reasons which will be the case of 
highgrading) but also the additional costs of handling and storing unwanted or low valued fish.  
 
-The implementation of the landing obligation will generate different effects, depending on the 
fleet. The overall results might be difficult to predict. 
 
-Stock recovery and the improvements in the fleet efficiency are necessary to increase the 
salaries of the crew. 
1.3. Summary of uncertainties and limitations 
The data on the mixed and multispecies fisheries systems are still inadequate and do not allow 
a full evaluation of the risks associated with different management options. So far, not a single 
analysis incorporates all the fleets and stocks in the BoB in the same modelling framework. 
 
The impact of the landing obligation in the BoB has not been fully evaluated. The reasons for 
this are diverse, but the main factor must be the uncertainty associated with the 
implementation of some of the measures. However, it has been shown that the concepts such 
as the FMSY ranges are promising in terms of the flexibility they provide compared to the single 
point approach currently used for management references. Nevertheless, the implementations 
proposed in the STECF (STECF, 2015) are still provisional and not based on the approved ICES 
methodology. Furthermore, the risk associated with the use of these ranges has not been fully 
evaluated. 
1.4. Summary of recommendations 
The number of stocks with an unknown stock status in the Bay of Biscay is too high. 
Procedures to provide an assessment against the MSY principle should be urgently explored, 
even if they provide only a limited overview. 
 
The scientific advisory process should concentrate more on the mixed and multispecies 
fisheries. This recommendation is reinforced by the introduction of the landing obligation. 
 
STECF (STECF, 2015) advocates the use of harvest control rules (HCR) to avoid an additional 
level of uncertainty in the future decisions. A HCR represents a pre-agreed plan for adjusting 
management of a fish stock based on its perceived status. It implies that fishing possibilities 
are only driven by the natural variability of the fish and the management objectives in place, 
creating a stable environment to anticipate future fishing possibilities and hence the 
investment cessions of the fleets. Additionally to what the report of the STECF says we would 
also recommend defining the harvest control rules in the multispecies context, that is, harvest 
control rules have to consider and internalize the multispecies nature of the fisheries. 
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2. A quantitative bioeconomic analysis based on a BoB 
case study of the likely effects of the LO. 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
• In a multispecies context LO generates a choke effect; the real fishing mortalities of 
each individual stock will be below the FMSY calculated for this stock. In this context 
fishing (sustainable) opportunities are likely to be lost. 
• The incentives to reduce the discards levels are produced by the necessity that the 
fleets have on trying to be not constrained in the effort that they can apply when 
targeting one or more than one species.  
• There are many ways of reducing these discard levels, however all of them depend 
on the spatial and temporal changes in the fleet activity and the effort allocation, the 
technical factors (such as the selectivity of the fishing gear), etc.  
• Real fishing mortalities should be below FMSY. Harvest control rules based on single-
point estimates of fishing mortality can have this effect, at least in a multispecies 
context.  
• Landing obligation and MSY are two different objectives of the CFP. Landing 
obligation cannot be considered as a direct mean to achieve MSY. 
 
 
Quantitative analyses of fisheries are of growing importance given the necessity to assess the 
consequences of the future management actions. There are many models capable of dealing 
with this issue (Prellezo et al., 2012); however, they vary in their ability to build certain types 
of simulations. 
 
An analysis of the likely effects of the LO is presented and discussed, based on a case study in 
the BoB. The simulation includes all the fleets involved in the catches of the northern stock of 
hake (Merluccius merluccius) and the Celtic Sea and BoB megrim (L. whiffiagonis). The 
analysis is conducted using a bioeconomic simulation model (FLBEIA) with the linked 
biological, economic and social dimensions. This implies that the economic results (mainly 
profits of the fleet, and the effort allocation to the métiers) affect the biological outcome (the 
catches made). The SSB and the fishing opportunities (TACs and quotas) also affect the 
economic results. Both factors will have a social impact depending on the contribution to the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and/or the employment level. 
 
In a simulation analysis, it is important to set a full Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) 
cycle (Figure ). MSE is a simulation-based methodology that is meant to identify harvest 
strategies with adequate, albeit potentially suboptimal, management performance with respect 
to multiple criteria over a wide range of model assumptions about the dynamics of the 
resources. This should be done, firstly, to complete the full feedback of the system, and 
secondly, to provide the scenario-based results presenting not the “the best” answer but the 
“what if” answer. The MSEs used for the management of fisheries can include a certain level of 
implementation uncertainty. They are designed for comparisons of performance and 
robustness of different management procedures rather than for the absolute risk estimates. 
Because of their feedback nature, such procedures allow at least partial adjustment of 
implementation errors, which is of great importance in a mixed fishery context. 
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Figure 4. Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) cycle.  
 
  
        Source: AZTI 
 
In our BoB case study, the definition of the problem (the data used and the dynamics 
included) is based on the simulations performed for the impact assessment of the multiannual 
management plan (STECF, 2015). However, instead of using MSY ranges, harvest control rules 
are used. The objective of these harvest control rules is to assess a target fishing mortality 
compatible with the MSY (FMSY) unless the biomass falls below a certain level in which a further 
action is needed (Btrigger). 
 
In a simulation model, many different indicators can be provided. However, the main, and 
probably the most robust, answers are those obtained using the following indicators: 
 The evolution of the different biomasses by stock. 
 The evolution of the fishing mortality and its comparison with the target fishing mortality 
(FMSY). 
 The total catches (including landings and discards). 
 The Gross Value Added (the contribution of fishery to the Gross Domestic Product of the 
different member states). 
 
Using these indicators, three different comparisons were performed: 
1. The baseline scenario (LO scenario) versus the no-LO scenario. The baseline scenario 
applies the LO from 2018 onwards for all the subject stocks. Between 2015 and 2017, both 
options are equal. The option is designed to examine the effects of the landing obligation 
after 2018. 
2. The baseline scenario versus the landing obligation scenario in which it is included the de 
minimis exemption (a flat rate of 5%). 
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3. The baseline scenario versus the landing obligation scenario in which it is included a year-
transfer flexibility (a flat rate of 10%). 
The CFP (EU, 2013) includes the landing obligation for commercial species with TACs and 
quotas. For stocks for which the ban enters into force before 2017, the ICES provides catch 
advice for 2016 on the assumption that the catches previously discarded will now be landed. 
To maintain a linkage to the past advice on catch and landings, the advised catches are split 
into 2 categories: a wanted catch and an unwanted catch. The wanted catch comprises the fish 
that would be landed in the absence of the landing obligation. The unwanted catch refers to 
the fish that had been previously discarded. 
 
Within the simulations performed, the Article 15 of the CFP is covered in terms of 
implementation, exemptions (de minimis) in Section 2.2 of this report and flexibilities (year 
transfer) in Section 2.3 of this report. It is important to remember that there is another 
exemption, the high survival rate. This exemption has not been simulated because of the lack 
of information on its characteristics, except for Nephrops, and slipping (releasing fish before 
the net is fully taken on board if the catch is unwanted by the Skipper) for small pelagics in the 
BoB. The species transfer flexibility has not been considered either as it is not clear which 
species can be exchanged. 
 
The simulations performed are stochastic, that is, the uncertainty has been explicitly 
modelled. In this case, the only modelled source of uncertainty is the stock-recruitment 
relationship (the relationship between parental stock size and the subsequent recruitment in 
numbers or the year class strength). 
 
As uncertainty is a concept driving the management advice, it is important to understand how 
it is included. The study assumes that the recruitment provided by one stock size is not a 
single point (or a single vector) but a distribution. In other words we have the observed 
frequencies of occurrence of the values of a variable. This distribution is the result of a 
functional form (mathematically adequate) and the historical observations to fit this 
distribution (average value and a variance of the historical records). Instead of choosing the 
average value, we use any of the possible values that the recruitment can take. If we do it 
repeatedly (in this case, 250 times) we will obtain a distribution of the recruitment. This 
distribution will contribute later to the biomass, etc. This procedure allows a definition of risk 
levels, i.e., the number of times that these 250 iterations fall below a reference point (B lim). If 
the result is zero, there will be no risk, and if it is positive, the risk will be positive.  
 
We should note that: 
 
1. The results based on management strategy evaluation are not of a “what is best” but of a 
“what if” type. If the reference points are defined, it is possible to define risks and provide 
an average value with a risk associated for each simulated management strategy. 
2. Any obtained risk value applies to the conditions under which the simulation is run, i.e., the 
limits, constraints and assumptions of the simulation (see Kraak et al. (2010) for further 
discussion of this issue). 
 
2.1. The baseline scenario versus the no-LO scenario 
In this section, we simulated the effects of implementing the LO in 2018 without any 
exemptions or flexibility. The year 2018 has been selected as the LO starting year in the STECF 
(2015) impact assessment. To be able to analyse the results of this complex action, the 
implementation should start simultaneously for all the stocks and fleets subject to LO. 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
108 
 
Figure  and Figure  present the evolution of the SSB and F for two stocks, hake and megrim. 
Hake has an FMSY set at 0.27. The Harvest Control Rule for the TACs is to advise FMSY unless the 
biomass falls below a trigger biomass. If the biomass falls below this value, the F is 
proportionally reduced, so the biomass can recover. Another biomass reference point, the 
biomass limit, has to be considered as well. If the biomass falls below this limit, the advised 
TAC should be zero. We have no FMSY for megrim; this implies that the advised TAC is based on 
the biomass trends. To check for trends, the latest biomass levels are compared to the 
previous ones. If there is a decrease of a 20% or more, the TAC is reduced by 15%. If the 
comparison shows an increase of more than 20%, the TAC is increased by 15%. For the values 
in the between, the TAC remains unchanged. 
 
Figure 5.  Biomass evolution for hake (up) and megrim (down) under LO (Baseline) 
and without LO (no-LO) 
 
Source: AZTI 
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Figure 6.  Fishing mortality evolution for hake (up) and megrim (down) under LO 
(Baseline) and without LO (no-LO). The horizontal line for hake is the 
FMSY . 
 
Source: AZTI 
 
There are two important points to be noted in the analysis of the biomass and fishing mortality 
evolution: 
 
- Spawning stock biomass is always higher with than without landing obligation. This is 
true for all stocks; however, the extent of this difference depends on whether the stock is a 
choke species (when the smallest quota in a mixed fishery, the choke species, is 
exhausted, the fishing has to stop) and for which fleet. 
- Fishing mortality is always equal or less than FMSY. This is a combined effect of the 
harvest control rule that try to advise FMSY and the choke effect explained above. 
We can conclude that: 
 
Some fishing opportunities are always lost under landing obligation; the final fishing 
mortalities are lower than the target fishing mortalities (at least for one species). However, 
this does not necessarily imply that the catches will be lower with landing obligation than 
without it. They will be reduced in the initial years of landing obligation implementation. 
However, as Spawning stock biomass increases with LO, the catches will increase too. 
Although the fishing opportunities are lost due to the choke effect, the biomass of some stocks 
might increase; after a few years, this extra abundance could be converted into more catches 
(Figure 30). This implies that there are fleets that, in the mid-term, could benefit from the 
landing obligation (Figure 31). 
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Figure 7.  Catches for hake (up) and megrim (down) under LO (Baseline) and 
without LO (no-LO)  
 
             Source: AZTI 
 
Figure 8.  Gross value added created by one of the fleets of the BoB under LO 
(Baseline) and without LO (no-LO). 
 
         Source: AZTI 
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Under LO in a multispecies, multi-fleet context there will always be a choke species. This 
choke species will differ from fleet to fleet and it will limit the effort exerted by the fishery. In 
such cases, the fishing mortalities will decrease for all the stocks except for the one that 
produces this choke effect. Under such circumstances, advising FMSY independently of the 
choke effect will lead to an increase in spawning stock biomasses (at least for a single-stock 
approach). However, it might reduce the fishing opportunities associated with the present 
single-stock MSY concept. 
 
The short-term effects on the fleets are negative; no improvement in a biological system is 
instantaneous. Until the biomasses are substantially increased, the fishing efforts of the fleets 
will be reduced. This will result in lower landings and, consequently, lower profits. 
 
However, in the mid-term, the picture is different. The gross value added from the fisheries 
is higher under landing obligation than without landing obligation, partly as crew remuneration 
(salaries) but also as capital remuneration (profit). Nevertheless, it is important to remark that 
even if the overall effect is positive, it will not be uniformly distributed; there will be some 
winners and some losers. However, determine which fleets will win and which fleets will lose is 
too case specific and depends on their likely reaction to the management in place. 
 
The discussion of the long-term effects requires a further ecosystem-based analysis (presented 
in Section 3 of this report). 
 
2.2. The effect of the de minimis exemption 
The CFP has anticipated some LO exemptions and flexibilities. The de minimis exemption 
allows the fleets to ask for a discard quota under certain circumstances (impossibility of 
selectivity improvement or a disproportionate increase in the cost of fish handling).  
 
The main effect of this exemption is that the fishing mortality of the stock for which the 
exemption is granted will be higher than with the LO in place without any exemption 
(Figure 9). Total catches will increase as well, but not the total landings. This exemption is 
designed to reduce the effort constraint caused by the catches of individuals under minimum 
landing size. It might also reduce the effort constraint resulting from the previous over-quota 
discards. 
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Figure 9.  Fishing mortality comparison between two landing obligation scenarios 
with (de minimis) and without (baseline) de minimis exemption. 
 
Source: AZTI 
 
Figure 9 shows that, without de minimis, even when the harvest control rule for hake (nhake 
in Figure 9) means trying to reach the FMSY, the real F is below this target in most years. 
However, the use of this exemption increases the value of F well above the target. This is 
caused by the fact that the de minimis exemption does not count against the TAC (at least in 
this simulation). 
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2.3. The effect of the year-transfer flexibility 
 
Figure 10.  Fishing mortality comparison between two landing obligation scenarios 
with (year transfer) and without (baseline) year transfer flexibility. 
 
Source: AZTI 
 
Year transfer (Figure 10) allows the use of the next year quota (up to 10%) but this extra 
quota used has to be subtracted from the next year catches. This flexibility promotes the 
landings of extra catches (de minimis promotes the discards). However, the negative side of 
the year transfer is that it concentrates almost all the flexibility in the first year of its use. After 
this first year, the catches have to be “returned”, and the effect of the year transfer after this 
first year becomes small. This does not necessarily imply that the total effect of the year 
transfer is small. As it can be seen in Figure 10 the year transfer always moves the fishing 
mortality beyond the target one, however this is an effect caused only by the first year in 
which is applied and given that in the rest of the year the transfer is compensated by the 
return of the precious year quota.   
 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
114 
2.4. Summary of the results 
Landing obligation generates the choke effect. If combined with an harvest control rule that 
seeks a single-point estimate of MSY (i.e. FMSY), it will result in the final fishing mortality below 
the target fishing mortality (FMSY). According to the MSY criteria, this will cause a loss of fishing 
opportunities, translating into a short-term economic loss. The size of this loss will depend on 
the characteristics of each fleet, the catch composition and the initial discard level. In the mid-
term, some fleets will do better than others. However, the long-term effect is unknown as it is 
not clear how the ecosystems would respond. 
 
Exemptions and flexibilities effectively reduce the short-term negative effects; however, 
the penalty to be paid in the long-term is that the benefits of the LO will also decrease. The 
size of the exemption determines how close the system will be to the previous (no-LO) state. 
With large exemptions, the system will remain close to no-LO state.  
 
Incentives to reduce the discard levels are in place. These incentives come in the form of 
trying not to constrain the effort of a fleet targeting one or more than one species. There are 
many ways of reducing the discard levels, depending on the spatial or temporal activities of 
the fleet and the fishing gear technical changes made to improve the selectivity. In terms of 
technical measures it should be noted that not all of them have a relevant influence on 
reducing the constraints generated by the landing obligation (Alzorriz et al., 2016). 
2.5. Summary of uncertainties and limitations 
Many issues associated with the application of the landing obligation remain unclear. Thus, it is 
difficult to assess the consequences of the landing obligation and the MSY fully even excluding 
the ecosystem considerations. When the ecosystem factors are included (see Section 3), the 
system becomes even more difficult to analyse. 
 
The analysis identified two main sources of uncertainties and limitations: 
 
First, we have the current single-stock assessment and the subsequent single-stock 
reference and management points. This creates a contradiction between the aims (MSY) and 
the results (something lower than MSY). This is a contradiction not only in terms of 
implementation but also from a theoretical point of view. Assessments are provided based on 
single-species reference points even if an attempt to change it is underway. Obviously, the 
problem here is that the main interaction between the stocks (without considering the 
ecosystem) is technical, i.e., it is associated with the fleet. The fleet defines the final level of 
exploitation of the stocks. There are individual catch limits; however, the loss of fishing 
opportunities can erode the implementation of the CFP. The landing obligation is just an 
additional step, also causing losses of fishing opportunities, at least in the short and mid-term. 
 
The second source of uncertainties is the fleet itself. It is difficult to predict how the fleets 
will react. However, given the incentives in place, we can expect a reaction. Some positive 
changes are likely to be driven by the landing obligation, such as alterations in the fishing 
patterns to diminish the choke effect. We can anticipate that there will be changes in fishing 
gear technology and/or re-allocation of effort in the spatial and temporal dimensions). 
However, these reactions are not straightforward to simulate as the research on the fleet 
behaviour in the BoB is still in its infancy. It implies that the extent and intensity of these 
(likely) changes are difficult to predict. 
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On the other hand an aspect that has not been analysed in this report but that can play an 
important role is the aspect of the recreational fisheries. In the Bay of Biscay, and according 
to Zarauz et al. (2015), removal by the recreational fishery of Sea bass account for 
approximately the 40% of the total catches. Furthermore according to the same sources 
removals of Sparidae and Cephalopods, even if not clearly quantified, are also of high 
importance for the evolution of these species. 
2.6. Summary of recommendations 
The results discussed here come from an analysis of a model, and any model is based on 
several assumptions. Thus, it is better to interpret these results in relative terms rather than in 
absolute terms by keeping in mind the assumptions under which these data are valid. 
 
Under an Harvest Control Rule that forces the system to reach a target fishing mortality 
(FMSY), the landing obligation produces the effect of turning targets into limits. Real fishing 
mortalities of almost all the stocks will be below FMSYs, and hence this target fishing mortalities 
will only be seen as limits that can be crossed. Harvest control rules based on single-point 
estimates of fishing mortality have this effect, at least in a multispecies context. In this 
context, the concepts of (1) multi-stock reference points (Da Rocha et al., 2012), (2) 
Pretty Good Yield (Hilborn, 2011) or (3) a combination of the two, are building up a 
significant momentum. 
 
It has been obtained the result that the “choke” species could differ from fleet to fleet. This 
implies that part of this problem could be mitigated by: 
 
 A redistribution of the quotas that each member state has. 
 By a quota swapping between member states. 
 
Both actions would create a better balance between the catches and the quota composition by 
fleet, reducing the choke effect. 
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3. A QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF 
THE MAIN EFFECTS OF THE LANDING OBLIGATION IN 
THE CONTEXT OF THE MSY IN THE WHOLE ECOSYSTEM 
OF THE BOB 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
• A discard ban must be accompanied by a suite of supplementary regulatory 
measures. These measures should harmonize fishing technics, biological reference 
values, and markets. They should also ensure that regulations do not disincentive 
the reduction of discarding and consider the specific characteristics of some fleets.  
• Since the marine ecosystems are very complex, any changes in the way they are 
exploited might have several unpredictable consequences from a single-species 
perspective. 
• Ecosystem based fisheries management is the ideal framework to advise on the 
potential effects of human activities on the marine ecosystems. 
• Seabirds take an extensive advantage of discards and the availability of such fishery 
waste can affect their life-history traits and population dynamics, as well as the 
community structure. 
• In the Bay of Biscay there is no information on the effect of discards on the life-
history characteristics of marine mammals, such as breeding output and adult 
survival. 
 
 
An ecosystem can be considered a community of interacting living and non-living elements. 
The living elements constitute the biotic features, and the non-living objects are the abiotic 
features. While ecosystems do have boundaries, these are not always clear, and it may be 
difficult to decide where one ecosystem ends and another begins. 
 
Managing fisheries considering an ecosystem approach is sometimes considered a constraint 
in the short-term development. It has been seen as a trade-off of short-term sacrifices for 
long-term gains. However, the ecosystem approach gives us an opportunity to look at all 
dimensions of the problem. It should help us find the management solutions based on the 
coordinated action of society, at several different levels. 
 
There is a myth of the extreme complexity of implementing the ecosystem approach in the 
fisheries (Patrick and Link, 2015); some authors consider it naïve to even consider such a goal 
(Prellezo and Curtin, 2015). It is important to remark that, while it might be difficult, there are 
different levels of ecosystem approach and, in particular, of ecosystem-based 
management: 
 
It is important to define the classical fishery management (FM) concept as a benchmark. FM 
is focused on a single sector (fisheries), where the fish stock is evaluated by a single specific 
stock assessment. The main objective of FM is to delineate the status of a stock and its 
productivity, identify adequate levels of productivity and evaluate within-stock effects of 
fishing. Its main output is the so-called reference points. 
 
In the ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF), in some cases, the multiple-stock integrated 
assessments are conducted to identify the levels of optimal stock production, cognizant of the 
ecosystem factors, and evaluate the within-stock effects of the multiple potential  drivers of 
this change. However, the output is the same: stock reference points. 
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A further step is the Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management (EBFM). Conducted in the 
same sector (fisheries), the evaluation process is based on integrated ecosystem assessments. 
The objectives differ from FM or EAF; the trade-off identification is included. The output is also 
different; it provides systemic reference points. 
 
The Ecosystem-based Management (EBM) includes all the sectors (and not only fisheries); 
unlike in EBFM, the trade-offs are identified across sectors. 
 
The CFP defines the ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management as “…an integrated 
approach to managing fisheries within ecologically meaningful boundaries which seeks to 
manage the use of natural resources, taking account of fishing and other human activities, 
while preserving both the biological wealth and the biological processes necessary to safeguard 
the composition, structure and functioning of the habitats of the ecosystem affected, by taking 
into account the knowledge and uncertainties regarding biotic, abiotic and human components 
of ecosystems” (EU, 2013). This definition assumes substantial benefits from the aquatic 
resources while the direct and indirect effects of fishing operations on marine ecosystems are 
limited and not detrimental to their future functioning, diversity and integrity. 
 
The CFP definition merges the ecosystem approach to fisheries and the ecosystem based 
fisheries management. This EBFM is meant to contribute to the good environmental status 
(GES) (EC, 2010) in conformity with the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) adopted 
in 2008 (EC, 2008), in which the fisheries are considered a descriptor and a pressure. 
 
This is not the only definition of such approaches. In the ICES, the ecosystem approach has 
been defined as a management regime that maintains the health of the ecosystem while 
allowing the appropriate human exploitation of the environment, for the benefit of current and 
future generations. Thus, the ecosystem approach is expected to achieve long-term 
sustainability of the exploited marine resources (e.g., the fishery sector). 
 
Even before the “Rio Declaration” of 1992 (UN, 1992), the dangers of applying MSY concept 
to ecosystems were known (May et al., 1979). Walters et al. (2005) have explicitly stated that 
there is a risk of extinction of some species if MSY is applied to ecosystems carelessly. Any 
EBM implementation has to consider the existing relationships between the ecosystem 
components. MSY does not do it, and the advice provided might be misleading (Pauly et al., 
1998). In contrast, it has been shown that EBFM can be achieved by improving the current 
single-species management (Mace, 2001; Froese et al., 2008). Several studies (e.g., Zhou et 
al. (2010)) suggest that substantial reductions in fishing mortality (caused by fishing) should 
be considered to meet all the EBM requirements. These include multispecies interactions, 
maintenance of genetic diversity and reduction of waste and discards. Single-species models 
might provide the same advice (reductions in fishing mortality) for different reasons. 
 
If both recommendations are valid, the change from considering ecosystem a “black box” to a 
holistic approach where the ecosystem is the starting point in any analysis might seem a 
paradigm shift. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Mace (2001), the advice is a continuum 
representing both extremes. To advocate that both extremes should be represented in the final 
advice might be the right answer, but even so, the intermediate solutions must also be 
considered. 
 
Different international regulations limiting discards have been implemented in the recent 
years, as a result of public opinion campaigns to limit the discards considered a waste of living 
resources (Hall and Mainprize (2005) and Bellido et al. (2011)). 
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The compulsory landing of discards introduced by the European Union (EU, 2013) will have 
consequences at the fleet and stock level (see Section 2) but also at the 
environmental-ecological level. To minimize the impact of fisheries on the wider ecosystem, 
some selective fishing practices have been encouraged. These practices should reduce the 
bycatch and discards which, apart from target-species juveniles, mainly affect non-target 
species (Zhou et al., 2010). However, it is not clear whether the highly selective fishing is 
beneficial for the ecosystem (Bundy et al., 2005), if it supports the sustainability of fisheries 
(Garcia et al., 2012), and who should bear the financial consequences (Garcia et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, selectivity is not an explicit aspect of the management tools. 
3.1. Potential effect of the LO on the BoB ecosystem: a qualitative 
approach 
As other exploited systems, most fisheries have existed for decades in the BoB, affecting the 
whole ecosystem and contributing to its status. The fishery operations, which shift the nutrition 
and energy from the ocean to land and between depths or locations, cause habitat modification 
and return the unusable nutrition to the ocean. Reducing discards may not be always 
beneficial. It might affect the ecosystem negatively, at least in the short-term, in against the 
objectives of EBFM. The BoB ecosystem is a bottom-up controlled system, with a detritus-
based biomass input control and high energy transfer efficiencies (Lassalle et al., 2011; 2012). 
These characteristics increase the sensitivity of this ecosystem to fishing activities; thus, any 
changes that affect the fishing practices need to be carefully considered. 
 
The consequences of the LO are expected to be more apparent in the short-term, whereas a 
new equilibrium point should be achieved in the long-term. It should result in the desired 
changes in the structure and functioning of the BoB ecosystem (Tsagarakis et al., 2013) and 
benefit its health (Tett et al., 2013). These changes should lead to improvements in the goods 
and services offered to the society (Rapport et al., 1998). 
 
The discards might be deposited dead or alive (Suuronen, 2005), with different consequences. 
The direct effects of continuing this practice at the existing or reduced levels are not fully 
understood (Diamond and Beukers-Stewart, 2011); (Lindeboom and De Groot, 1998). The live 
discards, indirectly affecting the whole systems through cascading effects, are expected to 
have the biggest impact (Heath et al., 2014b). Eliminating the live discards means preventing 
the return to the sea of live individuals that might still play their roles in the system. This 
might affect the highly diverse systems such as the BoB and the Iberian coast (Suuronen and 
Erikson, 2010; Sardà et al., 2013). However, the negative changes could be alleviated by the 
improvements in the health of the stocks affected by the discard regulation. The system might 
become more productive under a decreased fishing pressure (Diamond and Beukers-Stewart, 
2011). The direct effect of the discard ban on the recovery of the stocks has not been assessed 
yet. However, the implementation of such regulations in other ecosystem different from the 
BoB (Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea ecosystems) has actually improved the estimated fishing 
mortality. This might have helped to make effective management decisions and is likely to 
have contributed strongly to the recovery of the fish stocks (Diamond and Beukers-
Stewart, 2011). 
 
The table below (Table 7) lists the general effects of eliminating discards cited in the literature, 
for an ideal situation where any other factor (i.e., fishermen behaviour or gear technologies 
used) changes. The main effects and mechanisms have been summarized at different 
biological organisation levels. 
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Table 3.  Potential effects of the full implementation of the landing obligation at 
different biological organisation levels. 
 
Biological 
organisation 
Main Mechanisms Potential 
effect(s) of 
Landing 
Obligation 
Ecosystem 
component(s)
/properties 
References 
Population 
level 
Individuals that could 
potentially return back 
alive to the system 
will no longer be 
available in the 
system. 
Increases in 
species 
mortality  
Species with 
high survival 
rate14 
(Depestele et al., 
2014); (Suuronen, 
2005); (Suuronen 
and Erikson, 2010) 
Reduction in biomass 
leads to reduction in 
natural mortality and 
intra-specific 
competition. 
Increase in 
species 
productivity 
Larval and 
juvenile stages 
of species with 
high survival 
rate 
(Quinn and Deriso, 
1999); (Zhou, 2008) 
Removing fraction of 
adults leads to a shift 
in the age distribution 
to younger and then 
faster growing 
individuals. 
Increase in 
species 
productivity 
Targeted species (Quinn and Deriso, 
1999); (Zhou, 2008) 
Increases in 
mean weight 
and length at 
catch in the 
long-term  
Target species (Gullestad et al., 
2015) 
Fleet land larger 
proportion of small 
fish and smaller 
proportions of large 
fish 
 
Improves 
stock recovery 
rates 
Overexploited or 
threatened 
stocks 
(Diamond and 
Beukers-Stewart, 
2011) 
Community 
level 
Died individuals or 
individuals with less 
survival rate will not 
return to the system 
Reduce 
availability of 
‘easy food’15 
Benthic 
invertebrates 
(Bozzano and Sardà, 
2002); (Harris and 
Huang, 2001) 
Fish (Bozzano and Sardà, 
2002); (Heath et al., 
2014b)  
Turtles (Tomas et al., 2001) 
Mammals (Lassalle et al., 
2012); (Heath et al., 
2014b) 
Birds (Bicknell et al., 
2013);(Heath et al., 
2014b) ; (Votier et 
al., 2013) 
Reduction of energy 
(discards) impacts the 
resilience of an 
exploited ecosystem 
Reduce 
secondary 
production and  
nutrient 
recycling 
Plankton  (Coll et al., 2008); 
(Heath et al., 
2014a); (Libralato et 
al., 2008); (Sardà et 
al., 2013)  
 
                                           
14 Mainly invertebrates and small fish 
15 Discards that return death to the system 
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Ecosystem 
level 
 
Reduction of species 
productivity lies on 
reduction of total 
system productivity 
Changes in 
system 
productivity   
Structure and 
functions 
(Hall et al., 2000); 
(Zhou, 2008) 
Reduction of energy 
(discards) impacts the 
resilience of an 
exploited ecosystem 
Trophic 
cascades: 
bottom-up and 
top-down 
effects 
Structure and 
functions 
(Heath et al., 2014b) 
Sardà et al., (2013) 
Changes in the 
availability of species  
Changes in 
predator-prey 
relationships 
Structure and 
functions  
(Zhou, 2008); (Coll 
et al., 2008); 
(Tsagarakis et al., 
2013)  
Increases in some 
species fishing 
mortality 
Changes in 
biodiversity: 
richness,  
evenness, 
mean trophic 
level (MTL) 
Structure and 
functions  
(Sardà et al., 2013); 
(Worm et al., 2006); 
(Zhou, 2008) 
Redirecting 
energy flows 
and pathways 
Structure and 
functions 
(Hall et al., 2000); 
(Murawski, 2000); 
(Roux et al., 2013); 
(Worm et al., 2006) 
Discards will never 
reach the benthic 
system 
Break benthic-
pelagic 
systems 
coupling 
Structure and 
functions 
(Tsagarakis et al., 
2013) 
Fleet land larger 
proportion of small 
fish and smaller 
proportions of large 
fish 
 
Changes in 
MTL of the 
catches 
Fleet – humans (Coll et al., 2008) 
(Diamond and 
Beukers-Stewart, 
2011) 
Total reduction of 
discards will be 
sometimes not 
feasible nor desirable 
Reduce the 
greatest 
benefits 
possible from 
fisheries 
resources to 
society in the 
short-term 
Fleet – humans (Diamond and 
Beukers-Stewart, 
2011); (Pascoe, 
1997); (Zhou, 2008) 
 
The marine ecosystems are complex, with many interactions between their abiotic and biotic 
components. They are also affected by human activities. Thus, any actual or potential changes 
should be carefully analysed using a holistic and integrative approach. In the case of fisheries, 
the EBFM would be the ideal framework to manage these problems. 
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3.2. Potential effects of the Landing Obligation on the Bay of Biscay 
top predators: a qualitative approach 
The marine predators interact with commercial fisheries in various ways (Arcos et al., 2008). 
The fishing activity can affect marine predators directly through mortality caused by 
entanglement in fishing gear (i.e., bycatch) and ship strikes (marine mammals) (Lewison et 
al., 2004). These animals can also be indirectly affected by changes in the distribution, 
abundance, size structure and behaviour of their natural prey (Arcos et al., 2008). In addition, 
fishing activity provides an unnatural source of food to the scavenging predators. Bottom 
trawling, one of the fishing activities providing large amounts of discards, affects the food 
sources of the demersal species (Hudson and Furness, 1988).  
 
The focus of the this section is not an assessment of predator direct mortality, but rather the 
revision of the effect that a decrease in discards as food subsidy (due to the 
progressive ban) might have on marine predator populations (both seabirds and marine 
mammals, particularly for cetaceans). Whenever information was available, a special mention 
was provided for the Bay of Biscay.   
 
Seabirds take an extensive advantage of discards and the availability of such waste can affect 
their life-history traits and population dynamics, as well as the community structure (Votier et 
al., 2004). Indeed, the discards provide an important food source for scavenging species, 
possibly changing their movement patterns (Bartumeus et al., 2010; Bodey et al., 2014). The 
discards substantially contribute to the diet of these birds (Navarro et al., 2009), improve their 
reproductive performance (Oro et al., 1996; Louzao et al., 2006) and increase their survival 
(Oro and Furness, 2002; Oro et al., 2004). Consequently, this human-introduced food resource 
might favour more generalist species, sustaining their increasing populations (Furness, 2003). 
In the BoB, few studies have examined seabird attendance of the vessels discarding fish. A few 
reports have shown that discards are part of the diet of certain populations and species, e.g., 
yellow-legged gulls (Arizaga et al., 2010). 
 
There are no studies estimating the discard consumption by the marine mammals and no 
reports on the effect of discards on movement patterns, breeding success and adult survival. 
There are some studies showing that cetaceans follow different fishing gears such as purse-
seiners, trawlers and longliners. They consume the commercial target species and, therefore, 
directly compete for the same resource. In the Bay of Biscay, Spitz et al. (2013). have studied 
a dietary overlap between common dolphins and sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax), which might 
be associated with the bycatch of common dolphins by pelagic trawlers. However, it is unclear 
whether the life-history traits of marine mammals, such as breeding output and adult survival, 
are affected by the discards. 
 
Anticipating the effect that the discard ban might have on marine predator populations is a 
challenging task. A recent review performed by Bicknell et al. (2013) highlighted the potential 
consequences of discard reform for seabird communities. However, we have not found such a 
review for marine mammals. While the role of discards for seabirds has been long studied and 
there is an overall understanding of the population-level effects (Bicknell et al., 2013), the 
same does not apply for marine mammal populations. This is partially due to the ease of 
conducting seabird population monitoring (i.e., land-based) compared to cetaceans and 
therefore obtaining information on the foraging ecology, at-sea distribution patterns and life 
history traits (e.g., breeding output and adult survival). 
 
For seabirds, the effects of discard decrease can affect predator populations directly through 
behaviour, diet (i.e., prey switching) and distribution patterns at sea (Bicknell et al., 2013). At 
the population level, demographic parameters such as breeding output and survival could be 
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affected (Bicknell et al., 2013). In European waters, the seabird scavenger community is 
composed mainly by a relatively small number of large generalist taxa (Bicknell et al., 2013). 
In the absence of discards, some of these species might be able feed on alternative food 
resources by increasing predation on other seabird species or occupying new habitats, and 
increasing seabird bycatch (Bicknell et al., 2013). Some of the potential positive effects could 
be a decrease in numbers of the dominant generalist species (Bicknell et al., 2013). However, 
we are still missing the community-wide understanding to foresee how the most vulnerable 
species (i.e., with limited foraging plasticity) could be more affected by a decrease of discards 
to the more generalist omnivorous species.  
 
Alternatively, anticipating the effect that the discard ban might have on marine predator 
populations could be assessed using ecosystem models. Studies from the North Sea marine 
ecosystem show that landing the entire catch while fishing as usual has negative effects for 
marine predators, while the combination of landing obligation with more efficient fishing 
practices (i.e., limit the capture of unwanted fish) could benefit predator populations (Heath et 
al., 2014a). In the Bay of Biscay, an ecosystem model was modified to specifically tackle 
fisheries impact on the main cetacean species considering both landings and discards (Lassalle 
et al., 2012). Therefore, it would be possible to perform simulation studies to compare 
different discard availability scenarios to understand the effects of discard banning on cetacean 
populations. For seabirds, it would be necessary to increase the number of compartments to 
incorporate the most abundant and vulnerable species.  
3.3. A first attempt to handle discarding problems from an ecosystem 
perspective in the Bay of Biscay: a quantitative approach 
Although the importance of moving towards the EBFM is widely recognized, so far, very few 
studies have been conducted in the BoB. Furthermore, none of them deals with the problem of 
discards or the effects of the implementation of the LO in that ecosystem. A forthcoming study 
focusing on discards (Andonegi and Prellezo, In preparation) analyses the effects of the 
fisheries on the ecosystem of the BoB. The study shows how the combined effects of the 
discard ban could modify the dynamics of the studied system. 
 
A substantial effort has been put into the modelling in this area, involving both the existing 
environmental interactions and the dynamics of the stocks (Andonegi et al., 2011). The trophic 
relationships between relevant commercial species (Saavedra et al., 2015; Andonegi et al., 
2009) have been analysed as examples of EAF. Several other studies have dealt with the food-
web dynamics of the BoB French Continental Shelf ecosystem from an EBFM perspective. 
Some other examples can be found in the reports by Lassalle et al. (2011; 2012; 2014), 
Chaalali et al. (2015) and Bentorcha et al. (In press), though none of them is dealing with 
discards specifically. 
 
Some effort has been made towards the implementation of integrative quantitative tools 
in the EBM in the BoB, in parallel with those described above. However, this is described in a 
work in progress and has not been published yet. One such case is the Nested 
Environmental State Assessment Tool (NEAT) being developed under the DEVOTES EU 
project16, expected to be available at the beginning of the next year (2016). Some work has 
been undertaken on a global scale using the Ocean Health Index (Halpern et al., 2012). A 
similar exercise, using more accurate local information, has been carried out for some of the 
regions in the BoB. There are also a few studies dealing with the implementation of Atlantis 
ecosystem model, which assesses all the human activities in the BoB. This model is used in the 
development of adaptive management tools helping the scientific community to provide the 
appropriate advice to the managers. Finally, it is worth mentioning a qualitative framework 
                                           
16 www.devotes-project.eu 
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developed within the ODEMM EU project17, which is used in the implementation of integrated 
ecosystem assessments (Levin et al., 2009) in the BoB within ICES (ICES, 2013, 2015). 
Similar new developments are being utilised in the DEVOTES project (work in progress). 
 
This section will focus on the EBFM, and some preliminary results from the work of Andonegi & 
Prellezo (in preparation) are shown. In this study, the authors analyse the potential changes 
in the ecosystem dynamics, using a food-web model constructed employing Ecopath with 
Ecosim software, version 6.4.(Christensen and Walters, 2004; Christensen et al., 2008). 
 
An Ecopath model has been built for the year 1996, simulating the status of the French 
Continental Shelf ecosystem at the end of last century. The model consists of 35 functional 
groups from the detritus and plankton to the marine mammals and seabirds. These functional 
groups are single-species groups or bulk species with the same characteristics; only one of 
them (hake) has a life history stage with a complex feeding strategy. Four fishing fleets have 
been included to cover the majority of the fishing activity in the area. Temporal simulations 
have been run for the years from 1996 to 2013 using the time-dynamic module of Ecosim. 
Different scenarios have been projected once the historical part of the model (1996-2013) was 
parameterised by fitting to the available time series. The authors have used information on 
landings and discards of the Spanish fleet from a local (AZTI) database. These data have been 
combined with the data reported by the different member states to ICES. Some information 
has been taken also from the existing models (Lassalle et al., 2011) and from other sources, 
including the FishBase database18 (Froese and Pauly, 2015). 
 
Some preliminary results have been obtained from the Ecosim run (Figure, Figure ), once the 
model has been parameterised by fitting it to the available time series (biomass, fishing 
mortalities and fishing efforts).  
Two different scenarios have been projected to analyse the changes in the system. One 
combines the MSY with the landing obligation where all catches need to be landed (LO 
Scenario). The second scenario, the MSY one, it is based on forcing the system to reach FMSY 
levels (No-LO). However, the MSY reference points have been set only for a few of the species, 
such as hake and blue whiting; the remaining functional groups have been forced with a 
historical average fishing mortality (the mean of the last three years). In the landing obligation 
scenario, hake and megrim, the species managed under a TAC system and affected by this 
regulation, are forced to different fishing mortality values obtained from the simulations 
detailed in Section 3 of this report. 
 
                                           
17 https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/odemm/ 
18 www.fishbase.org 
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Figure 11. Modelled (lines) and observed (dots) biomasses for commercially 
relevant species (from left to right: adult and juvenile hake, megrim, 
anchovy, sardine, horse mackerel, mackerel and nephrops) in the Bay 
of Biscay – The MSY no-LO approach. 
 
 
Source: AZTI 
 
Figure 12. Modelled (lines) and observed (dots) biomasses for commercially 
relevant species (from left to right: adult and juvenile hake, megrim, 
anchovy, sardine, horse mackerel, mackerel and nephrops) in the Bay 
of Biscay – The MSY LO approach. 
 
 
Source: AZTI 
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3.4. Summary of the results 
There are some differences between the results obtained from the no-LO and LO scenario 
analyses. While both adult and juvenile hake biomasses were higher in the no-LO than in the 
LO scenario, other species of the same guild (e.g., megrim) showed different trends. This also 
happened in the pelagic system, where, depending on the species, the management of each 
scenario caused different effects. The LO benefited anchovy and horse mackerel, whereas the 
sardine biomasses kept decreasing. Similarly, the discard ban seemed to have a negative 
effect on the carnivorous invertebrates such as Nephrops. 
 
Even though the results presented here are preliminary, they demonstrate that there is no 
ideal solution for all the stocks. What seems a good solution for some species might be 
undesirable for other stocks. This highlights the need for the holistic frameworks to find the 
most appropriate measures for the management of marine resources. 
 
3.5. Summary of uncertainties and limitations 
There are many assumptions in this work. Most of these assumptions had to be made because 
the spatial resolution of the available information did not exactly match the area studied (BoB) 
in this exercise. The distribution of most of the species included in the model exceeds the 
study area and there is no accurate information about the distribution of the individuals. The 
data coming from stock assessments and observations on landings and discards are not 
spatially explicit either, which hampers this type of study. 
 
The pedigree (or quality) of this analysis is expected to improve once the scientific survey data 
are introduced for tuning the biomasses simulated by the model. We hope that this is going to 
happen in the near future. 
 
The Ecosim application presented for the BoB is only dealing with the top-down effects caused 
by fishing. However, some bottom-up disturbances might arise if the environmental conditions 
were considered. This might lead to changes in the dynamics of low trophic level species such 
as small pelagics and could alleviate the impact of the top-down cascading effects. 
 
The knowledge of the intra- and inter-species relationships is another key factor in this kind 
analysis. Currently, this knowledge is limited or not publicly accessible; such data would 
greatly help in obtaining reliable and “close-to-reality” results. 
 
An inclusion of social and economic information in the discussed frameworks would also be 
beneficial. The MSEs from the ecosystem perspective are crucial and should be developed in 
the near future. 
 
In order to assess the impact of discard bans, it is necessary to obtain information on the 
foraging ecology, at-sea distribution and abundance patterns, and population-level 
demographic parameters. That is not currently available for many marine mammals (Lassalle 
et al., 2012). Even for seabirds, we still poorly understand the nature of the impacts of the 
discard banning and there is still a need for detailed long-term seabird and marine mammal 
population monitoring (Bicknell et al., 2013), in addition to the characterisation of the 
community structure (Wagner and Boersma, 2011). 
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3.6. Summary of recommendations 
The reduction or elimination of the bycatch and discards is one of the core aspects of an 
EBFM. However, the management procedures should always consider the existing trophic 
interactions, the relationships between abiotic and biotic ecosystem components and the area-
based management. 
 
A discard ban must be accompanied by a suite of supplementary regulatory measures, as 
we have learned from the existing analyses of the consequences of such actions. These 
measures are fleet dependant, that is, they have to be considered fleet by fleet. For example 
in Norway the main objective of these measures has been to promote an exploitation pattern 
where fish below minimum legal size are spared, and where unwanted bycatch can be 
minimised. This suite has to consider several interconnected measures.  
 
These measures could include a kind of compensation for the ex-discards now landed in 
order to compensate the extra work of handling and processing the unwanted catch that now 
has to be landed. Another important measure is to harmonise the connection between mesh 
sizes and minimum conservation reference size, considering also the commercial size 
references, avoiding differences between different areas but equal markets that can confuse 
consumers. This suite should also ensure that regulations are formulated to minimise 
possible incentives to discarding, for example allocating quotas to cover expected 
unavoidable bycatches. Finally this suite should also consider the specific characteristics of 
some fleets like small coastal vessels fishing with passive gears, which have limitations in 
terms of mobility and ability to change fishing ground and hence to avoid some undesired 
catches. 
 
Development and implementation of exclusive fishing technologies and operational methods 
could help to achieve a sustainable use of the marine resources. Trade-offs are needed to 
balance the effects on the different components of the marine ecosystem. 
 
Further ecosystem, whole ecosystem (Plagányi, 2007) or end-to-end (E2E – (Rose et al., 
2010)) models should be developed to achieve the preventative, precautionary and 
anticipatory planning and management implementation of the EBFM. Such systems 
should help to analyse the likely implications of the discard ban in the BoB. Collaboration 
between different agents working in this area with accessibility to the existing information and 
databases will be the key to achieving this ambitious goal. 
 
The considerable reduction in discards will have direct and indirect effects on marine 
predators that need to be accurately assessed. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct studies 
to increase our knowledge on the influence of changing discards and natural fish prey 
availability on predator foraging ecology (in terms of functional responses and searching 
behaviour) and how the interplay between these two foraging resources influence on fitness, in 
addition to understanding the wider community responses (Bicknell et al., 2013). In particular, 
the ICES (2014a) recommended different initiative such as (1) developing an index to score 
the sensitivity of species to food reduction from discards (and offal), (2) comparing seabird 
abundance and breeding success before and after the discard ban of the most sensitive 
species, (3) an integrative meta-analysis of diet studies focusing on the most dependent 
species to test for species-specific, temporal and regional differences and (4) identifying the 
most vulnerable seabird colonies.  
 
Specifically in the Bay of Biscay, studies should be undertaken by simultaneously performing 
studies to estimate population abundance and predator counts attending fishing vessels before 
and after the discard ban implementation (Louzao & Wilson, pers. comm). On-board fishing 
vessels, discarding experiments should be performed to obtain discard consumption across 
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predator communities, seasons and regions. To understand the role of discards on 
influencing the ecology and population dynamic of marine predators, these types of 
studies might be combined with tracking studies and population monitoring to obtain 
information on the foraging ecology, reproductive output and survival of seabird populations 
(Louzao & Wilson, pers. comm.). In the case of marine mammals, an extensive photo-
identification effort should be conducted to estimate the probability of calving for reproductive 
females of marine mammal populations, as well as survival (Tixier et al., 2014).  
 
While an overall ecosystem recovery though a more effective fishing management would be 
the most desirable management action (Bicknell et al., 2013), ecosystem models can be used 
to test different scenarios in discard management to identify the most beneficial actions 
considering predator populations. It is important to consider the different predator population 
communities, fisheries and fish stock assemblages (Bicknell et al., 2013). 
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4. General recommendations on the best way to implement 
the discard plans and the multiannual plans, according to 
the appropriate scenarios at the regional level 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The number of stocks with an unknown stock status in the BoB is too high. 
Procedures to provide an assessment against the MSY principle should be urgently 
explored. 
• The scientific advisory process should concentrate more on the mixed and 
multispecies fisheries. This recommendation is reinforced by the introduction of the 
landing obligation. 
• Under LO real fishing mortalities will be below target fishing mortalities (FMSY). 
Harvest control rules based on single-point estimates of fishing mortalities have this 
effect in a multispecies context. We recommend exploring the concepts of multi-
stock reference points and Pretty Good Yield or a combination of the two. 
• The fishing management procedures should always consider the existing trophic 
interactions, the relationships between abiotic and biotic ecosystem components and 
the area-based management. 
• A discard ban must be accompanied by a suite of supplementary regulatory 
measures. These measures should harmonize fishing technics, biological reference 
values, and the demand for fish. They should also ensure that regulations do not 
disincentive the reduction of discarding and consider the specific characteristics of 
some fleets. 
• Trade-offs are needed to balance the effects on the different components of the 
marine ecosystem.  
• Further ecosystem, whole ecosystem or end-to-end models should be developed to 
achieve the preventative, precautionary and anticipatory planning and 
management implementation of the ecosystem based fisheries management. 
• Studies should be undertaken by simultaneously performing studies to estimate top 
predator population abundance and counts attending fishing vessels before and after 
the discard ban implementation. 
• In the case of marine mammals, an extensive photo-identification effort should be 
conducted to estimate the probability of calving for reproductive females of marine 
mammal populations, as well as survival. 
• Ecosystem models can be used to test different scenarios in discard management to 
identify the most beneficial actions considering predator populations. It is important to 
consider the different predator population communities, fisheries and fish stock 
assemblages. 
• The existing uncertainties in terms of data and dynamics make the application of 
ecosystem based management a risky exercise. The assessment coming from the 
ecosystem based management will reflect these uncertainties. However, if we follow a 
carefully considered plan, it will be no more risky than the traditional fishing 
management. 
• The future is not likely to be a simple extrapolation of the recent past. 
• Fishing fleet’s adaptability can deal with the undesirable states but can also 
accommodate or even boost the unexpected opportunities. 
A study of attempts of European fisheries trying to recover their stocks (Cardinale et al., 2013) 
shows that targeting MSY might be a good stock recovery method. However, when 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
 130 
recovered, the stocks do not necessarily remain balanced. The study gives several reasons for 
this conclusion: 
 
 MSY is not a single point, but an area where the risk has to be defined. Multispecies and 
multi-fleet characteristics of the Bay of Biscay make this even more important. 
 
 Implementation of discard plans interferes with obtaining the values close to the MSY. It 
does not matter if we consider MSY as an area. Fishing opportunities will be lost. 
However, there are no general rules.  
 
There are many reasons to decide on a discard action and the mitigation actions can differ. The 
study of Sigurðardóttir et al. (2015) has concluded that, given this diversity, the full 
management system needs to create an incentive framework that motivates fishermen to 
avoid unwanted catches. This framework has to be understood from the economic/financial 
performance of the fleets but also from their compliance with the rules in place boosting the 
participation and the overall governance of the industry in the creation of the incentives 
scheme. It is only in this setting that the discard mitigation methods might be effective. 
 
To consider how to handle these discard mitigation measures we can refer to the study of 
Catchpole and Gray (2010). The authors have concluded that the fishery crises including 
incentives, funding, expertise, leadership and enforcement are very important. Fishery 
regulators could take steps to deal with these factors. They could do it by fast responses to 
the crises, more incentives and funding, greater use of fishermen knowledge and leadership 
and improved enforcement mechanisms. 
 
In the context of implementation problems, MSY looks like a target and probably a necessary 
target; however, in itself MSY is not a plan. A plan has to involve an ecosystem-based 
management. There are different levels of the management (see section 4 of this report) and 
the existing uncertainties in terms of data and dynamics make the application of EBM a risky 
exercise. However, if we follow a carefully considered plan, the risks will be reduced; it will be 
no more risky than the traditional FM. 
 
The plan has to be iterative and adaptive. The scientific investigation should be linked to the 
societal debate on management objectives, trade-offs and tools for analysis. No one individual 
scientist can be fully aware of all activities and links, so it is important to build teams working 
towards a shared vision, with effective communication between the main players. 
 
The plan must maximise the use of available information rather than accept that insufficient 
information and the lack of quantitative models will hamper the application of the ecosystem 
approach. Even the full understanding of the ecosystem does not make the political decision-
making easier. Furthermore, the complexity of governance should not be an excuse to 
avoid developing new approaches. The society also has the right to make decisions based on 
its evolving political processes (Dickey-Collas, 2014). 
 
Specific measures can be recommended in terms of the target. The MSY is a CFP objective that 
can be interpreted; MSY, when presented as a number, is just an interpretation. The key 
factor here is to understand what the MSY seeks for. In the BoB, the main two bodies 
providing stock assessment advice (ICES and ICCAT) understand well their own interpretation 
of MSY. However, it does not mean that there is no room for other interpretations. 
 
Part 1 and 2 clearly state that MSY is variable and, furthermore, re-interpretable. The 
important conclusion is that some flexibility is likely to produce benefits. Flexibilities can be 
produced without endangering the sustainability. For example, the PGY concept, first 
mentioned by Alec MacCall (National Marine Fisheries Service, Santa Cruz, California), has 
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been defined by Hilborn (2011) as a sustainable yield of at least 80% of the maximum 
sustainable yield. PGY theory acknowledges the fact that MSY is just an average, and as it is 
sustainable and “pretty” optimal, other uses and/or societal pillars can be considered without 
invalidating the MSY concept. This flexibility is important in the management. It also avoids 
the criticism that MSY ignores the multispecies, multi-fleet and ecosystem components of the 
fisheries (Larkin, 1977; Prellezo and Curtin, 2015). Furthermore, it provides room for trading-
off between the economic and social sustainability pillars. 
 
This approach is also in accord with the iterative and adaptive characteristics that any plan 
would need. Exacerbated by the recent economic crisis, the general management policy and, 
in particular, EBFM, have become “predict and prescribe” strategies. This is probably a 
result of our limited understanding of the ecosystems. However, predictions have to be based 
on what we know and it is important not to base all our expectation on what could be called a 
giant with feet of clay. Furthermore, the future is not likely to be a simple extrapolation of the 
recent past. 
 
Figure 13. Forecast scheme. Understanding the basics and simulating. 
 
Source: AZTI 
 
Forecasting (Figure ) requires a complex balance; it has to be robust enough to acquire new 
basic data, but also consider the regime shifts. The modelling or simulation on the basis of 
insufficient data can cause undesired results. In Section 2 of this report, we introduced the 
Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) as a way of designing feedback control systems. 
Adaptation allows reducing uncertainty by monitoring over time. However, the adaptive 
management faces exactly the same challenge of finding the right balance between gaining 
new data to improve management in the long-term and achieving the best short-term outcome 
based on the current knowledge. In both cases, MSE and adaptive management, monitoring 
the response of populations to management and the environment are of primary importance 
(INPUTS of Figure ). In Europe, the Marine Strategy Framework Dijrective  (MSFD) places a 
legal requirement to consider the impact of fishing on population demography, genetics and 
Good Environmental Status(GES) MSE is an adequate approach integrating these factors, not 
focusing on the prediction power but on the scenarios that represent possible, plausible, 
internally consistent, but not necessarily probable, developments (Carter et al., 1994). 
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Science should focus on balancing the two sides of forecasting (Figure ). However, this should 
include the predictions based on the best available knowledge and avoidance of prescriptions. 
The risk of each possible outcome has to be evaluated by the society using their political 
processes. 
 
Flexibility is important, as highlighted by Schindler and Hilborn (2015): “The ability to adapt 
to ecosystem changes revealed by monitoring and assessment is likely to be a far more 
powerful strategy than assuming that what has worked in the past will work in the future”. 
Adaptability can deal with the undesirable states but can also accommodate or even boost the 
unexpected opportunities. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Achieving the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) exploitation by 2020 at the latest is one of 
the key elements of the reformed EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The MSY is 
currently defined in a single species (or stock) context, but MSY targets will likely change if 
considered in a multi-species or even an ecosystem context. The available results from a 
multispecies system produce not one single biological optimal solution for a maximum 
yield, but many. In the Baltic, policy makers have to choose between a cod dominated or 
a herring and sprat dominated system, or anything between these extremes. It is difficult 
to reach an agreement among Baltic Member States on the targets, because there are 
diverging interests. We suggest to search for factors other than yield, such a quota 
stability, to facilitate the decision making process, and provide an example where the stability 
in yield for one stock is the major objective (section 1). 
Moreover, the MSY estimate is affected by different sources of uncertainty, and the 
successful implementation of an MSY approach will be substantially influenced by other 
management considerations: additional anthropogenic mortality on exploited stocks 
(recreational fisheries – section 2), impact of other human activities on the ecological 
status of the Baltic Sea environment (section 3), effects of the Landing Obligation on the 
ecosystem (section 4), and the implementation error of the reformed CFP (section 5). 
(1) The incorporation of the total anthropogenic mortality needs to involve recreational 
fisheries that have a high impact on marine fish stocks worldwide and in the Baltic Sea due to 
significant removals (low catches per recreational fisher but millions of fishing days). 
However, many national recreational fisheries surveys are still incomplete or lacking 
completely making it difficult to understand the relative pressures and impacts of all fisheries 
in a region. The availability of marine recreational fishery data is crucial to design and evaluate 
effective recreational management measures. Due to the heterogeneity of recreational 
fisheries, management measures must be tailored to the individual Member States and their 
fisheries. Including recreational mortality into assessment models inevitably challenges the 
management regarding the allocation of resources between the commercial and the 
recreational sector. To increase ecosystem services and assess the potential for growth in 
both sectors, development of a co-management framework that balances environmental, 
economic, and social effects of recreational and commercial fishing will be required. 
(2) Stock development not only depends on fisheries management, but also on the ecological 
status of marine ecosystems. The Baltic Sea is the world’s largest brackish-water 
ecosystem and suffers from numerous pressures, involving euthrophication, large zones at 
the seafloor with very low or without oxygen, toxic pollutants, coastal degradation, expansion 
of non-indigenous species, and climate change. Consequently, future management needs to be 
flexible to include these pressures, with management targets continuously adjusted. The 
present disconnect and fragmentation of institutional arrangements and management bodies 
needs to be overcome.  
(3) The EU Landing Obligation aims at reducing discards of quota species. In the Baltic 
Sea, discards of salmon are very small, discards of herring and sprat are negligible. Only cod, 
plaice and some flatfish species not regulated by catch limits cause relevant amounts of 
discards which are, however, minor (around 2%) when compared to the total landings 
from the Baltic Sea. Non-quota regulated and bycatch species and fish offal can be still 
discarded after the introduction of a Landing Obligation. Consequently, avian scavengers 
(mainly herring gull Larus argentatus) are unlikely to suffer from adverse large-scale effects 
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of the Landing Obligation, but local effects in certain areas cannot be excluded. The 
consequences on benthic scavengers are largely unclear. 
(4) Fisheries management has often failed to achieve the intended level of resource 
exploitation due to implementation error (this is largely the failure to control exploitation 
by all kinds of measures adopted to monitor, control and surveil the use of fisheries 
resources). For instance, under landings quotas the fishing mortality rates are not limited, 
causing an implementation error. In contrast, under catch quotas (landings plus discards) 
this source of implementation error is avoided, but only if all catches of quota species are 
accounted for. Full catch accountability can be achieved by observers or remote electronic 
monitoring including closed circuit television (CCTV), i.e. fully documented fishery (FDF). A 
fisheries management could be improved by a quid-pro-quo or tiered approach, when 
groups of fishers (or Member States) deploying FDF are entitled to catch their full quota 
shares, whereas groups of fishers (or Member States) without FDF would be assumed to 
discard; these assumed discards would be subtracted from their quota share. Some of the past 
implementation error may have been caused because the complex top-down control and 
lack of trust have undermined fishers’ potential intrinsic motivation to fish sustainably. 
Compliance is not necessarily a function of the economical pros and cons of rule violation: 
compliance may be higher or lower, depending on intrinsic motivations; monetary incentives 
may undermine such motivations. An increased level of self-decision may lead to more 
buy-in to sustainable fishing practices and voluntary compliance to catch limits and the 
Landing Obligation. Behavioural science showed that people in small and self-selected groups 
are inherently more likely to behave “pro social”. Some key recommendations are given for 
changes, e.g. in institutional settings, that may increase voluntary compliance and 
sustainable fishing practices. However, transition to a system allowing for more freedom from 
top-down regulation, with more self-governance, may be difficult and may take many years 
but is expected to ultimately pay off. 
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INTRODUCTION 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Achieving the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) exploitation by 2020 at the latest 
is one of the key elements of the reformed EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
 The MSY is currently defined in a single species context, but MSY targets will likely 
change if considered in a multi-species or even an ecosystem context. 
 Measures implemented to achieve the MSY, such as the Landing Obligation, might 
have adverse effects on other non-target ecosystem elements. 
 Other management considerations with important effects on the successful 
implementation of an MSY approach include the incorporation of total 
anthropogenic mortality on commercially exploited stocks and the minimisation of 
the implementation error. 
 The Baltic Sea has a comparatively simple-structured ecosystem and fishing fleet and 
is thus considered a good model region for exploring the impact of management 
measures in EU waters. It is also a region where considerable progress has been made 
on multispecies modelling, where few scavenger populations benefit from discarding, 
and where recreational fishing has been demonstrated to have an important impact on 
the harvest from marine stocks.  
One of the most important aims of the reformed EU CFP is achieving the MSY exploitation of all 
managed European fish stocks no later than 2020 (Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013). Other 
aims of the reform include an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management, long-term 
environmental sustainability of fishing and aquaculture operations, and the elimination of 
discards. These aims and the approaches to achieve them are strongly interlinked.  
 
Despite the apparent clarity of the MSY objective, the basic regulation leaves room for 
interpretation of the term “maximum sustainable yield”. At present, MSY targets are derived in 
a single species context, while it is widely recognised that these could be very different if 
interactions between different fish populations or other elements of the marine environment 
are considered. Moreover, single species’ MSY targets cannot be reached for all commercially 
exploited fish stocks within one region simultaneously.  
 
Part of the problem is that multi-species modelling has only recently started to be used for 
fisheries management. In many cases the data required to arrive at results which could be 
used for fisheries management are still inadequate. It is also clear that other management 
considerations will have an influence on the successful implementation of an MSY approach, 
namely the consideration of all human impacts on fish stocks, and the implementation error for 
the new rules (implementation error is the failure to control exploitation by all kinds of 
measures adopted to monitor, control and surveil the use of fisheries resources). Some of the 
measures implemented to achieve the MSY might have adverse effects to other ecosystem 
elements – for example, eliminating discards are expected to promote the recovery of 
overfished stocks, but might at the same time lead to a reduction of the population of avian or 
benthic scavengers. 
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Terms of Reference 
The European Parliament’s Committee for Fisheries (PECH) therefore commissioned a number 
of regional case studies on the topic, with very similar terms of reference (ToR) among the 
regions. For the present study considering the Baltic Sea, these ToRs are:  
 The in-depth study will focus on EU waters of the Baltic Sea, a specific case-study, to 
provide the relevant knowledge to implement the discard plans and multiannual plans, 
managing the harvested stocks to levels that can produce the MSY, taking into account 
the status of the ecosystem.  
 The study will be based on the best suitable existing data and information obtained 
from the fishing fleets operating in the marine area defined for the case-study and from 
the results of the scientific modelling work conducted in the region.  
 The study will develop a summary report of the state for the art scientific knowledge on 
the above objectives, provide different practical options for the management, and 
describe and analyse the following topics: 
1. A summary of the current state of MSY modelling in the region, including specific 
outcomes and main conclusions The summary will identify and analyse objectives, 
stocks and fleets, interactions, uncertainties - according to the indicators used. It will 
also produce an assessment of those elements not included (such as removals by 
non-commercial fleets) and their likely influence on reaching the objectives of the 
CFP in the short and medium term. 
2. A bio-economic analysis based on a case-study in the region on the likely 
consequences of the Landing Obligation regarding the objectives of the CFP, specially 
the MSY. For this purpose, different scenarios and/or practical options should be 
identified and assessed, considering risks, uncertainties and the main interactions. 
3. An assessment of the main impacts that Landing Obligation in the context of the MSY 
may have on the ecosystem of the region, identifying and analysing the related 
uncertainties.  
4. An analysis of the approaches on how to implement the new rules effectively and in 
line with the objectives of the reformed CFP, including an assessment of the 
implementation error, and a provision of strategies to minimise the implementation 
error by applying findings from behavioural economics. 
5. Based on these analyses, recommendations will be made to the European Parliament 
providing the knowledge on the best way to implement the discards plans and 
multiannual plans according to the different scenarios at the regional level. 
Structure of the report 
After discussion with the client, we adapted the structure of the work to account for the 
peculiarities of the Baltic Sea region. The ToRs are still addressed but the report structure does 
not match the structure of the ToRs. Extensive modelling was not considered imperative within 
this study because most of the multispecies modelling has been conducted recently (during 
2010-2012). The results of this recent work are sufficient to illustrate the challenges for the 
implementation in a fisheries management. They would have to be updated again before 
multispecies considerations are actually implemented in a management plan, but at present 
such an update is impossible as basic data from an analytical stock assessment are missing for 
one of the key fish stocks, i.e. the eastern Baltic cod.  
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Ecosystem modelling (regarding the effects of the LO) was also considered unnecessary as the 
amount of the biomass removed from the system after a full implementation of the Landing 
Obligation – and thus the effect on scavengers – is found to be comparatively small. Instead, 
we put more emphasis on the effect of additional removals from human activities other than 
commercial fishing, and on the minimisation of the implementation error. Both factors have 
consequences for achieving an MSY exploitation. Unfortunately, these consequences are 
largely underestimated and inappropriately accounted for in fisheries management. 
 
Following this introduction, the report is structured in four major sections:  
In Section 1, we present the results of the multispecies modelling work conducted by the 
Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) and the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) expert groups in 2010 through 2012 during the 
evaluation of the Baltic cod management plan. At that time, various options for 
implementation were outlined, ranging from a herring-sprat dominated to a cod dominated 
ecosystem. The management, however, was neither able to decide on one of the options nor 
requested alternatives, but instead continued with a single species management. We outline 
what went wrong in the process and discuss alternative solutions, e.g. balancing objectives 
other than just yield, such as the stability of catches. 
 
Sections 2 and 3 address the impact of other human activities on commercial fish stocks, 
especially recreational fishing. We know from data collections since 2004 that anglers can 
remove a large fraction of some Baltic fish stocks, most importantly western Baltic cod and sea 
trout. We outline why recreational fisher’s catches should be included in the assessment, why 
anglers are important for any MSY consideration, why they are important for the economy of 
coastal regions, and which management approaches for angling appear to work. 
 
The impact of policy changes on the Baltic Sea environment are outlined qualitatively in 
Section 4. This mainly addresses the changes expected after a full introduction of the CFP 
reform and considers the effect of reduced discards, e.g. on scavenging sea birds. 
 
The final Section 5 discusses issues around the implementation of the rules. We are 
interested in approaches to ensure the MSY objectives of the CFP reform can be fully met. The 
minimization of implementation errors is an important aspect to ensure that catch limits 
maintain populations of harvested stocks at levels compatible with MSY. Implementation error 
has contributed to a large extent to past failures of fisheries management.  
 
Therefore, in addition to quantitative analyses to inform how catch limits need to be set in 
discard plans and multiannual plans, an analysis of factors underlying implementation error is 
necessary. One obvious factor is enforcement of the discard ban and the catch limits. Under 
landings quotas, it was relatively easy to monitor the landings in the ports, but landings quotas 
did not limit fishing mortality and this was a large contribution to implementation error. Under 
catch quotas, it is not clear how the Member States will monitor the catches and enforce the 
discard ban. Fully Documented Fisheries (FDF) might be one approach; another is a tiered 
approach, where the higher the uncertainty of the documented catches, the more conservative 
the catch limits will be. Another component of implementation error is the level of adherence 
of the individual fishers to the rules and regulations. Findings from the behavioural sciences 
(e.g. behavioural economics) provide insights into how the institutional settings, framing, 
incentive-structure (non-economic as well as economic incentives), and choice architecture 
influence fisher behaviour rationally and irrationally. We conducted an initial analysis into these 
influences, accompanied by suggestions for mitigation of negative influences. 
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Special features of the Baltic Sea 
The Baltic Sea (Map ) is different from most other EU waters. It is one of the largest brackish 
water areas in the world. While the terrestrial (freshwater) runoff into the Baltic Sea is 
significant, saline water only enters from the North Sea. The Baltic Sea is eutrophic (nutrient-
rich), and in the deeper basins large zones with low or without oxygen (hypoxic or anoxic) 
occur frequently. Bottom water in these basins usually has a much higher salinity than the 
surface water. The density stratification is strong and vertical mixing only affects the bottom 
water in the shallower western Baltic Sea (and surface water bodies elsewhere). Thus, the 
oxygen supply of the bottom water in the deeper basins in the east only comes with lateral 
inflows of saline water (of higher density) from the North Sea (Feistel et al., 2008). 
 
Both salinity and oxygen content severely influence the distribution and development of 
marine fish species in the Baltic Sea. There are a few marine species and a few freshwater 
species, both more tolerant against the reduced and partly variable salinities. In the Baltic Sea, 
environmental factors have a much greater impact on the status of commercially exploited fish 
stocks than in most other European seas. Due to the importance of the environmental 
conditions for the system, not only the fauna of the Baltic Sea is simpler than in most other 
regions, but also the interactions between those species are simpler than e.g. in the adjacent 
North Sea (Hammer et al., 2008). Those simple interactions facilitated extensive ecosystem 
modelling, to determine the mechanisms observed after environmental regime shifts. 
Furthermore, multispecies modelling on commercially exploited fish stocks was conducted in 
the eastern Baltic Sea, where an analysis of only three species (cod, herring and sprat) was 
sufficient to already map most of the interactions. 
 
Likewise, the structure of the fisheries is relatively simple. There are only fisheries of nine 
nations exploiting the marine living resources of the Baltic Sea (eight EU Member States and 
Russia). Commercial fisheries can be broadly separated into active and passive fleets. They all 
exploit adult fish and are relatively similar across nations. Bycatches of target species’ 
juveniles and of protected fish species rarely occur. Moreover, compliance appears to be 
reasonable, at least in most nations and in recent years. The Baltic Sea was therefore the EU 
region where the discard ban was implemented first: for sprat, herring, cod and salmon in 
January 2015 and for plaice as of 2017. 
 
However, the ecosystem modelling in the Baltic Sea is being suspended because since 2014 
there is no analytical stock assessment of the largest demersal commercial fish stock, the 
eastern Baltic cod (i.e., there is no information on spawning-stock biomass and fishing 
mortality). The traditional stock assessment cannot be performed because of data issues (e.g. 
severe uncertainty in age and growth data) and complex environmental influences (involving 
e.g. hypoxia) (Eero et al. 2015). The problems cannot be readily solved and may continue for 
the next years. Consequently, we face the unusual situation that the status of the regions´ 
largest demersal stock cannot be fully assessed and are confronted with the view that the 
Baltic Sea and its ecological interactions may be more complex than previously thought.  
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Map 1: The Baltic Sea and adjacent waters with limits of ICES Sub-Divisions (SD) 
indicated. 
 
Sources: ArcView and ICES. 
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1. MULTISPECIES CONSIDERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT  
KEY FINDINGS 
 The MSY is currently defined in a single species context, but MSY targets will likely 
change if considered in a multi-species or even an ecosystem context. 
 Multispecies modelling for the eastern Baltic Sea demonstrated that the combined 
yield for cod, herring and sprat could be higher than at present, but at the same 
time fishing mortalities consistent with the MSY would be much higher and the risk 
for the spawning stock biomass to fall below limits would increase. 
 A societal decision on the targets for optimisation would be required (e.g. for 
highest yield in biomass, or protein for human consumption, or profit for the fishery; or 
whether the system should be cod-dominated, sprat dominated or something in 
between). There is no biologically optimal solution to this problem. 
 Policy makers felt unable to make this decision and decided not to start 
implementing a multispecies management, although this could be seen as a first 
step towards an ecosystem approach to fisheries management, which is a declared 
element of the EU fisheries policy. 
 We consider it very difficult to reach an agreement among Baltic Member States on the 
targets, because they have divergent interests. We suggest to search for factors 
other than yield to facilitate the decision making process, such as stability in yield. 
We explore one example where the stability of quota for cod is the major objective. 
 It appears unlikely that the effect of the Landing Obligation will have the potential 
to measurably alter those parts of the food web in the eastern Baltic Sea which are 
considered in multispecies modelling. 
1.1. Multispecies modelling of the Baltic Sea ecosystem 
At present, for most fish stocks in EU waters targets and limits required for an MSY approach 
management are derived in a single species context (i.e. for a single fish stock). However, 
different fish stocks in the same region often interact with each other, e.g. they feed on each 
other or compete for the same prey or spawning grounds. It is widely accepted that MSY 
targets or limit reference points would be very different in a multispecies context than they are 
in a single species context, and that single species MSY targets cannot be achieved for all 
commercially exploited species in one region at the same time.  
 
A good illustration is the situation in the eastern Baltic Sea, where cod feeds on small pelagics 
(herring and sprat), which compete for the same food source (zooplankton). Under certain 
conditions sprat, in turn, can regulate the cod stock productivity when adult sprat feed on cod 
eggs. This leads to periods with either high cod biomass and low sprat biomass, or vice versa 
(e.g. Hammer et al., 2008). Environmental conditions such as temperature, salinity or oxygen 
content in the bottom waters, play a much more important role in the Baltic Sea than in other 
EU waters. Fundamental changes in these conditions, so called regime shifts, might trigger the 
transformation into another ecosystem state (Eero et al., 2008; MacKenzie et al., 2007; Köster 
et al., 2003; Köster and Möllmann, 2000; Figure 1). 
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Figure 24: Schematic presentation of the interrelation between climate, 
environmental factors and the development of commercially exploited fish 
stocks in the eastern Baltic Sea. 
 
Source: from Hammer et al., 2008, after an idea of Möllmann, modified. 
To describe the linkages between different stocks, multispecies modelling was developed 
already in the late 1970s (reviewed in Pope 1991) and gained importance at the beginning of 
this century (e.g. Vinter 2001). Results of the multispecies modelling were on occasion used to 
detect changes in natural mortality (M), and they still inform the stock assessments in this 
respect. However, until 2012 fisheries science did not try to deliver management advice 
including multispecies considerations. This was done by a joint working group of the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (STECF) (ICES 2012a; STECF 2012), to address a request of the 
European Commission to propose a multispecies management plan for the Baltic Sea 
superseding the Baltic cod management plan of 2007 (EC Reg. 1098/2007). The extensive 
modelling work revealed, in short (ICES 2012b): 
 fishing mortalities derived from multispecies modelling consistent with the MSY 
approach (Fmsy: fishing mortality that produces the maximum sustainable yield) were, 
for most stocks, remarkably higher than single species’ Fmsys; (for cod: single species 
(ss) Fmsy=0.3 / multi species (ms) Fmsy=0.60-0.65, herring: ss Fmsy=0.16 / ms 
Fmsy=0.26; sprat ss Fmsy=0.35 / ms Fmsy=0.46); 
 combined yield (MSY) when fishing at multispecies’ Fmsys was higher than the 
estimated yield derived from single species assessments; it was much higher for herring 
and not significantly higher for cod; 
 the risk for stocks fished at the higher multispecies Fmsys to fall below the biomass 
limit reference point increased moderately; 
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 and most importantly: It appeared possible to maximize the combined yield for either 
highest cod yield or highest herring and sprat yield, which also means that the system 
could be exploited in a way that it would either become cod dominated (high cod 
biomass and yield, low pelagics biomass and yield) or pelagics dominated, or anything 
between these extremes. 
The work also demonstrated some significant limitations of the modelling work: It was found 
that information on connections in the food web, mainly derived from stomach content 
analysis already conducted in the 1980ies (“who has eaten what”) was old and probably 
outdated, as biomasses of the stocks concerned and, more generally, the environmental 
conditions in the Baltic Sea had changed significantly since the 1980s. Further, the analysis 
assumed no spatial segregation of the three stocks, or at least a significant overlap of the 
distribution area. More recent data has, however, demonstrated that the eastern Baltic cod 
stock is mostly concentrated in the Bornholm Sea (SD 25 and 26, Map ), while the center of 
gravity of distribution of sprat is much further to the north, south of the Archipelago (SD 29, 
Map ). It was therefore strongly recommended to update food web data and to make the 
models more spatially explicit, which would also require additional distribution data. 
 
A decision would now be required on the management targets: There was not one single 
biological optimal solution for a maximum yield from a multispecies system, but many of 
them. Managers could wish for an maximization of the cod or the pelagics (sprat) yield, or for 
various MSY targets, such as maximum harvest of biomass, protein (overall or for human 
consumption, as most of the sprat yield of some nation’s fisheries is used for industrial 
purposes), of landings value, fisher’s income or employment. The final decision to optimise 
towards one of these potential targets could not be taken by scientists but required a societal 
agreement.  
1.2. Incorporation of multispecies aspects in the management 
When the results of the modelling were presented to policy makers in 2012, they found them 
bluntly “useless” and questioned the whole approach. In fact, management decided to stick to 
single species assessment results which gave slightly lower yields but with lower fishing 
mortalities and a lower risk for spawning-stock biomass – a decision supported by science for 
the time being and which is still the basis of the management of commercially exploited fish 
stocks in the Baltic. Single species considerations also form the basis of the new multi-annual 
management for the Baltic Sea, the first plan to be developed after the CFP reform was 
implemented. In conclusion, there is no progress, neither at present nor in the foreseeable 
future, with the implementation of multispecies and thus ecosystem considerations into 
fisheries management.  
 
In its 2012 advice, ICES stipulated that “the present section may serve as a starting point for a 
dialogue between ICES and managers to foster the development of a multispecies 
management system for the Baltic. This text uses implicit management objectives and risk 
tolerance that need to be validated by managers. If managers decide to adopt a multispecies 
management approach, a transition period from the present management will be required.” 
And further: “The societal choice between [the options provided] must be based on social and 
economic considerations and informed by social and economic impact assessments.” 
 
Subsequent research in the Baltic Sea within the frame of the MYFISH project19 included 
considerations on multi-species modelling but also climate changes and their potential 
ecological, economic and social consequences (e.g. Möllmann et al. 2013, Voss et al. 2014a,b, 
Bleckner et al. 2015), although this did not influence political decision making. 
                                           
19 http://www.myfishproject.eu/project-myfish/myfish-overview; http://myfishproject.eu/media-centre-2/news 
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It might be useful to explore the reasons why policy makers have decided not to start this 
dialogue. We suggest that the preferences for management targets are so diverging among 
the different Member States involved in the use of this resource (and possibly even more 
among the wider group of stakeholders), that agreeing on targets is just not feasible. Very 
simplified, the “southern” Baltic fisheries have a higher interest in cod and thus would prefer 
a cod-dominated ecosystem (with higher cod biomass and yield but lower pelagics yield). The 
“northern” Baltic fisheries have a higher share on the sprat and herring catches and thus a 
greater interest in higher fishing opportunities from the small pelagic stocks. From a biological 
point of view, one of those options would be as good as the other or any option in between, 
and all of them could be sustainable and in line with an MSY approach. 
 
An agreement or at least the start of a discussion on potential targets might be possible if 
factors other than yield are considered. An in-depth analysis of potential drivers (for fisher’s 
behaviour) would be required to identify such factors. One potential target could be the 
stability of quotas: this is an element which is very desirable for the cod fishery, which is 
mostly conducted by smaller vessels with limited flexibility to move to other fishing grounds if 
the quota for cod in the Baltic is insufficient. The sprat fishery, in contrast, consists to a large 
extent of larger vessels, which only fish in the Baltic for part of the year when the fish is 
aggregated. These vessels usually also fish for other pelagic stocks in the North Sea (e.g. 
sprat, sandeel, Norway pout) and could probably better cope with larger inter-annual 
fluctuations of the quota.  
 
We therefore modelled a situation with the following assumptions: 
 the cod yield (TAC) is fixed at 70 000 t for 10 years (after the recovery of the stock to 
more than 150 000 t total stock biomass), which is about 45% higher than the mean 
landings and 21% higher than the TACs over the last 10 years; 
 sprat and herring TACs are allowed to fluctuate, and we expect that these fluctuations 
are more pronounced than under the present management regime. Pelagic fisheries 
would have access to the “surplus” which would be left after a cod stock of the size 
required to produce 70 000 t yield is satisfied; 
 recruitment of the cod stock varied randomly by 20% around the mean observed 
recruitment. 
The results of this exercise show that, under these assumptions, the biomass of the cod 
stock would increase by more than 25% in most cases (to more than 200 000 t in 89 out of 
100 model runs). This would mean that a larger cod stock would feed on more pelagic fish and 
thus reduce the fishing opportunities for the pelagic fleet. The risk for the cod stock biomass to 
fall below the initial biomass is low (3 out of 100 model runs), the cod stock would likely be 
underutilised at the end of the 10 year period. Therefore, such an approach would be 
acceptable for the cod fishers but still not be optimal for the pelagic fishers.  
 
The results suggest that further iterations are needed where our modelling approach could be 
refined with higher cod yields or lower starting biomasses. It should also be noted that a 
random variation of 20% for the recruitment in our example is rather low and would 
probably become much higher if the environmental conditions change drastically, as they 
have regularly done in the past. However, the work seems to be sufficient to illustrate the 
potential of the incorporation of additional factors such as the stability of quotas in the 
discussion on MSY targets. 
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1.3. Update of the multispecies modelling 
The results of the multispecies modelling work are now 4 years old, and some of the input data 
was considered outdated already when the work was conducted (see above). If to be used for 
the development of a management plan, these data and the modelling would need to be 
updated. Stomach content analyses are underway to update the food web data. However, ICES 
is currently not able to provide a single species assessment for the eastern Baltic cod stock, 
which is a prerequisite for the multispecies work. We expect that the current assessment 
problems can be solved in the next years. This gives time to explore the principles and targets 
of a future multispecies management, if deemed useful by policy makers.  
1.4. Considerations on the impact of the discard ban on multispecies 
MSYs 
It appears unlikely that the effect of the Landing Obligation will have the potential to 
measurably alter the food web in the eastern Baltic Sea, because the additional removal of fish 
forced by the Landing Obligation is just too small (see section 4). Discards of herring and 
sprat were negligible even before the discard ban, and cod discards will likely be reduced in 
the future (if the rules are properly implemented). This might reduce the fishing mortality on 
young cod and thus increase the predation on small sprat and herring. Given the uncertainty in 
the input data (see above) and the large impact of variable environmental conditions on the 
development of cod, herring and sprat in the eastern Baltic Sea, the effects of this potentially 
increased mortality of young sprat and herring can probably not be separated from other 
factors. 
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2. IMPACTS OF OTHER HUMAN ACTIVITIES ON 
COMMERCIAL FISH STOCKS: RECREATIONAL FISHERIES 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Recreational fisheries have a high impact on marine fish stocks worldwide and in 
the Baltic Sea. Recent surveys show that for some species – namely western Baltic 
cod, salmon and sea trout – recreational fishery catches can have a significant share 
of the total landings. 
 If recreational fisheries data are excluded from assessments, it is not possible to 
accurately determine all direct human impacts on fish stocks and this jeopardizes our 
ability to achieve the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). 
 Although large components of recreational catches are kept, substantial proportions are 
released alive, and in the case of cod most of them survive indicating that 
recreational fisheries releases are reconcilable with the new Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP). No estimates of release survival are available for Baltic salmon and sea trout. 
 Many national recreational fisheries surveys are still incomplete or lacking 
completely making it difficult to understand the relative pressures and impacts of all 
fisheries in a region. However, the availability of marine recreational fishery data is 
crucial to design and evaluate effective recreational management measures. 
 Including recreational mortality into assessment models inevitably challenges 
management regarding the allocation of resources between the commercial and 
the recreational sector. 
 Management measures that imply very large annual reductions of fishing 
opportunities to achieve MSY and include the recreational sector should make sure 
not to jeopardize the social and economic sustainability of the sector at large. 
 Recreational management measures must be tailored to the individual Member 
States and their fisheries. 
 Developing a co-management framework that balances environmental, economic, 
and social effects of recreational and commercial fishing is the next challenge. This 
should increase ecosystem services and assess the potential for growth in both sectors. 
 
In the past, the impact of recreational fisheries (particular angling) on marine fish stocks and 
ecosystems has been frequently neglected, but in recent years it has become increasingly 
recognized by fishery managers (e.g. Post et al., 2002; Coleman et al., 2004; Cooke and 
Cowx, 2004, 2006; Lewin et al., 2006). The marine recreational fishing sector also has high 
economic value and social benefits. Cisneros-Montemayor and Sumaila (2010) estimated 
that in 2003, 58 million recreational fishers were fishing in the sea worldwide, generating a 
total of 39.7 billion USD in expenditures and supporting almost 1 million jobs. Another study 
by Cooke and Cowx (2004) estimated a global recreational fishing participation rate of 11.5% 
(all ecosystems) resulting in a global recreational catch of 47 billion fish and harvest of 17 
billion fish (equal to 10.9 million tons). Thus, recreational fisheries account for roughly 12% of 
the total global fish harvest (FAO, 2014). Ignoring this contribution of recreational fishing on 
total fishing mortality could have consequences for economically and ecologically important 
fish stocks, as it locally could contribute to overfishing (Cooke and Cowx, 2004; 2006; Lewin et 
al., 2006). Although marine recreational fishing is a popular leisure activity throughout Europe, 
with at least 8-10 million participants and total expenditures valued at 8-10 billion Euro 
(Pawson et al., 2008), relatively little effort has been undertaken in the past to investigate its 
ecological, economic and social impacts. Only recently, research efforts in marine recreational 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
 162 
fisheries across Europe have started to increase (e.g. Pawson et al., 2008; Sparrevohn and 
Storr-Paulsen, 2012; Strehlow et al., 2012; Ferter et al., 2013; ICES, 2015a). If recreational 
fisheries data are excluded from assessments, it is not possible to accurately determine all 
the human impacts on stocks, and this jeopardizes our ability to achieve MSY. 
 
Marine recreational fishing in the Baltic Sea is a popular leisure activity with approximately 1 
million fishers (Strehlow et al., 2012; Sparrevohn and Storr-Paulsen, 2012; Sveriges Officiella 
Statistik, 2013). Marine recreational fishing also provides important social and economic 
benefits to society. Recreational fishing is carried out from two different platforms: the shore 
(land-based) and boats (sea-based). In Germany for example, fishing from the shore (surf 
angling and wading) and sea-based fishing methods (private boat and charter boat angling) 
are equally popular with the fishing effort almost evenly split in the Baltic Sea (Strehlow et al., 
2012). The marketing of catches from recreational fisheries is prohibited in Europe. 
 
Recreational fisheries may operate in similar ways to small-scale commercial fisheries involving 
a large number of small vessels (<10 m length over all) and thus should be considered as a 
component of small-scale fisheries. Recreational fishers may operate in similar areas and 
target similar species assemblages as small-scale commercial fisheries. This is particularly 
the case in the western Baltic Sea. Next to the most popular used fishing method in the Baltic 
Sea such as rod-and-line, recreational fishers use nets, pots and go spearfishing. The main 
species targeted by fishers in the Baltic Sea are cod, herring, mackerel, flounder, plaice, dab, 
sea trout and salmon. Recreational fishing licenses are obligatory in only few Member States. 
Accordingly, the total number of recreational fishers and thus catches is unknown and needs to 
be estimated by recreational fishing surveys. There are three main notable challenges 
associated with recreational fisheries data collection: (1) there is no central registration of 
recreational fishers, (2) recreational catches are not documented (no sales slips due to 
prohibition of marketing catches), and (3) recreational fishers fish in remote and hard to 
access areas. As a result, recreational fishing surveys are complex and difficult to conduct, 
often requiring a number of different surveys to collect data on effort (e.g. total number of 
recreational fishing trips), catch per unit effort (e.g. catch per fishing day), biological 
composition of the catch (e.g. size or age composition if catch at size or age is needed for an 
assessment), post-release mortality (to quantify the proportion of released fish dying) and 
economic value (to assess the contribution of the sectors) (ICES, 2015a). 
2.1. Why is it important to involve recreational fisheries in 
management? 
Although the average catch rate may be low in the recreational fishery, the total catch 
numbers may be very high due to the sheer number of recreational fishers. In Germany for 
example, the average harvest of charter boat anglers per fishing day was 3.5 cod in 2014. The 
total number of German anglers fishing in the Baltic Sea was estimated at around 156,000 
with a total effort of approximately 1.1 million fishing days. The estimated cod catch 
(harvested fish and dead releases) was 2 891 t compared to 3 243 t of cod landed by the 
German commercial fishery in 2014 (approximately 47% of the total German landings). If 
these data are excluded from assessments, it is not possible to quantify all human impacts on 
stocks and this jeopardizes our ability to achieve MSY (ICES, 2015a). Further recreational 
fisheries could be impacting local stocks or stock components, as well as 
endangered/threatened species. Moreover, recreational fisheries for particular species may 
become more or less important over time, e.g. the increasing trolling fishery for Baltic salmon. 
In a situation where the recreational fisheries have a large component of young fish, the 
catch in numbers could be large although the catch weight is small. And last, in a situation 
of overfishing recreational fishing mortality – if the known magnitude is large enough – 
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may prevent recovery of depleted stocks. The availability of time-series data is important to 
show trends and support evidence-based decision making. 
2.2. Use of recreational fisheries data 
The regular collection of recreational fishery data in Europe started in 200120 (CEC, 2001). The 
relevant species for which recreational data needs to be collected have been laid out in EU 
Data Collection Regulations21 (CEC, 2008; 2010; 2013a, b). It is recommended that existing 
recreational surveys collecting only single species data should be extended collecting data for 
multiple species, as it is generally easy to collect multiple species within the same survey 
program without significantly greater costs (ICES, 2015a). Up until now “the persistent lack of 
reliable catch estimates of European marine recreational fisheries remains one of the 
biggest challenges for stock assessments and fisheries managers today“ (Eero et al., 2014). 
Many national surveys are still incomplete or lacking completely, making it difficult to 
understand the relative pressures and impacts of all fisheries in a region (ICES, 2015a). 
Further challenges arise from the inconsistency of data over time and an unclear 
understanding of catch, which includes harvested and released components. ICES (2015b) has 
identified the following main drivers for collection of recreational fisheries data: 
i)  Advice on fishing opportunities. The need to quantify the total removals from a 
stock in order to give accurate advice on the fishing opportunities currently drives 
most of the collection of recreational fishery data;  
ii) Design and evaluation of management measures. Where there is a need for 
specific management measures for recreational fisheries, the development and 
evaluation of the measures requires information on the characteristics of the 
fisheries concerned;  
iii) Development and evaluation of management plans/strategies involving 
recreational fisheries. The development of fisheries management plans or 
strategies for a stock should include recreational catches where they are relevant for 
achieving management objectives; 
iv) Marine spatial planning22. There is a need for information to support marine 
spatial planning in areas where recreational fisheries compete for space with other 
users of the marine environment. 
2.3. Relevant species in the Baltic Sea 
The following three species have been identified as those where the recreational fishery is 
responsible for a large share of the total fishing mortality in the Baltic Sea. However, this list is 
not exhaustive and there are other species and stocks where recreational catch is a 
considerable component of the total catch but statistical estimates are not available or 
currently unknown. 
                                           
20  CEC (2001), Council Regulation (EC) No. 1639/2001 of 25 July 2001 establishing the minimum and extended 
Community programmes for the collection of data in the fisheries sector and laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1543/2000. Official Journal of the European Communities EN2001. 
21  CEC (2008), Commission Decision 2008/949/EC of 6 November 2008 adopting a multiannual Community 
programme pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008 establishing a Community framework for the 
collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific advice regarding the 
common fisheries policy. 
 CEC (2010), Commission Decision 2010/93/EU of 18 December 2009 adopting a multiannual Community 
programme for the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector for the period 2011-2013. 
 CEC (2013a), Commission Implementing Decision of 13.8.2013 extending the multiannual Union programme for 
the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector for the period 2011-2013 to the period 2014-
2016. 
 CEC (2013b), Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and the council of 11 December 2013 on 
the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and 
repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EU. 
22  Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for 
community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive). 
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Baltic cod 
National marine recreational fisheries surveys showed that the recreational fishery removes 
considerable amounts of biomass from the western Baltic cod stock (ICES, 2015a; Sparrevohn 
and Storr-Paulsen, 2012; Strehlow et al., 2012). In recent years, western Baltic cod has 
experienced considerable declines and is presently estimated to be at historically low biomass 
levels and below the limit reference point Blim (ICES, 2015c). The current recreational catch 
accounted for 25% of the total catch in 2014 (8 099 t commercial + 452 t discards + 
2891 t recreational) and is considered a minimum estimate as it only includes German data 
(ICES, 2015c). The European Council highlights that Baltic Member States agreed to improve 
their data collection systems to include recreational fishery data into International Council for 
the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) assessments. 
 
Baltic salmon 
Harvest rates of Baltic salmon have decreased considerably since the beginning of the 1990s. 
As basis for MSY the status of wild stocks is assessed using the potential smolt production 
capacity (PSPC) for each river. The reference points are reached when PSPC is above 75%. In 
2014 the overall PSPC of salmon stocks was 65%, however only five of the 40 assessed stocks 
had reached 75% of the PSPC (ICES, 2015d). Recreational catch estimates of Baltic salmon in 
freshwater and marine habitats have been included in the assessment for many years. 
However, catch estimates of the recreational salmon fishery are uncertain, incomplete or 
missing for several Member States. Currently, recreational fishing is thought to take 13% of 
the total marine catch, but this is likely to change as better estimates become available 
(ICES, 2015d). In particular, the impacts of the growing recreational trolling fisheries in the 
Baltic Sea are likely to be underestimated making it difficult to assess its effect on the recovery 
of weak salmon stocks. 
 
Baltic sea trout 
Due to concerns about the status of Baltic sea trout populations, an assessment was 
established and carried out in 2012 and updated in 2015 (ICES, 2015d). In general, sea trout 
populations are in a lower than optimal state in most of the Baltic Sea (ICES, 2015d). Bothnian 
Bay stocks are seriously endangered, while a good stock status is only found in the western 
Baltic Sea and in part of the Gulf of Finland (ICES, 2015d). These stocks are not total allowable 
catch (TAC) managed, MSY proxies still need to be determined. Parr abundance adjusted with 
habitat quality and water chemistry is used to assess individual sea trout populations (ICES, 
2012c). Baltic Sea trout is a popular target species in the recreational fishery. Recreational 
catches are known with little accuracy and are substantially underestimated (ICES, 2015d). In 
2012 recreational catches were much larger than commercial catches (429,6 t recreational + 
281,3 t commercial). The majority of recreational catches is taken in coastal waters and to a 
lesser extent by the recreational fishery in rivers (cf. ICES, 2009; 2015d). 
 
Populations of diadromous species such as Baltic salmon and sea trout (species that spawn in 
rivers and use the sea as adults) are also affected by other human activities influencing 
freshwater habitats, mostly through damming, dredging, pollution and siltation of rivers 
(ICES, 2015d). Consequently, ICES is recommending habitat restoration, removal of migration 
barriers and improvement of the water quality (ICES, 2015d).  
2.4. Releasing fish under the Landing Obligation 
Although large components of recreational catches are kept, substantial proportions are 
released alive either due to regulations or voluntarily (released fish that legally could have 
been retained; Ferter et al., 2013). Overall release proportions by weight in the Baltic Sea 
ranged from 29–70%, with the exception of Poland where only 1% of the recreational cod 
catch is released (Ferter et al., 2013). Exemplary release proportions for cod were 29% 
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(Germany), for sea trout 70% (Denmark) and for salmon 36% (Sweden, marine waters; Ferter 
et al., 2013). From a management perspective it is important to quantify post-release 
mortality and evaluate other potential sub-lethal effects of the catch. Both are needed to 
obtain accurate catch estimates and determine if this would impact the sustainable 
management of fish stocks. This may be particularly relevant for unwanted catch or species 
captured incidentally (e.g. protected species) but there is no evidence that this is of any 
importance in the Baltic Sea. For Baltic cod we demonstrated that nearly 90% of the fish 
survived after being released back into the sea (Weltersbach and Strehlow, 2013), indicating 
that fisheries management and conservation objectives are supported and recreational 
fisheries releases are reconcilable with the new CFP. However, presently there are no post-
release mortality estimates available for sea trout and salmon. 
2.5. Economic and social benefits 
Marine recreational fishing is an integral part of European coastal life and communities, with 
more than 8 million anglers spending over €8 billion every year and with a continuous 
growth of the sector at large (Pawson et al., 2008). Economic data is particular useful for 
managers to help manage the resource efficiently. A study by the Thünen Institute of Baltic 
Sea Fisheries estimated the total annual expenditure of the German marine recreational 
fisheries in the Baltic Sea at 112 million euros (unpublished data). This money is often spent 
in the coastal communities contributing to local employment such as tackle shops, hotels, 
restaurants, boat and equipment rentals, charter boats and fishing guides, for example. The 
recreational sector does not only contribute economically but also provides social benefits to 
society like relaxation, exercise and experience of nature. Further, recreational fishers often 
collaborate with scientists as citizen scientists collecting biological catch data (length, weight, 
tissue samples) that helps contribute to the evidence-base and thus to the sustainable 
management of stocks. 
2.6. Managing recreational catch 
Including recreational mortality into assessment models inevitably challenges management 
regarding the allocation of resources between the commercial and the recreational 
sector. However, unlike in the US, there is currently no management framework in the EU that 
balances the interests of both sectors. Moreover, allocation decision should not only be based 
on historical harvest patters and economic principles but also take into account fairness and 
equity (Eero et al., 2014). Once the managers have decided, the TAC may be set to either (i) 
correspond to the total catch including commercial catch and recreational estimates, or (ii) the 
TAC can be provided for the commercial sector only, as is currently done for western Baltic cod 
(ICES, 2013). 
 
In a situation where there is a need to reduce the overall fishing mortality, the recreational 
fishery may also require management actions (Eero et al., 2014). Thereby managers should 
keep in mind that recreational management objectives are more about angling quality 
than yield per recruit, thus the fishing effort that produces MSY may differ from the level 
providing maximum total satisfaction (Cox et al., 2003; Hussain and Tschirhart, 2010; Pereira 
and Hansen, 2003; Post and Parkinson, 2012; Radomski, 2003). Consequently, marine 
recreational fishery stakeholders should be included in advisory councils to incorporate their 
management goals. Management measures that imply very large annual reductions of 
fishing opportunities to achieve MSY and include the recreational sector should make sure not 
to jeopardize the social and economic sustainability of the sector at large. Marine recreational 
fisheries are under jurisdiction of the individual Member States (in Germany: individual 
federal states). Therefore, multiple management measures are in place with no regional or 
national coordination.  
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In general, the following regulations are commonly used to manage the marine recreational 
fishery in the Baltic Sea: 
 Minimum landing sizes (MLS) are commonly used and apart from the indicative 
minimum conservation reference size it is up to the individual Member States to choose 
different MLS. Accordingly, captured fish under the MLS is released back into the sea.  
 Bag limits restrict recreational fishers to keep only a certain number of individual fish 
per day. This form of harvest regulation is commonly used for salmonids in the Baltic 
Sea. 
 Closed seasons are applicable for several recreational target species in the Baltic Sea. 
Again individual regulations may differ locally and between Member States. Unlike in 
the commercial fishery recreational fishers are still allowed to fish but will need to 
release their entire catch for those species restrictions apply for.  
 Closed areas define areas that are closed for recreational fishing to aid the 
conservation of stocks and preservation of sensitive habitats. Commonly found 
regulations restrict the allowable fishing distance to commercial fishing gear to prevent 
conflicts. Other non-take areas are designed to protect spawning migrations (estuaries 
or river mouths) and/or overwintering aggregations. To design and/or evaluate closed 
areas, higher resolution data as usually available from recreational fishing surveys may 
be needed. 
 Gear restrictions regulate the number of fishing rods per angler, number of hooks per 
rod, as well as number of passive gear for recreational fishers. Many different 
regulations apply for the Baltic Sea.  
Similar to commercial fisheries it is important that if MSY objectives are to be achieved, 
recreational fishers adhere to regulations regarding catch retention, e.g. MLS or bag limits. 
And similar to the commercial sector there is a problem with adherence to harvest regulations 
among the participants in the recreational fishery. However, the level of non-compliance is 
fishery-specific and difficult to assess. 
 
The availability of marine recreational fishery data is crucial to design and evaluate effective 
recreational management measures. It is similarly important to understand the behavioural 
responses of recreational fishers to regulatory policies. As recreational effort is not necessarily 
driven by catchability – since recreational fishers not only value catch but also other ecosystem 
services and are not constrained economically – this may lead to unexpected outcomes. For 
example, lower bag limits may induce higher fishing effort if more catch-oriented fishers 
compensate for reduced harvest or lead to a reallocation of effort to other fish species. This 
dynamic is further complicated as the recreational fisheries differ substantially between 
Member States in terms of participation rates, effort, catch rates, motivation (e.g. social 
interaction, sport), and consumptive orientation (cf. Griffiths et al., 2016). As a result, there is 
no “one-size fits all” management. Management measures must be tailored to the individual 
Member States and their fisheries. Therefore, managers are charged with the difficult task of 
developing a regional perspective to sustainable recreational fisheries management taking 
into account the heterogeneity of recreational fisher populations (Lester et al., 2003). When 
recreational catch is poorly known, sensitivity analyses or management strategy evaluation 
methods could be useful to explore the effects of uncertainty in catch information. 
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3. IMPACTS OF OTHER HUMAN ACTIVITIES ON 
COMMERCIAL FISH STOCKS: OTHER ANTHROPOGENIC 
FACTORS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Stock development depends not only on fisheries management, but also on the 
ecological status of marine ecosystems. 
 Increasing human uses and climate change put increasing pressure especially on 
coastal habitats. 
 Eutrophication is still a major issue in the Baltic Sea inducing hypoxia with 
massive effects on total fish abundance and communities. 
 Reductions of toxic pollutants in the Baltic Sea have been a success story. 
However, legacy pollution maintains concentrations of some substances at levels 
of concern and for some substances no advances have been made. 
 Coastal degradation affects many fish stocks during their life cycle. High level of 
coastal degradation in the Baltic Sea calls for a protection of the remaining 
pristine habitats. 
 Non-indigenous species affect ecosystem functioning, however, the level of 
impact is often unknown. Ecosystem-based management should integrate non-
indigenous species and their interactions with other drivers. 
 Climate change exacerbates the already high stress on the marine 
environment and is changing Baltic fish communities. Accordingly, future 
management needs to be flexible and management targets continuously 
adjusted. 
 There is a disconnect and fragmentation of institutional arrangements and 
management bodies responsible for various environmental problems and the ecological 
functioning of coastal areas affected. A sustainable ecosystem-based management 
should better integrate environmental concerns into the Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP) and facilitate coherence between the different policies. 
 
Next to commercial and recreational fisheries there are other human-induced factors impacting 
coastal-marine ecosystems. In 2003, worldwide, more than 1.2 billion people were living 
within 100km of the coast, with average densities nearly three times higher than global 
average densities (Small and Nicholls, 2003). Anthropogenic stressors such as eutrophication, 
pollution, coastal modification, species introduction, and climate change are increasingly 
threatening the living resources that depend upon the coastal-marine habitats (Doney, 2010; 
Hughes et al., 2015; Rabalais, 2015). Stricter adherence to scientific advice and fishing 
mortality levels set at maximum sustainable yield (MSY) has resulted in a more sustainable 
fisheries management. However, there are examples where stocks have not responded to 
reduced fishing mortality and management strategies are failing to reach their objectives. 
Future management should include good environmental status of marine habitats as a 
prerequisite for productive fish stocks in an attempt to develop a true ecosystem-based 
management (Elmgren et al., 2015). Examples include integrated coastal zone management 
coupled with extensive environmental monitoring of ecological effects (Andersen et al., 2015). 
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In the Baltic Sea, massive environmental problems in the 1960s led to the creation of the 
Helsinki Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the Baltic Sea Area with its 
governing body HELCOM (Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission - Helsinki 
Commission). Unlike other large marine ecosystems in Europe, environmental impacts are 
more pronounced in the Baltic Sea due to its huge catchment area and limited water exchange 
(Elmgren et al., 2015).  
3.1. Eutrophication 
Although success has been made reducing nutrient inflows in the previous decades due to the 
reduction of point source discharges, e.g. installation of sewage systems with improved 
wastewater treatment, there are still issues concerning nutrient inflows from diffuse sources 
(Elmgren et al., 2015). Long-term observation of nutrient concentrations caused by 
anthropogenic activities showed an increase in eutrophication which is only slowly levelling off 
(Feistel et al., 2008) and a recent assessment found that the eutrophication status was 
unacceptable in all 17 open sea basins of the Baltic Sea (Fleming-Lehtinen et al., 2015). 
 
Eutrophication is a condition of high nutrient concentrations – mainly nitrogen (N) and 
phosphorus (P) but also organic matter (C, carbon) – stimulating algae growth often leading to 
an imbalance of the aquatic ecosystem (HELCOM, 2005). High nutrient loads come from 
airborne discharge originating from emissions to the air and waterborne input from diffuse 
sources resulting from agriculture (Feistel et al., 2008). A considerable amount of P is further 
accumulated in muddy sediments, with a high potential for resuspension, especially in the 
shallow waters characterizing the Baltic Sea (Andersen et al., 2015). The increased 
concentrations result in massive phytoplankton and zooplankton growth leading to increased 
water turbidity and consequently decreased light availability for submerged aquatic vegetation 
such as seagrass. The decomposition of the organic matter depletes oxygen levels (a condition 
known as hypoxia) making eutrophication one of the strongest drivers of hypoxia (Conley et 
al., 2009) and the Baltic Sea the area with the largest contiguous oxygen-free zone of 
the world. The negative impacts of poor water quality and hypoxia effect total fish 
abundance and communities, particularly in the Baltic Sea (Österblom et al., 2007; Snickars et 
al., 2015). The complex relationships between the input of nutrients and their influence on 
marine ecosystems are shown in Figure  Scientists have come to the conclusion that reduction 
of hypoxia in the Baltic Sea will only occur if nutrient loads are reduced (Conley et al., 2009; 
Wulff et al., 2007).  
 
Here a discrepancy becomes apparent between polluters and the level of impact symbolized 
through the land-sea interface (e.g. Hughes et al., 2015). This land-water boundary needs to 
be overcome (e.g. disconnect of institutional arrangements and management bodies that do 
not take into account the ecological functioning of coastal areas as spawning and nursery 
grounds) if political agreements on effluent reduction are to be effective (cf. Elmgren, 2001; 
Elmgren et al., 2015). 
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Figure 2: The impact of eutrophication, illustrated by an exemplary case, on the 
spawning habitat of western Baltic herring. 
 
Source: D Moll; symbols courtesy of ian.umces.edu/symbols/ 
3.2. Pollution 
Coastal and marine pollution cause serious threats for the health of marine organisms and 
human beings (Islam and Tanaka, 2004). Pollutant discharge comes from pulp and paper 
mills, agricultural and urban runoff, oil spills, untreated sewage, etc. (Islam and 
Tanaka, 2004). Pollutants accumulate in coastal sediments and have a high persistence. The 
major contaminants are heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants (POPs), such as DDT 
(dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane), PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls) and dioxins for example. 
In the Baltic Sea considerable advances have been made reducing toxic pollutants. 
Nevertheless, dioxin concentrations in fish from parts of the Baltic remain above EU threshold 
values and “legacy pollution maintains concentrations of some substances at levels of concern“ 
(Elmgren et al., 2015). Besides accumulating in marine organisms, pollutants may impair 
reproduction functions of fish (Islam and Tanaka, 2004). 
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3.3. Coastal modification 
Coastal modification and development encompasses a number of human activities such as 
shoreline constructions (ports, jetties and marinas), dredging of fairways, 
construction of gas pipelines, beach nourishment, etc. (Figure ). Coastal modification can 
severely affect habitats and biodiversity both in coastal ecosystems and in deeper regions 
(Sundblad and Bergström, 2014). The associated stress caused by suspended sediments and 
turbidity can affect fish populations in many different ways (Kjelland et al., 2015). A recent 
assessment demonstrated that 44% of the species for which advice is given by (International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea) utilize coastal habitats during some time of their life 
cycle, and these stocks contributed 77% of the commercial landings of ICES-advice species, 
emphasizing the ecological value of coastal habitats (Seitz et al., 2014). A study carried out 
in the Stockholm archipelago in the Baltic Sea estimated that “approximately 40% of available 
habitats were already degraded in 2005” (Sundblad and Bergström, 2014). 
 
Figure 2: Forms of coastal modification. 
 
Source: D Moll; symbols courtesy of ian.umces.edu/symbols/ 
3.4. Species introduction 
The introduction and establishment of non-indigenous species may substantially alter local 
biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (Ojaveer and Kotta, 2014). A recent literature review 
found that of 18 widespread established non-indigenous species an ecological impact was 
observed for 13, among them round goby (Neogobius melanostomus) and the comb jelly 
Mnemiopsis leidyi (Ojaveer and Kotta, 2014). However, there is little available knowledge on 
the nature and magnitude of impacts (Ojaveer and Kotta, 2014). Instead of focusing on a 
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single invader, we should integrate non-invasive species into an ecosystem approach to 
management also considering the interactions with other drivers (Strayer, 2012). 
3.5. Climate change 
Climate change exacerbates the anthropogenic stressors mentioned above increasing the 
already high levels of stress on fish stocks and the marine environment (Snickars et al., 
2014)). Projected warming in the Baltic Sea is expected to be higher than in other marine 
areas (Elmgren et al., 2015). Warmer sea water dissolves less oxygen, thus, it is likely that 
the interaction between climate and eutrophication will enhance the conditions for hypoxia to 
occur (Conley et al., 2015). In northern Europe climate change will also lead to increased 
precipitation with cascading effects resulting in decreased photic depth and salinity (Snickars 
et al., 2014). Increasing temperature and decreasing salinity as predicted by climate change 
scenarios suggest declining trends of zooplankton in deeper water and potential food 
shortage for benthic-feeding fish such as cod (Snickars et al., 2014). And a long-term data 
analysis of coastal fish communities during four decades in the Baltic Sea revealed that there 
was an “overall transition from communities dominated by marine species and those favoured 
by cold water to a state characterized by species of a freshwater origin in favour of warmer 
waters” (Olsson et al., 2012). Changes in fish communities caused by climate change, altered 
productivity or changes in species interactions will require a flexible management, where 
management targets are continuously adjusted (Olsson et al., 2012). 
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4. MAIN IMPACTS OF THE LANDING OBLIGATION ON THE 
ECOSYSTEM 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The Landing Obligation aims at changing the current practice of discarding. The entire 
catch (landings plus previous discards) of total allowable catch (TAC) species has 
to be landed. 
 In the Baltic Sea, the Landing Obligation applies to one demersal species (cod 
Gadus morhua) and three pelagic species (herring Clupea harengus, sprat Sprattus 
sprattus, and salmon Salmo salar). Plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) will be covered 
from 2017 onwards.  
 Of these species, only cod and plaice cause relevant amounts of discards. 
Discards of the other species are either very small (salmon) or negligible (herring and 
sprat).  
 The Landing Obligation is not fully implemented yet and actual figures are missing 
or incomplete. Therefore, potential effects are demonstrated exemplarily using 
assessment data from 2014.  
 The exercise revealed that the Landing Obligation would result in landing of little 
additional biomass (around 2%) when compared to the total landings from the 
Baltic Sea in 2014.  
 Considerable amounts of non-TAC and bycatch species will be still discarded, e.g. 
all flatfish species except plaice, as well as benthic invertebrates, seabirds and marine 
mammals.  
 Scavenging on discards by seabirds is widespread in the Baltic Sea, however, the 
number of seabird species feeding on discards is generally lower than in other EU 
waters. Gulls are the most numerous scavengers (mainly herring gull Larus 
argentatus). Adverse large-scale effects of the Landing Obligation on 
scavenging seabird populations are unlikely, but local effects in certain areas 
cannot be excluded.  
 The role and importance of discards and offal for benthic communities in the 
Baltic Sea is largely unclear. 
 
Fishing activities are one of the most widespread human uses of the sea and can cause 
various impacts of different intensities on marine environments and species (Goñi, 1998). One 
of these impacts is caused by the bycatch of unwanted species and sizes that are 
discarded at sea. Discards are a source of energy that is removed and immediately returned 
to the marine ecosystem (Sardà et al., 2015). The EU`s Landing Obligation aims at changing 
the current practice of discarding. The entire catch (landings plus previous discards) of TAC 
species has to be landed so that undersized specimens are no longer returned to the 
sea. 
 
This chapter addresses the potential consequences for the marine ecosystem of the extra 
removal of biomass. As a first step, we relate this biomass to a) the total commercial 
landings from the Baltic Sea, and b) the biomass that will continue to be returned to the sea 
(this involves discards (e.g. undersized specimens of non-TAC species) and offal (i.e. 
remains of gutted round fish like cod). 
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4.1. Discards 
In the Baltic Sea the Landing Obligation will apply to one demersal species (cod Gadus 
morhua) and three pelagic species (herring Clupea harengus, sprat Sprattus sprattus, and 
salmon Salmo salar). Plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) will be covered from 2017 onwards.  
 
As the Landing Obligation is not fully implemented yet, actual figures are missing. Therefore, 
potential effects are demonstrated exemplarily using assessment data from 2014, when most 
recent estimates were produced (Table 7). This implies that for cod a minimum landing size 
(MLS) of 38 cm is used and fishing patterns are assumed constant (e.g. no changes in fishing 
by the skippers to avoid bycatch). Therefore, bycatch and discard estimates should be 
considered maximum estimates. Moreover, it is of note that total and relative amounts of 
discards are heterogeneously distributed in space and time, and are also highly variable 
between years (e.g. due to natural variations in recruitment).  
 
In 2014, when the Landing Obligation was not in place yet, about 21 487 t of fish biomass 
was discarded (Table 7). Once the Landing Obligation is in place, from this amount one third 
(33%) will continue to be legally discarded at sea (mainly non-TAC flatfishes) while two 
third (67%) have to be landed. However, when compared to the total landings from the Baltic 
Sea, the Landing Obligation would result in landing of little additional biomass, only around 
2%.  
4.2. Offal 
Unlike flatfishes, cod and salmon (and other round fish) are processed on board the fishing 
vessels in the Baltic Sea. This is a legal provision due to food safety issues (e.g. parasites 
that may move from the intestines into the flesh). The remains of the gutting are called offal 
and discarded at sea. Under the LO, market-sized cod (larger than the minimum 
conservation reference size (MCRS)) still have to be gutted at sea while cod smaller than the 
MCRS have to be landed whole (i.e. ungutted). Thus, remarkable amounts of offal will 
continue to be provided to scavengers. When applying an estimated proportion of offal of 
14.7% for cod (ICES, 2000) to the most recent landing data of cod, more than 6 000 t of offal 
incurred in 2014. It is important to note that this is more than half (53%) of the amount of 
total cod discards in the year 2014 (Table 7). In the Baltic Sea, the total amount of offal 
originates nearly exclusively from the gutting of cod, the amount of offal from gutting other 
fish species is insignificant (ICES, 2000). Offal constitutes a major food subsidy to scavenging 
species like seabirds (Tasker et al., 2000, Garthe and Scherp, 2003, Furness et al., 2007). 
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Table 7: Hypothetical example applying the Landing Obligation to 2014 fisheries 
data from the Baltic Sea. Offal: waste from gutted fish disposed at sea; 
assuming 14.7% of offal for whole cod (ICES, 2000). 
FISH STOCK LANDINGS 
BYCATCH 
OFFAL 
BYCATCH 
+ OFFAL 
OFFAL 
NOT 
COVERED 
BY LO 
LANDED 
UNDER 
LO 
 
(ICES 
subdivisions in 
the Baltic Sea) 
(tons) (tons) (tons) 
(% 
total 
catch) 
(tons) (tons) 
(% 
bycatch 
+ offal) 
Cod 22-24 8 000  500 6 1 176 1 676 70 
Cod 25-32 34 347  11 309 25 5 049 16 358 31 
Salmon 22-31 1 022  54 5 (3)   
Salmon 32 95  6 6 (3)   
Plaice 21-23 1 931  1 956 50 (3)   
Plaice 24-32 534  481 47 (3)   
Flounder 22-23 1 193 540  31 (3)   
Flounder 24-25 14 610 5 874  29 (3)   
Flounder 26, 28 4 614 (1)   (3)   
Dab 1 269 757  37 (3)   
Brill 28 4   (3)   
Turbot 253 (1)   (3)   
Sea Trout 219 (2)   (3)   
Herring 3a  
& 22-32 
312 032  (3)  (3)   
Sprat  244 000  (3)  (3)   
Sum 624 147 7 175 14 312  6 225 27 712 23 
  21 487     
Source: Last available stock and discard data (ICES, 2015c, ICES, 2015e). 
Note: Discard calculation is based on a MLS/MCRS of 38 cm (MLS until 31.12.2014), and no adaptation of 
fishing pattern is assumed. Bycatches should therefore be considered maximum estimates.  
(1) considered substantial, but not quantifiable; (2) no estimates; (3) negligible 
4.3. Effects of discards on seabirds 
Discards, especially fish, are a major food source for many scavenging sea birds, marine 
mammals, fish and benthic invertebrates (Garthe and Scherp, 2003, Bicknell et al., 2013, 
Kaiser and Hiddink, 2007, Furness et al., 2007). The decrease in fish biomass caught and 
provided by fishers to scavengers is assumed to reduce food availability for scavengers 
and might affect the equilibrium of existing species interactions (Veiga et al., 2016). The 
Landing Obligation may also affect the marine-coastal environment and communities of 
certain species in the worlds´ largest brackish water sea.  
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Scavenging on discards by seabirds is widespread in the Baltic Sea. However, the number of 
seabird species feeding on discards is lower than in other marine regions (Garthe and Scherp 
2003). Herring gull (Larus argentatus) is the most abundant scavenging species in all Baltic 
areas and seasons, followed by great black-backed gull (Larus marinus) and lesser black-
backed gull (Larus fuscus) as well as mew gull (Larus canus) (Garthe and Scherp, 2003). For 
other common seabird species in the Baltic Sea, like great cormorant (Phalacrocorax 
carbo) and common guillemot (Uria aalge) discards and offal are not important (Tasker et al., 
2000, Garthe and Scherp, 2003). Other scavenging seabird species typical for the North Sea, 
like gannet (Morus bassanus) or northern fulmar (Fulmaris glacialis), do not occur in the Baltic 
Sea or at very low numbers (Garthe and Scherp, 2003).  
 
Analysis of herring gull pellets demonstrated differences in the importance of offal in the 
diet, depending on the region and season (Garthe and Scherp, 2003). Experiments showed 
that herring gulls mainly ingested discarded cod, preferably specimens smaller than 30 cm. 
Gulls did not take discards of flatfish species like plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) and flounder 
(Platichthys flesus); only dab (Limanda limanda) was taken but at very low rates (Garthe and 
Scherp, 2003).  
 
Generally, it is difficult to unambiguously demonstrate effects of fisheries on seabird 
population abundance because adverse or beneficial effects can be caused by numerous 
factors at multiple spatial and temporal scales (Tasker et al., 2000). Moreover, it is 
problematic to predict the response of seabird communities to changes in discard rates 
because historical baseline data would be needed to elucidate the confounding effects of other, 
more ‘natural’ ecological processes (Votier et al., 2004). Most scavengers are opportunistic 
by nature. For instance, herring gulls – listed as of “least concern” in the most recent Red 
List of Baltic Sea bird species (HELCOM, 2012) – also use other anthropogenic food 
sources like refuse dump sites (Markones and Guse, 2007, Capandegui, 2006). Hence, the 
effects of changes in terrestrial dump site access on herring gull population dynamics could be 
confounded with LO-induced changes in marine food supply, or other factors. 
 
The population dynamics of lesser black-backed gulls is probably affected by changes in 
trawler discard availability in the western Mediterranean (Oro, 1996). Two sub-species of 
lesser black-backed gull (Larus fuscus ssp.) live in the Baltic and were assessed separately in 
the most recent Red List of seabirds in the Baltic (HELCOM, 2012). The sub-species L. fuscus 
intermedius, that breeds in the western Baltic (Denmark, Swedish west coast, recently also in 
Germany) is of least concern. In contrast, the nominate sub-species L. fuscus fuscus that 
breeds in the central and eastern Baltic Sea and eastern Scandinavia (Map 3) is listed as 
vulnerable. There are some indications that the size of L. f. fuscus population at the east coast 
of Sweden is related to the presence of sprat, but a detailed study could not reveal starvation 
of chicks as a reason for low breeding success in this area (Capandegui, 2006). However, 
herring gulls prey on chicks of L. fuscus fuscus and it cannot be ruled out that food shortage 
caused by lower fish stocks and/or lower discard rates might increase the predation pressure 
of herring gulls on L. fuscus fuscus. Such switching of prey by the great skua (Stercorarius 
skua) as a facultative scavenger in case of food shortage was demonstrated to be a 
potentially serious threat to some seabird communities in the North Sea (Votier et al., 2004). 
Yet, Bicknell et al. (2013) stated that it seems unlikely that decreasing discard rates could 
cause a crisis for most seabird populations. In addition, offal would still be available as food 
source (see above). 
 
The discard ban and its impact on the MSY objective - The Baltic Sea 
 
 
177 
Map 3: Distribution of lesser black backed gull subspecies Larus fuscus fuscus in 
the central and eastern Baltic Sea. 
 
Source: HELCOM (2012) 
4.4. Effects of discards on benthos 
Seabirds display remarkable efficient and selective consumption near fishing vessels. They 
influence strongly how much discards and offal reach the benthic scavenger communities 
(Furness et al., 2007). For example, in the Baltic normally most of discards and offal are eaten 
by seabirds (Garthe and Scherp, 2003). The remains may be partly eaten by opportunistic 
fishes in the water column before touchdown at the seabed. However, few studies are 
available (Furness et al., 2007) and the role and importance of discards and offal for benthic 
communities in the Baltic Sea is virtually unknown. 
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5. IMPLEMENTATION ERROR 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Fisheries management has often failed to achieve the intended level of 
exploitation of the resource; this is called implementation error. 
 Under landings quotas the fishing mortality rates are not limited, causing 
implementation error. In contrast, under catch quotas (landings plus discards) this 
source of implementation error is avoided, but only if all catches of quota species 
are accounted for. 
 Full catch accountability can be achieved by remote electronic monitoring and 
closed circuit television (CCTV) – this is called fully documented fishery (FDF). 
 A quid-pro-quo approach, or tiered approach, would be that groups of fishers (or 
Member States) deploying FDF are entitled to catch their full quota shares, 
whereas groups of fishers (or Member States) without FDF would be assumed to 
discard; these assumed discards would be subtracted from their quota share. 
 Behavioural science suggests that some of the past implementation error may 
have been caused because the complex top-down control and lack of trust have 
undermined fishers’ potential intrinsic motivation to fish sustainably. 
 Compliance is not necessarily a function of the economical pros and cons of rule 
violation: compliance may be higher or lower, depending on intrinsic motivations. 
Monetary incentives may undermine such motivations. 
 An increased level of self-decision may lead to more buy-in to sustainable fishing 
practices and voluntary compliance to catch limits and the Landing Obligation. 
 All else being equal, people in small and self-selected groups are inherently more 
likely to behave “prosocial”. 
 In this chapter some key recommendations based on behavioural science are given 
for changes, e.g. in institutional settings, that may increase voluntary compliance 
and sustainable fishing practices. However, transition to a system allowing for 
more freedom from top-down regulation, with more self-governance, may be difficult 
and may take many years. 
 
Fisheries management has often failed to achieve the intended level of exploitation of the 
resource; this is called implementation error. “Implementation error is usually regarded as 
falling outside the scientific component of fisheries management and although very much in 
evidence, has been little studied (O'Boyle, 1993). It is largely the failure to control 
exploitation by whatever MCS (monitoring, control and surveillance) measures have 
been adopted. The reasons are many and interrelated, for example, poor surveillance and 
enforcement, lack of concern by the judiciary when cases are heard, failure of participants to 
support measures due to lack of opportunity for input during their development or simply 
disagreement with the measures enforced” (Caddy and Mahon, 1995). In management 
systems which are based primarily on advice from biological assessments, failure to 
incorporate, or incorrect incorporation of non-biological information, also contribute to 
implementation error. These problems may frequently be known to the managers and their 
technical advisers, but it may be impossible to quantify the uncertainty, except in retrospect. 
“A workshop to review management of groundfish stocks on the Scotian Shelf off eastern 
Canada from 1977 to 1993 concluded that implementation error was the primary cause of the 
failure to conserve stocks (Angel et al., 1994). The workshop noted that ‘In sum, the tactical 
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approach chosen to control fishing mortality generated illegal behaviour which was not curbed 
by the available enforcement regime’ ” (Caddy and Mahon, 1995). 
 
Minimizing implementation error is therefore as important as the accurate estimation of the 
required target fishing mortality and catch limits for the “ensuring that catch limits maintain 
populations of harvested stocks to levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY)”. Implementation error has contributed to a large extent to past failures of fisheries 
management. Therefore, an analysis of factors underlying implementation error is 
necessary. In order to minimize overlap with the report to the European Parliament (EP) by 
Hedley and Catchpole (2015), we refer to that report for more detailed accounts on monitoring 
and control, enforcement and compliance, remote electronic monitoring (REM) and (FDF), and 
concerns for increased black market trade for juvenile fish. 
 
Prior to the Landing Obligation, the main instrument to control fishing pressure in the EU has 
been the setting of Total Allowable Landings quotas. This instrument has allowed for 
implementation error because landings quotas do not limit catches. Under landings quotas, 
unlimited overquota catches are allowed as long as they are not landed; in other words, they 
must be discarded at sea. There are three major reasons for discarding: (1) fish smaller 
than the minimum landing size (MLS) are not allowed to be landed; (2) fishers may discard 
lower-quality fish and utilise their landings quota to land better-quality fish (high-grading); 
this practice is forbidden since 2002 but no offenders have been caught and sanctioned 
(Schou, 2015); (3) in mixed fisheries, fishers may catch overquota fish when they continue 
fishing for other species whose quota is not yet exhausted; these fish, which may be 
(unavoidable, incidental) bycatch species or part of the targeted assemblage, must be 
discarded. 
 
The LO, with Total Allowable Catch quotas (limiting actual catches rather than only 
landings), attempts to make an end to the implementation error caused by the landings quota 
system. However, it is expected that the EU will experience problems in fully implementing 
the Landing Obligation if the incentives for discarding continue to exist. For example, although 
the MLS will be abolished under the LO, fish smaller than a minimum conservation 
reference size (MCRS) are not permitted to be sold for human consumption and thus have a 
lower value. Therefore, incentives for discarding fish below MCRS and thus highgrading may 
continue to exist. In addition, in several areas choke-species problems may arise in mixed 
fisheries or fisheries with unavoidable bycatch. In an earlier report to the EP (Zimmermann 
et al., 2015) we showed that it is possible to deal with potential choke-species problems in 
the Baltic Sea through several avenues. Nevertheless, unless the Landing Obligation is fully 
enforced, the incentives for discarding may remain also in the Baltic Sea. 
 
Thus, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) can only be fully implemented if the Landing 
Obligation is fully complied with and catch limits are not exceeded. However, it is not yet 
clear how the catch limits and Landing Obligation will be enforced and how catches will be 
verified. The Regulation23 leaves the documentation to the Member States (CEC, 2013b, 
Article 15.13): 
“For the purpose of monitoring compliance with the LO, Member States shall ensure detailed 
and accurate documentation of all fishing trips and adequate capacity and means, such as 
observers, CCTV and others. In doing so, Member States shall respect the principle of 
efficiency and proportionality.”  
                                           
23 CEC (2013b), Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and the council of 11 December 2013 on 
the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and 
repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EU. 
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The level of accuracy is not specified, i.e. it is not stipulated whether all catches need to be 
counted or whether aggregated estimates will be sufficient. In the latter case, uncertainty 
margins should be applied.  
 
As long as not all catches are observed, counted, documented, and verified, the Regulation 
leaves room for implementation error, in two ways: 
1. Directly: Fishers may still catch (and discard) in excess of the quotas. 
2. Indirectly: Removals will be known only with a certain degree of uncertainty to 
stock assessment scientists. This will lead to imprecise estimates, imprecise advice 
and imprecise management measures, for example too low or too high total 
allowable catch (TAC). Prior to the LO, this has been commonly the case. Scientists 
attempted to estimate the removals (including discards) through sampling trips 
with observers on board. Problems of reliability and representativeness of the 
samples may, however, increase under the Landing Obligation because fishers may 
fear that when scientists are aware of law violations, this information will be passed 
on to the enforcement authorities. To mitigate this problem, data collection for 
science (i.e. stock assessment) should be kept strictly separated from data 
collection for enforcement purposes (Mangi et al., 2013). For example, it has 
been found that fishers report bycatch of rare species in scientific programs but not 
in their logbooks, although obligatory (Vølstad, personal communication).  
5.1. Towards full catch accountability and results-based 
management 
Hand in hand with the Landing Obligation the EU aims for a result-based management 
(RBM). The concept of RBM in fisheries is proposed as a way for public authorities to delegate 
specific management and documentation responsibilities to resource users (reversal of the 
burden of proof). The concept comprises three defining features: (1) The authorities define 
measurable objectives for the utilization of fisheries resources; (2) the resource users are 
made responsible for achieving these objectives and for (3) providing documentation that 
allows for an audit of the extent to which they are met (Nolde Nielsen et al., 2015). The EU 
legislator fixes objectives, targets and standards, and Member States cooperate regionally 
with input from all stakeholders to design the best suited tools to achieve these objectives and 
targets. This would entail moving away from the current prescriptive and detailed regulations 
(e.g. the technical measures), and reducing the complexity of current legislation. It would 
encourage the industry to innovate and to develop technology supporting the achievement of 
agreed aims. 
 
If implementation error is to be avoided, the freedom from current complex and prescriptive 
legislation implied by RBM can only be provided to the actors (Member States, fishing 
enterprises) if either full trustworthiness or full proof of the catches can be ensured in return. 
Full documentation (i.e. proof) of the catch can be achieved by REM systems such as CCTV, 
sensor systems etc., but these systems are costly and fishers are often averse to being 
watched. Some Member States also expressed a dismissive attitude towards Remote Electronic 
Monitoring (REM). 
 
To address this, various versions of quid-pro-quo or tiered approaches have been 
suggested (STECF, 2011; Mike Park, personal communication March 2013; Schou, 2015). In 
such approaches, individual fishers or groups of fishers (or Member States, which are 
hereafter also implied under ‘groups of fishers’) can choose between different levels of 
monitoring. Those under a high level of monitoring would bear the costs (monetary costs 
as well as psychological costs owing the above-mentioned aversion of being watched) but be 
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able to provide accurate catch information, whereas those under a low level of monitoring 
would forego those costs but provide uncertain catch information. The burden of that 
uncertainty would then fall on the latter (groups of) fishers with low level of monitoring; these 
fishers would either be under more stringent and prescriptive regulations or be subject 
to a reduction of their quotas or both. For those fishers providing uncertain information it 
would, for example, be assumed that their catches would amount to the upper end of a 
specified uncertainty interval. This could for example mean that (groups of) fishers with 100% 
observer coverage (e.g. by CCTV) would be allowed to catch and land the actual catch share 
they are entitled to, whereas (groups of) fishers without observer coverage would be 
assumed to discard according to historical rates and this catch would be deducted from their 
entitlement. There could be an intermediate level where catches are accounted for indirectly 
through data on catch methods and patterns, comparison with reference fleets, etc. and the 
quota deduction will be in proportion to the resulting uncertainty. This approach could also be 
a solution to the “brace-and-belt” issue identified in our second report to the EP (Stepputtis 
et al., 2015): during the transition from “belt” to “brace” some groups of fishers could take 
their “belts” off and wear “braces” while other groups of fishers still wear “belts”.  
 
It should be noted that under full coverage by CCTV and/or other REM systems, not all 
footage needs to be observed nor all data need to be inspected. A risk-based approach 
would be to check only a certain proportion of the available footage/data but when suspicion 
arises that in a specific case the reported catches are not accurate, this specific footage/data 
will be subjected to greater scrutiny (Mangi et al., 2013). 
 
This tiered, quid-pro-quo approach can be taken at any level of groups of fishers, even at 
Member-State level where some Member States opt for full accountability and get their full 
quota share and other Member States opt for less accountability (perhaps for the time being in 
a transition period) and are subject to a reduction of their quota share because some 
discarding still has to be assumed. This is not counter the principle of Relative Stability if this is 
formulated in terms of fishing opportunities rather than actual catch: in order to be 
allowed to fully realise its fishing opportunity, a Member State must fully account for its catch, 
otherwise the Member States’ historical discards are assumed to take place and are deducted 
from the catch share (partly, in case of intermediate levels of accountability). 
 
In order to ensure buy-in – and hence compliance – from the fishing sector, such tiered quid-
pro-quo approaches should be carefully framed. Should it be framed as a “stick” or as a 
“carrot”? A “stick” would be used where quota would be deducted if fishers do not take up the 
full monitoring. A “carrot” would be offered where fishers receive extra quota if they take up 
the full monitoring. The response to “carrots” versus “sticks” should be carefully considered. 
Human beings are known to be subject to loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Loss 
aversion is encapsulated in the expression “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). It is thought that the pain of losing is psychologically about twice as powerful 
as the pleasure of gaining. In line with this notion, a behavioural-economics experiment found 
that a “stick” was sometimes more effective than a “carrot” in motivating people (Gächter et 
al., 2009). All current and recent EU pilot projects with catch quota and Full Documented 
Fishery (FDF) have used the “carrot” and fishers seemed to be happy to opt in. On the other 
hand, the EU cod plan (EU, 2008) used the “stick” of effort reductions to motivate (groups of) 
fishers to take up cod avoidance measures and this was not well received by the fishing sector 
(Kraak et al., 2013). Thus, observations in the EU fisheries appear contrary to the behavioural-
economics experiment of Gächter et al. (2009). Perhaps a mixture of “sticks” and “carrots” 
may work best. In order to find out what kind of framing would lead to highest buy-in, directed 
research on the response of fishers to “sticks” and “carrots” or mixtures thereof is needed.  
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In order to incentivize uptake by fishers of FDF systems, it may be important to emphasize 
additional benefits of FDF (on top of full access to the fishing opportunities). The quid-pro-
quo approach could, for example, stipulate that in return for FDF, the fishers will be 
subjected to less prescriptive rules and hence have more perceived freedom and flexibility in 
running their business (e.g. fishers applying FDF would have to comply with fewer technical 
measures on gear). FDF also presents an opportunity for ﬁshing businesses to increase 
efﬁciency by reducing waste (discards) which would lead to increased proﬁts; 
furthermore, fishers may see FDF as a method for industry-driven data collection, and full 
documentation of the ﬁsh supply chain (from net to plate) could bring strong market 
incentives through information on sustainability of the species, traceability and 
documentation on how the ﬁsh has been caught and treated onboard (Mangi et al., 2013; 
David Stevens (fisher), personal communication and https://youtu.be/zsuNxpH4alo). The 
concepts of traceability and transparency could also be used in more innovative ways. 
Humans are not only subject to an aversion of being watched, but people may also like being 
watched when they are proud of what they are doing. In the eastern US, an idea has been 
trialed which draws on the effect of actors in a system knowing each other which may have a 
positive impact on compliance. In this trial fish products (in this case lobster) marketed 
and sold locally to the production area carry a Quick Response (QR) code which gives 
information about the individual catcher. In this way the actual seafood item sold is directly 
linked to the harvester. In other markets (meat products), this form of information promotes 
trust from the consumer, but in the fisheries case it may also promote compliance from the 
fishers by instilling in them a greater sense of ownership of the final product (Kraak et al., 
2015).  
 
Further research on the “being-watched” effect should be conducted with experiments that 
are relevant to the specific settings encountered in fisheries management. The aversion to 
being watched is in agreement with the notion that too much monitoring may have the 
result that individuals feel they are not trusted and as a consequence become less 
trustworthy (Ostrom, 1998). In contrast, it has been well documented that people will be 
more likely to behave ‘prosocial’ (e.g. cooperate, comply) in non-anonymous situations, for 
example because it opens possibilities of direct or indirect reciprocity and reputation building 
(Kraak, 2011). Recent investigations have shown that subtle cues of being watched such as 
two stylized eye-like shapes on a computer screen suffice to change human behaviour and 
reduce selfishness; these eyeshaped cues seem to elicit unconscious hardwired reactions 
(Milinski and Rockenbach, 2007). Perhaps a way to exploit this human propensity without the 
disadvantage of eroding trust is to display a picture of “watching eyes” on the e-logbook 
screen (Kraak et al., 2015). 
 
The discussion below focuses on factors contributing to implementation error that involve 
the behaviour of individual fishers. It should be noted, however, that implementation error 
may also be caused by processes at Member-State level, for example the lack of political 
will to enforce regulations. Fishery inspections are extremely heterogeneous between 
Member States, where one Member State might regulate stricter and another is more lax. The 
discussion below, however, is based on the behavioural sciences, which deal with the 
psychology of individual behaviour and not with the ‘behaviour’ of larger, aggregate, entities 
such as states.  
5.2. Crowding out of social capital and intrinsic motivation 
Kraak (2011) framed the problem of overfishing in terms of the Tragedy of the Commons, 
where, according to standard rational economic theory, individuals are predicted to be 
unwilling to ‘cooperate’ for the common good through sacriﬁcing catches in the short term, 
leading to overharvesting of the resource. However, over the last decades, a multitude of 
research has shown that humans often achieve outcomes that are ‘better than rational’ by 
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building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust help to overcome the temptations 
of short-term self-interest (reviewed in Kraak, 2011). Factors enhancing ‘cooperation’ include 
familiarity and non-anonymity with the possibility of direct or indirect reciprocity and 
reputation-building, face-to-face communication and physical contact, the threat of 
punishment or social exclusion (Kraak, 2011). In the case where the public good is an open-
access common-pool resource, such as the ocean ﬁsheries, an increase of the number of 
participants is negatively related to achieving cooperation (Weissing and Ostrom, 1991; 
Ostrom, 2001). 
 
In section 5.1, we have already several times alluded to the notion that compliance is more 
likely when the people (in this case: fishers) whose behaviour needs to be regulated, buy-in 
to the rules. Fisheries management is in many cases a top-down bureaucratic exercise with 
centralized control (Daw and Gray, 2005). The regulations are viewed by the ﬁshers as 
opposing rather than supporting their interests and this manifests itself as a reduced 
compliance to ‘the letter’ as well as ‘the spirit’ of the regulations (Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; 
Hatcher et al., 2000; Nielsen, 2003; Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003; Kraak, 2011). The 
crowding-out hypothesis states that the willingness to obey regulations voluntarily depends 
on whether one is controlled or not (Bowles, 2008; Richter and van Soest, 2012). 
Counterintuitively, the tendency to control undermines any intrinsic motivations to comply 
voluntarily. The reason is that control signals mistrust, which directly affects other motivational 
factors, such as cooperation, reciprocity or being a good citizen. As a result, there is a hidden 
cost of control, as pointed out by Falk and Kosfeld (2006). The disturbing implication is that 
control can crowd out intrinsic motivations, calling for even stronger control, leading to a 
vicious cycle of mistrust and strong controls. Behavioural economics has established that 
regulations that are chosen by the individuals (for example via voting) are obeyed more, as 
they are perceived to be more legitimate (Vyrastekova and van Soest, 2003). It is apparent 
from the work of Ostrom that self-imposed rules and self-imposed sanctions work better 
(Ostrom, 2009). 
 
Indeed, fisheries systems can be characterized by mutual mistrust, between regulators 
and fishers, between scientists and fishers, and among fishers themselves. Usually fishers are 
not expected to voluntarily take action to fish more sustainably. Often the institutional set-up 
is such that fishers are perceived as the antagonists. The key challenge for European fisheries 
is not to prevent the erosion of social capital, since there may be very little left – if it was 
there in the first place. Instead, the key question is how one can crowd in desirable behaviour 
by establishing a trusting relationship. The problem seems to be how to make the transition 
from the current institutional dysfunction and inertia. Rebuilding of mutual trust is likely 
a key issue, but this cannot be done simply on a short time scale. 
 
The lack of trust may be exacerbated by the fact that fishers have lost respect for the rules 
and regulations because many of them do not seem to make sense, seem contradictory, or 
seem to provide perverse incentives. Also the new CFP is perceived by fishers to suffer from 
these problems. With the RBM approach with its fewer and simplified rules the challenge is to 
avoid contradictory rules and perverse incentives by careful design. As discussed above, 
this involves a thorough understanding about how fishers respond to “carrots” and “sticks” and 
to being watched. 
 
In Europe there seems to be very little trust towards regulation among the fishers because of 
the top-down structure of EU fisheries management. There seems to be more room for self-
decision and co-decision in the US (co-decision here meaning between regulators and 
fishers): on the US east coast the groundfish fisheries have collective quota programs, and on 
the US west coast fishers pool their quota (Holland and Jannot, 2012). These groups can set 
their own rules, not necessarily encoded in law, which means rules can more easily be 
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changed. These people were not necessarily connected in communities before; they came 
together because they have a common problem that can best be solved by collective 
action. For example, in mixed fisheries where vulnerable bycatch species effectively become 
the choke species, it is profitable to join in groups and share the individual small bycatch 
quota. In the case of New England, the fishers could choose their group, whereas in Alaska 
they were assigned to one. Several economic experiments have established that group choice 
is a key point to facilitate cooperative behaviour. If individuals can self-select into groups, 
there is a larger tendency to act in the group’s interest and also to coordinate on a common 
cooperative strategy (Brekke et al., 2011; Gurerk et al., 2006). Also in Europe there are 
examples of fishers voluntarily pooling their quotas: in a Danish village, boat owners and 
fishers have established a cooperative company where they have bought quotas jointly, with 
the aim of securing the community of its present and future catch rights (Schou, 2011). In 
that way, the cooperative company replaces the Danish state as provider and guarantor of 
fishing rights (Schou, 2011).  
 
Large group size and anonymity may be among the causes of the apparent lack of trust. 
Social capital and intrinsic motivation to cooperate tends to be higher in small groups of people 
who regularly interact with each other in non-anonymous ways. Indeed, as shown above, 
examples exist of fishers who have built up social networks and individual allegiances. It would 
seem therefore that a key principle of eliciting positive behaviour in the regulation of fisheries 
could be facilitating the organisation of fishers in small groups, and promoting interaction 
between the managers and the fishers at this group level. 
 
On the other hand, the in-group/out-group setting of industry versus managers (or 
scientists or non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) may drive fisheries representatives to 
follow the ‘party line’ and ‘fight to the last ton’ in consultations, whereas autonomous 
individuals could perhaps be more flexible. Institutional inertia or ‘group think’ can be a big 
impediment to achieving common objectives of sustainability. In the current system, fishers 
can be disempowered and become victims of institutional forces from above that are trying to 
control them. In order to increase social capital, it can be much more effective to bring the 
dialogue to the individual level. Individuals of different stakeholder groups could sit at the 
same table and express their interests and preferences in iterative rounds. This way, the 
individuals with different interests ‘get a face’ and these individual expressions may trigger 
other individuals to re-evaluate their conditions, perhaps leading to greater areas of consensus 
(Kraak et al., 2015).  
 
Fishers may often distrust scientists (and vice versa). Kraak et al. (2015) discussed several 
reasons for this lack of trust and provided examples of possible solutions. Industry-science 
collaborative projects could be set up (building mutual trust) in which fishers could try new 
practices and scientists explore the consequences. In the US as well as in Europe various 
scientist-facilitated initiatives are arising where scientists process and display information that 
fishers provide to share among themselves, for example on catch per unit effort (CPUE) 
hotspots or bycatch rates of species that need to be avoided so that fishers can catch their 
quotas at lower impact to the ecosystem (e.g. O'Keefe and DeCelles, 2013; Hetherington, 
2014). In collaboration with scientists the fishing industry can create fishery management 
plans which comply with management policies. In the Netherlands fishing organisations have 
started to hire ex government scientists to help them check the assessments and advice and 
develop plans.  
 
The theory of crowding out does not only state that control may undermine intrinsic 
motivations to comply, but also that monetary incentives may undermine such motivations. In 
experiments and in the ﬁeld it has been found that sometimes ﬁnancial incentives induced 
more self-interested behaviour, even after they were withdrawn (Bowles, 2008). For example, 
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in a study by Cardenas et al. (2000) experiments were run with people in rural Colombia who 
are confronted with a common pool problem in their daily life. In the experiment subjects were 
asked to decide how much timber to extract from a forest. The scenario presented was that 
harvesting had an adverse effect on water quality (as is actually the case in the study region), 
posing a cost on everyone in the group. The game was played ﬁrst without any regulations in 
place, while at a later stage an extraction norm was introduced that was enforced by a mild 
probabilistic ﬁne. Cardenas et al. (2000) found that subjects reduced their extraction level 
immediately after the regulation was introduced, but started extracting more aggressively 
after realizing that consequences were rather mild. Strikingly, in the last rounds, extraction 
levels were higher with the regulation than without. As a result, payoffs were signiﬁcantly 
lower when individuals were confronted with a formal rule than in its absence; the weak 
ofﬁcial rule interacted with the internal norms of the subjects and destroyed their intrinsic 
motivation to cooperate. Richter and van Soest (2012) reviewed similar experiments, such as 
the one where imposing a fine on parents arriving late to collect their children at day care 
increased the number of late-coming parents, or the one where small honoraria for seminar 
speakers may increase the probability of declining the invitation. These results suggest that 
the application of non-monetary incentives in fisheries management should be explored, 
along with other factors enhancing intrinsic motivation such as moral reminders, non-
anonymity, small group size, face-to-face communication. Nevertheless, Bowles (2008) as well 
as Richter and van Soest (2012) warn that the loss of social capital may, to a high extent, be 
irreversible and that from the reviewed experiments it cannot simply be concluded that 
regulations or sanctions should be abolished. 
5.3. Voluntary compliance 
In most countries, the standard approach to obtaining fisher compliance is to deter rule 
violations through investments in enforcement activities, including at-sea patrols, dockside 
monitoring, and observer programs. This approach is built on the assumption that the 
occurrence of fishery offenses is solely a function of the perceived costs and benefits of 
an offense, such as the gains derived from the rule violation, the likelihood of detection, and 
the severity of the penalties (Becker, 1974). However, modern criminology (e.g., Tyler, 2006) 
and behavioural economics (Mazar et al., 2008) recognize that many people comply with rules, 
either in part or full, because they believe it is the right thing to do. For instance, tax 
compliance is much higher than deterrence models would predict (Frey and Torgler, 2007). 
Conversely, a study among Danish fishers (Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003) reported that they 
“feel they are taken hostage by an illegitimate management system, and thus feel it is morally 
correct not to comply”. When we witness unethical behaviour, our own morality erodes (Ariely, 
2012). Cheating can be socially contagious (Gino et al., 2009): as long as we see members of 
our own social groups behaving in ways that are dishonest, it is likely that we too will 
recalibrate our internal moral compass and adopt their behaviour as a model for our own. Tax 
compliance, for example, varies widely across European countries and a high correlation has 
been found between perceived tax evasion and tax morale (Frey and Torgler, 2007). And if the 
member of the in-group happens to be an authority figure – a parent, senior manager, 
teacher, or someone else we respect – chances are even higher that we will be dragged along. 
Individuals may even feel pride about breaking the rules, resulting in groups of people 
committing crimes because everyone is doing it. Perhaps compliance could be enhanced by 
publishing stories of complying fishers in the fishing press and thereby foster pride about 
sustainable fishing practices. 
 
In laboratory experiments Mazar et al. (2008) found that (1) the amount of dishonesty is 
largely insensitive to either the expected external benefits or the costs associated with the 
deceptive acts; (2) causing people to become more aware of their internal standards for 
honesty by moral priming decreases their tendency for deception; and (3) increasing the 
`degrees of freedom´ that people have to interpret their actions increases their tendency 
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for deception. For instance, Mazar et al. (2008) found that non-monetary crime targets (i.e., 
property rather than money) can increase economically incentivized dishonesty in a laboratory 
setting. Similar laboratory studies by Mead et al. (2009) found that mental tiredness also 
increases cheating. These two studies suggest that violation of fishing regulations could at 
least in part be exacerbated by a lack of moral reminders, the opportunity to steal a non-
monetary asset (i.e., fish), and the mental tiredness of fishers. Mazar et al. (2008) suggest 
that understanding dishonesty has important implications for designing effective methods to 
curb it. The costs of obtaining a particular level of fisheries compliance through enforcement 
activities could potentially be reduced through complementary investments in activities that 
increase voluntary compliance. 
 
Studies (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008) have indicated that honesty can be enhanced by asking 
people to sign a statement in which they declare their commitment to honesty before taking 
part in a task rather than after (e.g. signing the honesty statement on the tax income 
declaration form at the top rather than at the bottom). In fisheries this finding could be applied 
by making fishers sign the logbook at the top / in the beginning (Kraak et al., 2015). The 
e-log system could have a confirmation screen which requires the operator to acknowledge 
that they are filling the form out accurately before the electronic system can receive data input 
(Kraak et al., 2015). This could be combined with a picture of “watching eyes” displayed on the 
screen (see the above discussion of ‘being watched’) (Kraak et al., 2015). 
5.4. Quota allocation, transferability, ITQ, group quotas 
It is generally thought that individual transferable quotas (ITQ) can alleviate overcapacity 
and facilitate balancing of the catches to the quotas (Costello et al., 2008) (provided that the 
catches are monitored and the catch limits enforced). The capital that is thus set free can be 
used for other purposes (Schou, 2011). In the face of catch quotas under the LO, it would be 
of great benefit to facilitate quota transferability not only within but also between Member 
States (see also Zimmermann et al., 2015). ITQ are often considered to have negative 
societal effects such as capital concentration and closure of coastal communities. This 
can be mitigated by designing ITQ management to serve societal policies in terms of structural 
development of the fleet and allocation priorities (Schou, 2011). Policy can for example restrict 
concentration of ITQ ownership, define fleet segments with no inter-segment transferability, 
reserve quota shares for coastal fisheries or geographical regions, and facilitate new entry e.g. 
young fishers entry (Schou, 2011), and they should perhaps not necessarily be handed out for 
free and in perpetuity. Instead fishing rights could be handed out through a lottery or bidding 
system (Bromley, 2009).  
 
Group-allocated catch shares may foster social motives and cooperation (although it can 
also bring back the ‘race for fish’ among the group members that the individual quota system 
aims to bring an end to). Fisheries management could set up a structure in which several 
levels of organisation are offered to which individual fishers can opt-in (e.g. voluntary 
pooling of quotas); each levels has its benefits and costs, but because the individuals can 
choose themselves, there would be greater acceptance of the disadvantages of the chosen 
setting.  
 
Operating in groups/cooperatives may be more or less attractive to fishers: a perceived 
advantage may be risk sharing and a perceived disadvantage may be that the individual 
surrenders his individual decision-making for the sake of democratic group decision-making. 
However, if self-decision in small groups and bottom-up designing of rules is deemed to 
promote compliance and ‘prosocial’ behaviour, Member States may want to design policies 
where operating in groups/cooperatives is incentivized, e.g., by giving more freedom 
from top-down regulations to groups/cooperatives than to individuals.  
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There are significant costs of managing a group/cooperative that need to be covered. To the 
extent that social behaviour of fishers in small groups decreases the negative 
externalities to society caused by non-compliance, overfishing, capital concentration, etc., 
policies can be designed that effectively subsidize those groups/cooperatives. This can be 
done in the form of setting aside a portion of the Member State’s quota for such social 
initiatives, or else by financial instruments. 
5.5. Conclusions and recommendations 
In conclusion, much of the past implementation error has been caused because the complex 
top-down control and lack of trust have undermined potential intrinsic motivation to fish 
sustainably. Compliance is not necessarily a function of the economical pros and cons of rule 
violation: compliance may be higher or lower, depending on intrinsic motivations. An 
increased level of self-decision may lead to more buy-in to sustainable fishing practices and 
voluntary compliance to catch limits and the LO. All else being equal, people in small and 
self-selected groups are inherently more likely to behave “prosocial”. However, transition 
towards a system allowing for more freedom from top-down regulation, with more self-
governance, may be difficult. Some key recommendations are given below. 
 Let actors choose, in a quid-pro-quo tiered approach, between various levels of 
realisable fishing opportunities with relative freedom from prescriptive measures while 
paying the appropriate (monetary, psychological) costs of FDF. 
 Increase regulators’ trust of fishers through FDF. 
 Increase fishers’ trust of regulators by designing simpler legislation, with non-
contradictory rules, not leading to perverse incentives. 
 Increase fishers’ trust of scientists and scientists’ trust of fishers by setting up 
industry-science partnerships and collaborative research. 
 Increase fishers’ mutual trust and their intrinsic motivations to fish sustainably 
by facilitating and encouraging fishers to organise themselves in small groups with 
common interests. 
 Allow for several levels of organisation to choose from and allow for self-selecting of 
group membership. 
 Incentivize the organisation of fishers into groups through the provision of, e.g., extra 
quota, relative freedom from top-down regulation, or through financial 
instruments.  
 Allow for self-decision within small groups of fishers, where their own rules and 
sanctions do not necessarily have to be coded in law. 
 Allow groups of fishers to decide themselves on the methods of FDF. 
 Do not only rely on monetary incentives and monetary penalties; these may crowd 
out intrinsic motivations. 
 Publish good (and bad?) behaviour of named fishers in the (local or fishers’) press. 
Publishing good behaviour of named fishers may be a non-monetary incentive 
because it fosters pride of being a sustainable (good) fisher. Publishing bad behaviour 
of named fishers may be a non-monetary incentive because it poses the threat of social 
exclusion; but a perverse effect may be that it fosters pride of behaving badly and the 
bad behaviour becomes contagious. To be on the safe side, stay with publishing good 
behaviour only. 
 Establish QR codes (Quick Response Codes) that link a product to an individual 
fisher to foster pride of being a sustainable fisher. 
 Use moral reminders in the e-log software, such as pictures of watching eyes on the 
screen and a requirement to sign a statement of accurate reporting at the start of their 
e-log session. 
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